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IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS, 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANUES, 
a Minnesota corporation, 
Supreme Court Case No. 34375 
Defendant-Respondent. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
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ldaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriter vs. Northland lnsurance Companies 
ldaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriter vs. Northland lnsurance Companies 
Date Code User Judae 
NCOC 
COMP 
SMFl 
AFOS 
ANSW 
CCWOODCL 
CCWOODCL 
CCWOODCL 
CCTEELAL 
CCWOODCL 
New Case Filed - Other Claims Darla Williamson 
Complaint Filed Darla Williamson 
Summons Filed Darla Williamson 
Affidavit Of Service 9.21.06 Darla Williamson 
Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial Darla Williamson 
(D. Farley for Northland) 
Order for Scheduling Conference Darla Williamson 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Darla Williamson 
11/30/2006 01:15 PM) 
Notice Of Service of Discovery Requests Darla Williamson 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Darla Williamson 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintift's Motion for Darla Williamson 
Partial Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Lynnette McHenry in Support of Darla Williamson 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing on Summary Judgment and Darla Williamson 
Scheduling Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Darla Williamson 
Judgment 02/01/2007 01:30 PM) 
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Darla Williamson 
Stipulation to Extend Time for Briefs on Motion Darla Williamson 
for Partial Summary Judgment 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on Darla Williamson 
11/30/2006 01:15 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Order Amending Scheduling Order on Summary Darla Williamson 
Judgment 
Notice Of Trial Setting Darla Williamson 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/03/2007 09:OO Darla Williamson 
AM) 
Deft Northland lnsurance Companies' Rule 56 (f) Darla Williamson 
Motion RE: ldaho Counties Risk Management 
Program Underwriters' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Support of Motion Darla Williamson 
Notice of Hearing (Jan 25,2007 @ 1:30pm) Darla Williamson 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Darla Williamson 
Judgment 01/25/2007 01:30 PM) 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Darla Williamson 
Partial Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Brian r. Martens in Support of Darla Williamson 
Response 
RMK9 
HRSC 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
NOTS 
MOSJ 
MEMO 
CCWOODCL 
CCCHILER 
CCCHILER 
AFFD CCCHILER 
NOHG DCKORSJP 
HRSC DCKORSJP 
STlP 
STlP 
MCBIEHKJ 
MCBIEHKJ 
HRVC DCOLSOMA 
ORDR DCOLSOMA 
NOTC 
HRSC 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
CCMAXWSL MOTN 
AFFD 
NOTC 
HRSC 
CCMAXWSL 
CCMAXWSL 
CCMAXWSL 
RSPN CCMAXWSL 
AFFD CCMAXWSL 
Memorandum in Opposition To Defendant's Rule Darla Williamso~ 
56(f) Affidavit .. 000603 MEMO CCLEONCR 
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Date Code User Judse 
MEMO CCWATSCL 
CCCHILER 
Reply Memorandum in Support of ICRMP's Darla Williamson 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
MOTN Defendant Northland Insurance Companies' Darla Williamson 
Motion to Compel, and Motion for Fees and 
Costs 
Affidavit of Bryan A Nickels in Support of Darla Williamson 
Defendant Northland lnsurance Companies' 
Motion to Compel, and Motion for Fees and 
Costs 
Notice Of Hearing (1125/07 @ 1:30pm) Darla Williamson 
Notice Of Service Darla Williamson 
Northland Insurance Company's Motion to Darla Williamson 
Shorten Time Re: Motion to Compel and Motion 
for Fees and Costs 
Notice Of Withdrawal of Defendant Northland Darla Williamson 
lnsurance Companies' Motion to Compel & 
Motion for Fees & Costs 
Affidavit in Furtherance of Motion and In Darla Williamson 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Brief Re: Motion and In Opposition to Plaintiffs Darla Williamson 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Darla Williamson 
Judgment held on 01/25/2007 01:30 PM: 
Interim Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Darla Williamson 
held on 02/01/2007 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Darla Williamson 
Judgment 05/03/2007 01:30 PM) 
Defendant Northland Insurance Companies' Darla Williamson 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Northland Darla Williamson 
lnsurance Companies' Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Affidavit of Brian R Martens in Support of Motion Darla Williamson 
for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Bryan A Nickels in Support of Darla Williamson 
Defendant Northland lnsurance Company's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Defendant Northland Insurance Companies' Darla Williamson 
Motion for Overlength Brief and Memorandum in 
Support 
Affidavit of Donald J Farley in Support of Darla Williamson 
Defendant Northland lnsurance Company's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing (513107 @ 1 :30pm) oarla ~ i l l i a m s o @ 0 0 8 ~ 6  
AFSM CCCHILER 
NOHG 
NOTS 
MOTN 
CCCHILER 
CCWRIGRM 
CCAMESLC 
NOWD CCNAVATA 
AFFD CCAMESLC 
BREF 
INHD 
CCAMESLC 
DCKORSJP 
HRVC 
HRSC 
MOTN 
MEMO 
DCKORSJP 
DCKORSJP 
CCCHILER 
CCCHILER 
AFFD 
AFFD 
CCCHILER 
CCCHILER 
MOTN CCCHILER 
AFFD CCCHILER 
CCCHILER 
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ORDR DCOLSOMA Order Granting Defendant Northland lnsurance Darla Williamson 
Companies' Motion for Overlength Brief and 
Memeorandum in Support 
Notice Of Service Darla Williamson 
Notice of Hearing re: Motion for Summary Darla Williamson 
Judgment (5/17/07 @ 1:30 pm) 
Notice Of Service Darla Williamson 
Stipulation Re Summary Judgment Briefing Darla Williamson 
Deadlines 
Order Granting Stipulation RE: Summary Darla Williamson 
Judgment Briefing Deadlines 
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment Darla Williamson 
Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Darla Williamson 
Judgment 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Darla Williamson 
held on 05/03/2007 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Reply in Support of Defendant Northland Darla Williamson 
lnsurance Companies Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Darla Williamson 
held on 05/17/2007 01:30 PM: Interim Hearing 
Held 
Order Granting Plaintiffs Partial Motion for Darla Williamson 
Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosure Darla Williamson 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 12/03/2007 Darla Williamson 
09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 
Civil Disposition entered for: Northland lnsurance Darla Williamson 
Companies, Defendant; ldaho Counties Risk 
Management Program Underwriter, Plaintiff. 
order date: 611 112007--Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment Granted 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Darla Williamson 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
Judgment Darla Williamson 
Northland lnsurance Companies Memorandum of Darla Williamson 
Costs 
Affidavit of Counsel Darla Williamson 
Objection to Memo of Costs Darla Williamson 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Darla Williamson 
Defendant's Reply in Support of Northland Darla Williamson 
lnsurance Companies' Memorandum of Costs 
Request for Additional Documents on Appeal Darla ~ i l l i a m s o ~ @ g ~ ~  $ 
Notice Of Hearing Darla Williamson 
NOTS 
NOTC 
MCBIEHKJ 
MCBIEHKJ 
NOTS 
STlP 
MCBIEHKJ 
CCTEELAL 
ORDR DCOLSOMA 
RSPS 
AFFD 
CCAMESLC 
CCAMESLC 
HRVC DCKORSJP 
RPLY CCWRIGRM 
DCKORSJP 
ORDR DCKORSJP 
MlSC 
HRVC 
CCCHILER 
DCOLSOMA 
DCOLSOMA 
DCOLSOMA DEOP 
JDMT 
MEMO 
DCKORSJP 
CCWRIGRM 
AFFD 
OBJT 
APSC 
RPLY 
CCWRIGRM 
CCAMESLC 
CCTHIEBJ 
CCDWONCP 
MlSC 
NOHG 
CCTOONAL 
CCBARCCR 
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711 612007 HRSC CCBARCCR Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Darla Williamson 
08/22/2007 02:45 PM) Def Memo of Costs 
8/22/2007 HRWV DCKORSJP Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Darla Williamson 
08/22/2007 02:45 PM: Hearing Waived Def 
Memo of Costs 
8/23/2007 AMEN CCCHILER Amended Notice of Hearing Darla Williamson 
HRSC CCCHILER Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Darla Williamson 
09/12/2007 02:45 PM) Memo of Costs 
911 212007 INHD DCKORSJP Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Darla Williamson 
09/12/2007 02:45 PM: Interim Hearing Held 
Memo of Costs 
9/20/2007 DEOP DCOLSOMA Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiff's Darla Williamson 
Objection to Costs 
Phillip J. Collaer, ISB No. 3447 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, ldaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-551 0 
E-Mail: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
a Minnesota corporation, 
Defendant. I 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
Fee Category: A1 , $88 
COMES NOW, the plaintiff, ldaho Counties Risk Management Program 
Underwriters ("ICRMP), by and through its attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian and 
Hull, and for a claim against the defendant Northland Insurance Company complains 
and alleges as follows: 
1. 
Plaintiff, ICRMP, is a joint powers entity with its principal place of business in 
Boise, Idaho. Plaintiff was, at all times relevant t o  this action, duly authorized to 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
conduct business relating to the sale and adjustment of insurance sold to its members 
within the state of ldaho. 
11. 
Northland insurance Company ("Northland") is a Minnesota corporation 
engaged in the business of selling casualty insurance and reinsurance in the state of 
Idaho. 
111. 
Northland applied for and was issued a Certificate of Authority by the ldaho 
Department of Insurance authorizing Northland to transact insurance within the state 
of ldaho. 
IV. 
Northland has engaged in the business of selling insurance policies to  
individuals and entities such as ICRMP within the state of ldaho. 
v. 
All acts and events alleged herein have occurred in Ada County, state of ldaho. 
The amount in controversy exceed $10,000. This Court maintains jurisdiction and 
venue pursuant to ldaho Code § § 1-705 and 5-404. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
VI. 
That ICRMP was formed in 1985 pursuant to a Joint Powers Resolution 
executed by various governmental entities, including Kootenai County. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
VII. 
That Kootenai County has been a member of ICRMP from 1985 to the present 
time. During that time, Kootenai County had purchased insurance policies from 
ICRMP. Each ICRMP policy provided comprehensive general liability and errors and 
omission coverage subject to certain conditions, exceptions, definitions, and 
limitations. 
VIII. 
Since its inception, and including the time the Paradis v. Kootenai County 
lawsuit was filed (See Exhibit A), ICRMP has purchased reinsurance from Northland. 
The reinsurance policies were purchased on an annual basis for the purpose of 
limiting ICRMP's financial exposure for claims covered by the ICRMP policies arising 
out of claims or lawsuits brought against ICRMP insureds. 
IX. 
That, in 2003, Kootenai County, the Kootenai County Commissioners, and 
former employees of Kootenai County were named as defendants in a civil lawsuit 
filed by Donald Paradis in the Federal District Court for the District of Idaho. See 
Exhibit A attached hereto. 
X. 
In accordance with the terms and conditions of the insurance policy it had 
purchased from ICRMP, Kootenai County, on behalf of itself and its current and 
former employees, notified ICRMP of the lawsuit and requested that the company 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 
provide a defense to the litigation and indemnify the county, its current and former 
employees for all claims described in the Paradis Complaint. 
XI. 
In accordance with the terms and conditions of the reinsurance policies ICRMP 
had purchased, ICRMP notified Northland of the Paradis lawsuit and forwarded a copy 
of the Paradis Complaint to Northland at its offices in St. Paul, Minnesota. 
Xll. 
After reviewing the Paradis Complaint, ICRMP notified its insureds that while 
certain conditions and exclusions within the ICRMP policy may be applicable, it 
appeared the allegations in the Complaint created a duty to defend the lawsuit. 
Kootenai County was sent a reservation of rights letter advising it of the company's 
position relative to coverage and reserving all rights under the insurance contract to 
later deny coverage and withdraw the defense. See Exhibit B attached hereto. 
XIII. 
Northland was provided copies of the reservation of rights letter (Exhibit 9) 
identified in Paragraph Xll, above. 
XIV. 
ICRMP retained various law firms to  defend Kootenai County, as well as its 
current and former employees. 
x v .  
Throughout the Paradis litigation, ICRMP routinely communicated with 
Northland providing the defendant with written reports regarding the status of the 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4 
litigation, as well as the costs which were being incurred in the defense of the 
insureds. 
XVI. 
On February 13, 2006, Northland sent ICRMP a letter stating its belief that 
coverage for the Paradis lawsuit did not exist under the Northland reinsurance policy 
purchased by ICRMP. See Exhibit C attached hereto. 
XVII. 
Correspondence was exchanged between ICRMP and Northland regarding the 
defendant's position that coverage did not exist for the Paradis lawsuit. See Exhibits 
D and E attached hereto. Despite Northland's denial of coverage, ICRMP continued 
to provide regular reports advising Northland of the status of the Paradis litigation and 
the costs which were being incurred defending its insureds. 
XVIII. 
On June 27, 2006, Northland was advised by ICRMP that settlement 
discussions had commenced in the Paradis litigation and that a mediation was 
scheduled. Northland's participation in the mediation process was solicited. See 
Exhibit F attached hereto. 
XIX. 
On June 27, 2006, ICRMP presented a billing to  Northland seeking 
reimbursement for defense costs which had been paid by ICRMP. At  that point, the 
defense costs paid by ICRMP exceeded the self insured retention (SIR) provided in the 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5 
Northland policy. All defense costs or indemnity obligations exceeding the SIR were 
the obligation of Northland. 
XX. 
Northland responded to ICRMP's request for its participation in the mediation 
and the billing for reimbursement of defense costs by letter dated July 20, 2006. 
Northland refused to reimburse ICRMP for defense costs and also declined to 
participate in the mediation. See Exhibit G attached hereto. 
XXI. 
On August 8, 2006, a mediation in the Paradis case was conducted by the 
Honorable Larry M. Boyle. During mediation, the parties were able to  reach a 
settlement whereby the ICRMP insureds agreed to  pay $900,000 in return for a 
complete release and dismissal of the Paradis lawsuit with prejudice. 
XXII. 
The settlement described in YXXI, above, was memorialized in a Mutual 
Release, Indemnity, and Settlement Agreement ("Release Agreement"), which was 
signed by Mr. Paradis and the ICRMP insureds. After the Release Agreement was 
signed, the settlement funds were paid to  Mr. Paradis and the lawsuit against the 
ICRMP insureds was dismissed. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (BREACH OF CONTRACT) 
XXIII. 
Northland, by its correspondence with ICRMP, indicated its intention to breach 
the terms and conditions of the policies of reinsurance which had been purchased by 
ICRMP. 
XXIV. 
Northland, by its refusal to reimburse ICRMP for defense costs exceeding the 
SIR breached the policies of reinsurance ICRMP purchased from Northland Insurance 
Company. 
x x v .  
Northland, by its refusal to attend mediation and participate in settlement 
discussions breached the terms and conditions of the policies of reinsurance which 
ICRMP had purchased from Northland Insurance Company. 
XXVI. 
ICRMP has suffered damages in the form of monies it has paid in excess of the 
SIR, in the defense and settlement of the Paradis v. Kootenai County, et a1 litigation. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for judgment to be entered against the 
defendant in an amount which exceeds the Court's jurisdictional limits of $10,000 as 
will sufficiently compensate the plaintiff for its general and special damages, along 
with reasonable costs, prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and such other and 
further relief as the Court may deem just. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 7 
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff ldaho Counties Risk Management Underwriters hereby demands a 
trial by jury on all issues. 
DATED this /L/ day of September, 2006. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
BY 
Phillia J. Collaer, Of the Firm Attornevs for 
plainiff ldaho Counties Risk ~ a n a ~ e h e n t  
Underwriters 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 8 
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WIT.LTAM L. MAUK (ISR # 1825) ;; v ., , L  ! : . . .  .:,.;,-,- , ! ,  
MAUK & BURGOYNE 
.. 
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5 15 South Sixth Street . ,. . < .  ~ , ,  .: , . .  t , : :  u 
Post Oflicc Box 1743 
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f;acsimilc: (208) 345-3319 
Attonleys for Plainriff 
UNITED SSATRS DISTRICT COURT 
DTSTRIC'S OP IDAHO 
'DONALD M. P A W I S ,  
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WILLIAM 3. BRADY, individually andin his 
orlicial capacity; KOOTENAT COUNTY, u 
political subdivision of the Svirte of Idaho; 
GLEN E. WALKEK, it~dividually and in his 
capacity as the formcr Kootenai County 
Prosecutor; D. MARC HAWS; PEIXR C. 
ERBLAND; GEORGE EI,LIOTT, individually 
and in their capacities as ugents of Kootcnai 
County; W ~ D O E S  A through I), fictitiously- 
namcd persons, 
FEE PA10 
R#ASf@- 
) 
) CASE NO. 
\,!. -- -. 
COMES NOW thc Plaintiff, above named, and for causes of action against the 
Dcfcndmts, stales, avers and allcgcs as follows: 
COMPLAINT AND DIEMAN13 FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
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Case Document 1 Filed 041091 
+ 
1.  Thib is  a civil action to redrcss various torts and the deprivation of civil rights 
- hrnught under the constitutions and laws of the United Statcs and the State of Idaho, as herein 
more particiilarly described. 
JURISDICTION A.Nn VENUE 
2. Thc jurisdiction of this Court is invoked and sccured pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
Section 133 1, affording federal questio~~jurisdicl.ion, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332, affording divcrsity 
jurisdiction, and 28 IJ.S.C. Scction 1343, affordingjurisdiction for violations or civil rights. 
3. Because there is a common nucleus of opcrative fwts affecting Plainliff's statc 
8lld federal claims, this Court has pcndctit jurisdiclion over the stnte claims pursuant to 28 1J.S.C. 
Section 1367. 
4. Venue is propcrly set in the Disttict of Idaho in that almost a11 of thc acts and 
omissions which form the bilsis of this Complaint occurrcd in Idaho, Plaintiff is a citizen and 
resident of Ada County, Idaho, the Dcfcndmt, Kootenai Counry is a govemmcntal subdivision of 
thc State of Idaho, and all other Defendants, cxcept one, are eilizcns and resi&nLs of this state. 
PARTIES 
5. Plinlirf'Donald M. Paradis ("Pilradis") resides in Roise, Ada County, Idaho and 
is a citizen of thc State of Idaho. For ovcr twenty years, Lmm June 23, 1380 until April 10,2001 
hc was incimrceratcd in  various jails and prisons, including the Kootenai County jail and in the 
Idaho State Correctional Institution at Boise, Idaho. 
6 .  Dcfenddnt Kootenai County (the "County") is, and tit ull times pcttinent hereto 
was, a political and govcrnlnental subdivision of the State of Idaho, and included among its 
govemmcntal agencies the ofiiccs of the Pwseculing Attorney of Kuotenai County and the 
Sheriff of Kooteniii County. 
COMB1,AINT AND DEMAND ti'OR JURY TRIAI. 2 
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5 7. Dcfendant William J. Brady ("Ur. Brady") is, and at all times pertinent hcrcto 
- was, a citizen and residcnt of the State or Oregon. Although at various titncs pertinent to this 
action, Dr. Brady wirs employed by thc State of Oregon as its Chief Medical Examiner, all of his 
conduct which forms the basis of ihis action was performed eithcr as. a private cili2.en or as tthc 
cmployee and agent of Kootcnni County. 
8. Dcfcndant Glen E. Walker ("Walker") is, and at a11 timcs pertinent hereto was, a 
ci6;lcn and resident or Kootenai County. At times most pertinent t o  this aclii~n, Walker wits the 
elected Prosecuting Attorney or Kootcnai County and the chief policy und decision-makcr 
affecting the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by the County. 
9. Defendiint D. Marc Haws ("llaws") is, and for most of the time pwtinont hcrcto 
was, a citizen and resident of thc State of Icltlhu, lormerly rcsidiug in KoaLenai County and 
currently rcsiding in Ada County. At timcs inost pertinent LO this action, Haws was employcd as 
the Chief Dcputy Prosecuting Attorney of Kootenai County. 
10. Derendant Pctcr C. Erbland ("Erbland") is, and at :ill times pertincnt hereto was, a 
citizen and residcnt of the State of Idaho, residing in Kooteniii County. At times most perlinetit 
lo this action, Brblimd was employcd as a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County. 
1 I. Defendant Cieorge Elliott is, and at till times pertincnt hcrcto was, acilixen and 
resident or the Statc of Idaho, residing in Koatcnai County. At times most pertinent to this 
action, Elliott wtls employed ae a dcrcctive with the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department. 
12. With rcsycct to the state torts allegcd hcrcin, Defendants Walkcr, Haws, Erbland, 
Elliott and Dr. Brady iire sucd as the agents of Kootenai County, insofar ss their conduct was 
within the course and scope of thcir employments m d  agencies. For the purpose of  Plaintiff's 
claims for violations of civil rights undcr color of state law, and for thc purpose of state tort 
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claims whcrc their conduct was in cxccss or oulsidt: of thc authorities uf'lheir agencies, these 
Defendants are sucd in their individual capacities. 
13. Defendants, DOES A through D, arc fictitiously-named persons or entities, whosc 
true identities are. prcsc~~ily unknown ti) Plaintiff, but each of whom is responsible, in wholc or 
part, Tor thc wroongful conduct allcgcd herein. Plainlit? rcscrves the right to amcnd this 
Complaint, as furthct. infotlnatio~l becomes available, to properly idcntify the tr& namcs of such 
Dcfcndiints and the specific acts and omissions giving rise to their liability. 
'14. Certain facts allegcd hcrcin, attributable to crnployees and agents of Kootenai 
County, are imputed to and thc legal responsihility of the County by virtue of the principles of 
agency, the doctrine of rcsporu2eu.t supsrior and statr statutes and case law authorizing such 
imputation of' re%pons~biIity. 
15. To the degree the acts and omissions of any putative agent and crnployee of 
Kootenai County were outside of Lhe scopc and responsibility of his or her agency or 
ernploymcnt, such persons are sticd in  their individual capacities and are i n t e n d  to be included 
among the fictitiously namcd Defendants. 
16. prior to commenccmcnt of this action, on October 9,2001, Plaintiff served a 
Notice of Tort Claim on the duly authorized agenls of Kootcnai County, in compliance with 
Chapter 9, Titlc 6, Idaho C d e .  
17. To the extent this suit allcges violution of Plaintiff's civil ~ights, he seeks tcdress 
from this Court and an assessnlent of liiihilily and damages agsinxt thosc Dcfcndai~ts who 
deprived him of his civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C., Scctiok~s 1383 and 1985. 
COMP1,AINT AND DEMAND FOR JUKY TRIAL - 4 
K\WnKt~nAUK\PARADiS\Civil S!iit\WZ l:mnpldnt.&il: 
Case Document 1 Filed Page 5 of 30 
CIONTEXTUAL HISTORY 
18. Tn 1980 and 1981, Donald M. Paradis was wrongfully irccused, prosccutcd and 
cot~victed in thc State of Idaho of tfie first dcpcc murder of Kimberly Ann Palmer ("Palmer") 
and scntcnced to death. 
19. His wrest, incwceratiou, proi;ecution and conviction wwe the product of a 
conspiracy amc>ng thc Dcfcndants, resulting in the repcaed presentation of perjurcd tcstimony 
against him and, for fifteen years, ihc deliberate, wdicious w d  chronic hiding of evidence of his 
innocence rrom him, his attorneys, the jury that convicted him and numerous cbl~rts and judges. 
20. h January 1996, Paradis and his attorneys discovered thc existence of 
handwritten ncrtcs madc by the attorney who proswutcd his case, Haws, (hewin tho "Haws 
Notcs") revealing evidence and information which contradicted and impcached the testimony 
snd opinions cxptrsscd at trial by the proseculion's kcy witncss, Dr. Brady, and which was in 
direct conflict with the proswution's claim that Pdlmer was killcd in Idaho and died after 
aspirating watcr from a shallow creek whcre her body was found. 
21. In May 1996, thc ldaho Boud of Pardons andParolcs hcld a clemeilcy hearing on 
Plaintiffs case during which Thomas Gibson ("Gibson") publicly ctnniessod that he alone killed 
Pillnler in Spoknnc, Washitlgton, and that Paradis was neithcr an sccomplice nor even present. 
22. Shortly thereafter, the Cr~vctaor of ldaho commuted Paradis' scntcnce from death 
to life imprisonment without the possibility 01-parolc. 
23. While in ptison, Paradis filed and pursued numerous appcals and post-conviclion 
relief and habeas corpus petitions, largcly without success. However, in 1997 hc was granted an 
cvidcntiary henring on the exculpatory Hdws Notcs. Purudis v. Aravc, 130 F.3d 785 (9Ih Cir. 
1997). Tn 1999, at that hcaring, the contradictions between the Haws Notcs and Dr. Briuiy's trial 
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testimi)ny wcrc fully exposed, and. on March 14,2000 U.S. Dis~rict Judgc Edward J. Lodge 
found that ~laintiff's~constitutional right to a fair trial had been violated and set aside his 
conviclion: Purudi.s v. Arclve, 20 F.3d 950 (yth Cir. 2001). 
24. On April 10,2001, Bill Douglas, the currcnt Kootenai County Prosecuting 
Attorney, dismissed all homicide chargcs against Paradis and hc was set free, having spent over 
20 years in jail or prison, 15 years on death row. 
25. By this action, Paradis seeks to vindicate tho gross injustices committed against 
him by theDeicndants, and to obtain some measurc of tnoaetary relief for the loss of his freedvm 
and thc petrmanent impuirment of his capacity to lead my semblance of a normal lire. 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
26. During the early rnoining of June 21, 1980, Palmer and a I'riend, Scott Currier 
("Cumer"), wcce brutally murdered at a residcncc on Dearborne Street in Spokane, Washingtonn. 
27. The Following day, thc bodies of Palmer and Curricr were discovered in a stccp, 
overgrown ravine, off Mellick Road near Post Falls, Idaho. Cumer's scvcrcly beaten b d y  was 
found in a slccping bag on the incline of the ravinc. Palmer's body was found face down, partly 
in a shallow creek at the bottom of thc ravine. 
28. That night, the bodies of the ~ w o  victims wcre driven to Porilmd, Orcgon by two 
criminal invest.igalors from the Kootcnai County Sheriff's Depann~cnt, Defendant George Elliott 
("Elliott") and Wesley Krucger ("Krucgcr"), arriving i ~ t  the offices of forcnsic pathologist 
William J. Brady about 9:30 a.m. the next morning, where the Koolenai County Prosecutor's 
Office had arrangcd for Dr. Brady to p e & m  autopsies on Palmer and Cunier. 
29. Ruth Jones, who iived at thc entrance to Mellick Road, informed the police that 
early the morning of Jitne 22 she had observed a van drivc up the road and, twenty to thirty 
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minutes laler, thrcc men walked past her house coming from thc area where the bodies and 
tun~cd-over van were later found. 
30. That s:une morning a policc officer who knew nothing of the homicidcs, stopped 
and briefly questioned Pwadis, Gibson wd  Latry Evans ("Bvanfi") as they waited for a ridc 
outsidc a conve~lience stcxe in Post Falls, Idaho. 
31. After the bodies of Palmcr .and Currier were discovered, on June 23, 1980, Pardis 
and two others, Charles Amachcr ("Amacher") and Roscarirle Moline, werc nrrcsted by Spokenc 
law enforcement authorities on suspicion of having committed thc homicides. Several days later 
Gibson was also arrested in Califortiia md extradiied to Spoktme. Evans was also sought by 
Washington anthorities but evaded law cnforcemenl until 1986. 
32. The autopsies of Currier and Pdmcr took the bet1er part of the day of June 23 and, 
except for bricf periods, were attended by Elliott and Krueger. Daring the medical cxaminations 
Elliott listened to Dr. Brady dictate his thoughts and obselrations m hc proceeded through thc 
aulopsics. 1Ie also asked multiplc questions of the pathologist regarding his findings and 
opinions and took notes. 
33. In these exchangcs, Elliott learned sevcral things which werc kcy to his 
investigation ;md fundamental to the issue of whcther Idaho authoritics had any jurisdiction ovcr 
rhc homicides, including (a) that in Urady's expert opinion Palmer died from manual 
strangulation, and not from drowning, (b) that there was no evidence of sexual molestation, (c) 
that. Palmer had a one and one-half inch cut on her labia that did not bleed, meaning it was 
intlictcd a significwt time aftcr hcr death, (d) that Palmcr's body revealed sevcral other post- 
mortem abrasions and wounds, m d  (e) that despite pointed inquiry from Elliott, ths pathologist 
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codd not venture an opinion on the place or time or death, and would not say Palmer was killcd 
- in Idaho. 
34. Elliott and Krueger departed with this infor~~iation a d drove back to Spokanc. 
The next m~brning Elliott presented a scport of the autopsy [indings to a meeting of Kootenai 
County and Spokane County law enforcemcnt pcrsonncl in Spokane, altended by Haws (herein 
the "task force meeting"). 
35. The notes which Haws took of Elliott's June 24, 1980 report includcd the 
following rerercnccs: (a) "no time of detttli eilher," (b) "VF (fcmale victim) strangled," (c) "voicc 
box broken 2 paris," (d) "dead whcn wcnt in water," and (e) "not sexually itssaulted." In 
depositians and hearing testimony acquired years latcr. Elliott confiinled these represcntations as 
corning from Dr. Brady and the pathologist acknowledged them as accuratc reflections of his 
June 23, 1980 autopsy findings and conclusions. 
36. At the June 24 mccting and in other subsequent exchangcs among law 
cnforccment personnel involved in the casc, Haws and Eliion learned there was substantial 
physical and witness evidencc connecting both homicides lo the Dcarborne Street residence in 
Spokane, and no direct evidence whatsoever connecting cithcr homicide to Idaho. 
37. The past-mortern cut on Palmer's labia identified by Dr. Brady's autopsy was 
extremely significant. Although it occurred in a highly vascular areaof thc body, Dr. Urady 
notcd in his autopsy report that there was "no vital rcaction," explaining that the wound sirnply 
did not bleed. 
38. To a forensic palhologist of Dr. Brady's considerable experience, the clinical 
findings indicated conclusively that, the labia wound had 10 havc been inflicted more than a half 
hour after Palrncr's hcmt stopped beating. As 1.11e judges of the Ninth Circuit correctly observed 
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years latcr, "[slince P a d i s ,  Cihst~tI andEvans were a1 the Mcllick Road site for only about 30 
minutes, Palmcr's death would have to antcdate the entire episode thcrc ...," and "[a] death at 
Mellick Road, ... would appear to become scvcrcly ilnplausible in the light of (Dr. Brady's) own 
[I tinmng." 
39. On June 24, 1980, Pxdrfis, Gibson and Aiwdcher were charged by authorities in 
Spokanc County, Washington, with thc murders of both Curricr and Palmer; however, shoi'dy 
thereafter a strategic decision was ma& to proceed only on the Curricr casc, leaving prosecution 
of the Palmer homictdc in abeyance. 
40. In early Septemher 1980, a Washington jury rerunled verdicts uf nut guilty 
against Pwadis, Gibson and Amacher on tht; Curricr homicide. b w s  ullended portions of the 
trial, even attempting to sit at the vahle of thc prosecution's counsel, and took extensive notes. 
41. Only aftn' these acquitlsls, on Scptcmbcr 24, 1980, did Kootcnai County seek 
arrcst wwrku~ts Tor Piiradis and Gibsom~ on P~almw's homicide. Plaintiff's first appcarancc before 
an Idaho court on this charge was Novemhcr 26,1980. 
42. A few months aftcr Paradis was formally chargcd, his first public defcndcr 
withdrew hecausc of a potential conflict. At that point the handling district judge appointed 
William Brown ("Brown"), an attorney who had only bccn practicing law for six months and had 
ncvcr conducted any jury (rial in a civil or criminal cme. IJnhcknownst to Paadis until ycars 
after his conviction, Brown also worked wwkcnds as a reserve pvlice officer in Coeur d'Alene. 
43. Throughout the proceedings leading 'o the trial of Paradis and Gibson in Idaho, 
Walker, Haws, Erbland and Elliot~ made numcrous representations to judgcs 'and the media about 
the ostensible facts of the case, md ahout rhc strcngth and certainty ol such facts, which 
represemitutions wcre in dircct conflict with the exculpatory cvidence obtained From Dt.. Brady at 
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the autopsy, and in inany instances patently false and fttbricated. Thcse represenladons included 
the following: 
1) At the four-day preliminary hearings of Pttradis and Gibson in December 
1980, the prosecution hypothesized tha~  Palmcr was killed at Mellick Road in Id&o, offering 
tangential, circulnstilntid and remotcly inferential evidence about the  elal alive locations where the 
Currier and Paltncr bodies had been found, but holding secret from thc coutz and deranse counsel 
the forensic evicloncc from Dr. Brady demonstrating that Palmer died clscwhere; 
b) At a bail hearing for Paradis in April 1981, Haws told the court that there 
was "water in Palmer's lungs caused by her last instinctive gulp as she lay facc down in the 
creek," an opinion never previously exprcsscd by Dr. Brtdy or anyone and, again, the 
prosecution withheld froom the court and clcfcnsc counsel the contrary forcnsic evidence; 
c) Jn opposing Plaintiff's motion to dismiss based on the ahscnce of probable 
cause to believe Palmer died in Iduho, Haws misrepresented the pnst-mortcm wound to Palmer's 
labia as "a superficial cut" in "her groin" area which, without a shrcd of evidentiary support, he 
described as consistent with a cut from u barb wirc fence as Palmer ran down the Mellick Road 
ravinc fleeing frum Paradis, Gibson and Evans; and 
d) Also opposing dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, Haws informed thc Idaho 
court tililt Dr. Rtady had testified in Washingtcm that Currier had been clead longcr than Palmer, 
hut omitted informing anyone that this testimony could he impcitched by what Dr. Brady told 
Elliott contemporaneous to the autopsy. 
44. As Paradis and Gibson awaited t~ial, Gibson had a note delivered to thc Idaho 
district court judge handling the case inforniing him that Palnler was killed in Spokanc, implying 
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he had caused or contributed to hcr d a t h  and that Paadis wau no1 prcsent and did not 
participate. 
45. Baausc of this, the Gihwn and Paradis trials wcre bifurmted. 
46. As the separate trials approached, it was abundanlly clear to the Kootenai County 
pmsccutors tht they had a fundanwnliil hole in their proup, namcly, the absence of any 
persuasive cvidence thal Palmer was killed in Idaho and, thus, an inability to link Paradis to 
anything morc thrm having helped to hide her hody. 
47. In June 1981, Dr. Brady traveled to Cncur d'Alene, ldaho and, according to him, met and 
talked with Haws for the first time 10 prcparc his testimony for the Gibson and Paradis tri.als. 
48. During their coavetsations, Haws probed Dr. Rrudy: (a) on the prosecutor's 
theory that Paln~er had inhaled water into her ltmgs, thus connecting hcr hiling to the creek 
where her body was found, und (b) on thc absence of bleeding from the labia cut, which 
contmdictcd that theory. On thesc kcy points, Haws promoted and suborncd Dr. Urady's 
adoption of opinions that would get the ckscs against Gibson and Paradis over the obvious 
jurisdictional hurdle,,connccting Pcllmer's death to Idaho. 
49. Again, Haws look notcs of portions of thc pretrid exchangc with Dr. Brady 
which, wheu these notea wcrc revealed 15 years Iatcr, reflect considerabic hesitancy by Brady on 
committing ti) Haws' aspiration of water theo~y. At most, Dr. Brady ventured the uncczin 
observation that watcr "w hrve played a rolc" in Palmer's death. The notes Further highlighted 
the exculpalory import of the post-mortem labia wound, with Haws raising the obvious yucstion 
of whcthcr there was hlood in Palmer's Jews in the area proximate to the genital wound, and 
murking lhc yncstion prominently with a star, the only such emphasis in the Haws Notcs. 
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50. 1Iours later, Dr. Brady took the stand at the Gibson trial and, with a clarity that is 
in strifing contrast to what thc pathologist had just told Haws and to thc Haws Notes, offered 
sworn testiniony embracing the prosccutor's aspiration of watcr theory, stating: 
"I think she inhaled water, exactly, that's what T think happened," 
and "I think thcre is a very slrong likclihood that she was alivc 
when she went in the water and inhaled some water, that is my 
opinion." 
51. On the complex question of thc absence of bleeding from the iabia wound, Dr. 
Brady admitted, upon inquiry, that there wtls nu bleeding or crusting indicated from physical 
exanination ol' thc wound and "simply no blood on (the) genital area of Palmer." Nonetheless, 
hc dismissed the significance of these finding with a hypotlictical recitation he and others of his 
profession know to be scientiiically fdsc, stating: 
"If thc wca was submerged in watcr, then the blood would have 
washed away, wouldn't be there, look exactly like I saw il." 
52. Plaintiff" defense counsel, Brown, sat through poflions of thc Gibson trial and 
later read the transcript of Dr. Brady's tcsrimony, never knowing of the self-contradicting 
statements thc pathologist had made to Elliott at the autopsy and to Haws right before taking thc 
witness stand, 
53. Although Gibson testilled that Palmer was killed in Spokane and described his 
complicity, Gibson was convictcd of killing Palmer in Idaho, largely on the strength of Dr. 
Brady's new found opinions. 
54. Six months later, in Dcccmher 1981, Dr. Brady again testified, thit; time against 
Pal-adis. In his sworn comnienls, the theory of Palmer inhaling water through her crushed throat 
bcctune more than a hypothesis; indeed, it was central to thc quesrions from Haws and thc 
opinions expressed by his increasingly partisan expert. 
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55. Almost parroting Haws' description to judges months before on the probable 
cause inquiry, Dr. Rrady testiticd, "the aspiration of wakr playcd a role, irnot the terminal 
cvent, in that girl's death after shc was stsungled." His concluding comment to thc jury w u :  
"Kimberly Ann Palmcr, I believe was strangled. T hclicve she w u  
strangled and shor(1y afterwards aspirated some mount of water 
during her terminal, during thc lizst momenta with her last hrcath, I 
think she inhaled some water." 
56. The labia woiand was dclibcrately omittcd from the examination of Dr. Brady by 
Paradis' woefully inexperienced defense ct>unscl because, a. hc testified later, hc feared it would 
raisc the specter oof scxual abuse. Tn discovery, derensc counsel had rcccived Elliou's typc- 
written investigation report stating Palmer had been sexually molested, but Plaintiff's cc>unsel 
ncvcr knew what Dr. Brady had told Elliott at. the autopsy, which Elliott had repealed to Haws, 
or thal in his notes from the task force nieeting Haws wrot.e "not sexually assaulted." 
57. Relying directly and rcpcxedly on the wcll coached, embellished, exaggcrated 
and T;llsc testimony of Dr. Brady, Haws argucd his case against Ptiri~dis to thc jury and securcd 
Plaintiff's conviction. 
58. In 1987, aftcr his apprehension, Evans was also tried by Kootcnai Cou~ullty and 
acquitted. 
59. Ymrs latcr, colnpilring the Haws Noles 10 Dr. Brady's numerous testimonies at 
trials, a1 habcas corpus evidentiay hearings and in depositions, the Ninth Circuit concluded: (a) 
that 'Dr. Rrady held too many contradictory opinions to have conlidcnce in the Paradis verdict, 
(b) that tbc circunistantial evidence 011 which Paradis' conviction relied "is undermined" by ihc 
Naws Notes, and (c) that quite probably "no reascmablc Juror could find from the mcdicnl 
evidcnce (now) available in the record that Palmer was alive when her body entered the crcck at 
Mcllick Rcvad." 
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60. On remand, followi~~g an extensive evidcntiary healing, the 1J.S. District Courl in 
ldilho ultimatcly agreed, l~olding that in procuring his conviciion and death sentence, Paradis' 
constitutional rights had been violated. Purudis v. Aravc, 2000 WL 307458 (U. Idaho 3/14/00) 
INCORPORATION 
61. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates pliragraphs 1 through 60 above, as part of cach 
of the counts, claims and caul;es of action stated below. 
COIJNT ONE 
(Civil Nights-Kuotunai County and Walker) 
62. In 1963, in the case of Bra@ v. Maryhd, 373 U.S.  83 (1963) ("Brrrdy"). the 
United States Supreme Court imposed an aafmiativc constitutio~lal duty on proswutors at every 
level of government throughout the TJnited States to disclose exculpatory evidence known hy thc 
prosecution team to criminal defendants and thcir attorneys. 
63. Ry 1980 and 1981, when Paradis became thc subject of criminal investigation and 
then prosecution by Kootenai County, Rrarly and a progeny of judicial decisions which followed 
reflected a cletlrly esktblished constitutiotld right entitling Paradis to be informed by Kootcnai 
County prosecutors, and law enforcement personricl assisting on their behalf, of all infoi~nation 
lhey wcrc aware of which ww in any way ftworable to his Afensc and material lv his possible 
innocence of the murder chage against him (herein the "Hrady di>ctrinc2'). 
64. At thc times of the Cunier and Pai~ncr homicide invauligations, Plaintiff's west, 
and continuing through the pri>sccution of Paradis without inrermption, Kootenui County 
officials, particularly the Kootenai Counly Piomuting Attorney, Walker, and thc Kootend 
County Sheriff, kncw or had to have known to a moral certainty that deputy prosecutors handling 
criminltl cases in Kootcnai County-and the police, detcctivcs and deputies who they rclicd 
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upon-would hc confronted repeatedly with circumstances where thcy became aware of 
' information (Lirngiblc, documentary, testimonial or otherwise), that was potentially exc~llpatory 
or a critninal derendant's guilt, potentially impesching of evidence or iestimony supporting 
conviction, i n  di~ect and pntct~tinl conflict with the prosecution's theory or explanation of the 
crime, or tending ti> undermine the prosecution's case and cxonerdte the dcfcndwt oS culpability. 
65. Under these circumstances, these samc Kootenai County officials, pa'ticulwly 
Walkcr, appreciatcd that pcoseculorial and ldw ennliwmcnt personnel would often he rcquired to 
makc difiicult choices rcgnrding rull and prompt disclosure of potenlially exculpatory or 
impeaching information to derendants and their attorneys, md ihat hesitance, evasiveness or 
failure on thc part of these employees to makc a choice entirely consistent with their lawrul 
duties and responsibilities would likely cavse a deprivation of constitutiond righls lo criminal 
defendants, presumcd by law to be innocent. 
66. Walker and othcr Kootenai County policy-makers further appreciatcd that through 
prnper and focused training, supervision and discipline of Kootenai County prosecutors and law 
enforcement personnel, the choiccs these employees would be required to make regarding 
cxculpatory evidcncc would be less difficult to makc and, when madc correctly, would cnsure 
the preservation of a defendant's constiiutional guaranties and mitigate the prospcct of 
convicting defcndrnts for crimes thcy did not commit. 
67. Kootenai County officials, patZicularly Walkcr, were made cvcn more aculely 
awwe or thcsc circumstances as thcy mighl afkctcd Pamdis, given their knowledge that when 
Haws ussumed rcspo~isibility ror prosecuting the casc against the Plaintiff he had only hecn 
practicing law around eight months and htid never heforc tried any homicide case, let alone a 
capital n~urder case. 
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68. Despite the requireinents of the B r d y  doctrine and the known implications of 
such quiremenls affecting thc rights of criminal ddenendanls and tlxc duties and wtivitiex of law 
cnforcc~nent personnel, in 1980 and 1981-and, indeed, continuing for years thcrcafter-the 
customs, policics and practices of Kootenai County, paiiicularly those of its Prosmuling 
Attorncy and Sheriff, displayed and reflectcd a dc1iber:tte indifference lo and cotrscious disregard 
for the constitutional rights of criminal defendants generally, and the Plaintiff in particular. 
69. By choicc, ncglcct or reckless indifrerence, Walkcr ,and others respon3ible for 
cstahlishing, proinoting and enforcing the policics of Kooteniu County arfecting prosccutors and 
law enforcement personnel, cithcr: 
a) In8d.Z it the practice, or caused it to bc the rule and practice, of Kootenai 
County prosccutors and police to evade or ignore their constitutional duties of disclosure and 
defendwls' rights uadcr thc Brudy doctrine; andor 
h) failed or refused to adequalely and propcrly train and instruct Koolenai 
County prosecutors and police on the implications of thc Brutdy doctrine in lawfully carrying out 
their employmct~t activitics and ir?sponsibiliti,es; and/or 
c) failcd or rcfused to adequately supervise Kootenai County prosecutors and 
police in fulfillment of their constitutional obligations under the Brudy doctrine; and/or 
d) failcd or refused to promptly and appropriately discipline Kootenai 
Cour~ty prosecutors and police who neglwtcd, cvadcd or violated the constitutional rights 
criminal defendants, particularly those guaranteed by thc Brruly doctrine. 
70. As the direct and proximal result of tho forcgoing, thcre existed u climate and 
policy of deliberate indiffcrcnce to the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff, rtffccting the conduct a 
of Walker, Haws, Erblwd, Elliott and others, causing thcm to: 
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a) intentionally and repcatcdly disregard their duties uf disclosure undcr the 
B r d y  doctrine; 
b) hide and deliheratcly obscure evidence which directly or indirectly 
cxoncratcd Paidis; 
c) manipulate, cncournge and conspire with Dr. Brady to g ~ v c  falsc, 
exaggerited and unsupportable ~e*iimony; and, 
d) mislead the Paadis jury, olhw prosecutor, dcfcnsc counsel tmd numerous 
tsial and appellate judges, by reprcscnting as fact or informed opinion numerous, critical mattcrs 
which all of somc of tllcrn knew to be contrary to established or provablc fact. 
71. These acts and (>mission8 violatcd Plaintiffs rights under the Fourth, Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amcndmeuts, and comparable provisions of the Idaho Cot~stitution, and caused him 
to suffer substantial injury, loss and d'vnage, as more specificdly alleged herein. 
COUNT TWO 
(Civil Rights-Kootenai County and Walker) 
72. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates paragraphs 62 through 71 below, us 
part of thc following Count. 
73. At the lime Paradis was arrcstcd and charged by Kooten~i County, he had a 
clearly established constitutiond right not tr) be seized and deprived of his liberty, and not to bc 
held and prosecuted, absent probablc causc, fouildcd upon demonstrable facts, supporting a 
reasonable conclusion (hilt he hadcommitted a crime within thc jurisdiction of the yrosecutoriill 
authot.ities and courts of Idaho. 
COMPIJAINT AND DEMAND FOR JUKY TRIAL - 17 
I ':\W~K~WAIJKWARAUIS\C~Y~I Sui1\002 Cumplaint.tluc 
Case Document 1 Filed 0410912 @ 9age Of 30 
74. h 1980 und 1981, Kootenai County officials, pwticularly the Kootcnai County 
Prosecuting Attorney, Walkcr, and the Kootenai County Sheriff, kncw or had to have known to a 
moral cc~tainty: 
a) that, in their investigation of crimcs 'and pursuit of suspects, deputy 
prosecutors, police, detectives and deputies would be confronted rcycatedly with circunislances 
where evidcncc of probable cause was lacking; 
h) that thesc samc pcrsonnel would he required to makc difficult choices 
regarding whcther to arrest, charge or prosccutc whcrc, despite their suspicions, cvidcnce of 
probable cause was lacking; 
c) Ihal if' these samc personnel acted precipitously and without justificdtion, 
or wted on thc apparent authority of a court's probable eausc determinations, obtained on falsc 
or incomplete premises, it would violate thc constitutional rights of those improperly accused; 
and, 
d) that through propcr and focused training, supervision and discipline, the 
choices thcsc personnel would he required to makc on probable cruse consideralic>ns would bc 
less difficult to make and, when madc correctly :~nd legally, would onsurc thc preservation of 
constitutional gi~arat~tics and mitigate the prospecl ol'arresting, restraining m d  prosecuting thc 
wrong people for crimes they did not commit. 
75. Despite the requirement that County prosecutors, police, detectivcs and deputies 
conform their official conduct to comply with thc rights guaranteed by the Unibd Statcs and 
Idaho constitutions, in 1980 and 1981, the customs, pulicies and practiccs of Kootenai County, 
particularly those of its Prosecuting Attorncy and Sheriff, displayed and reflected a dclibcrate 
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indiffcrence to and conscious disregard Tor the constit~~tional rights of criminal suspects, 
il~cluding the Plaintiff. 
76. By choicc, neglect or rcckless indiffcrence, Walkcr and others rcsponsihlc for 
cstablishing, promoting and enforcing thc policies of Kootenai County affecting prosecutors and 
law cnforcement pcrsonnel, eithcr: 
a) made it the prncticc, or caused it to be the mlc and practicc, of Kootenai 
County prosecutors and police ta arrcst, charge and prosecute criminal susy)ccts without probable 
cause; andlor 
b) Fdililed or refused to adcquntely and properly vain and illstruct Kootenili 
County prosecutors and police on thc i~nplications of obtdining judicial probable deterrninatiolls 
based on misreprcscnted or incomplete inl'orrnation; i~nJ/or 
c) failcd or refused to adequdtely supervise Kootenai County prosecutors and 
policc in fulfillment of tbeir constitutional obligations conccmi~lg prohablc cause determinations; 
muor 
d) failed or refufied to promptly and appropriately discipline Kootenai 
County prosecutors and police who neglected, cvaded or violatcd the constitutionlil rights of 
crimninnl suspccts on prvbiiblc cause determinations. 
77. As thc direct and proximate result of the foregoing, them existcd a climate md 
policy of deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of thc Plilintin', affecting the conduct 
of Walker, Haws, Erbland, Elliott and othcrs, and causing them to: 
I )  arrest, chwgc and prosecute Paradis without probable cause and knowing 
then? was inadequate cvidence to afford i d t o  criminal jurisdiction over him; 
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I b) hide and deliberately obscure evidence which dircctly or indirectly 
exonerated Paradis and undermined any reasonable probable cause determinillion; md, 
C) mislead judges required to makcprobablc cause determinations in this 
I case by rcprcscrtting as fact or infoimed opinion numerous, criricai mattcia which all or some of I them knew to be conlriuy to established nt provahic fact or, at the very least, were conlridicled I by other undisclosed facts. I 78. These wts and omiaxionr: violatcd Plaintift's rights under the United SCales 
Constitution, including the Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amcndmcnts, and co~npurnble 
provisions of the ldaho Constitution, and caused Paradis to suffer, and cvnlinue lo suffcr, 
substantial injury, loss and dmwage, as more specil'ically alleged hcrcin. 
COUNTS FOUR. FIVE AND SIX 
(Neligence, False Arrerl, M~llicious Prnsecution and False 
Imprisonment-Kootenai County and Its Agent$) 
79. By virtue of thc ldaho Tort Claims Act, Chapter 9, Title 6, Jdilho Code, every 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, including Kootenai County, has waived its sovereign 
I immunity Tor cerlain tort actions against it, including for claims of negligence, misrepnisenlalion, 
! dcccit, deflunation, PJlse arrest, false imprisc)nnient and malicious prosccution. 
I 80. Such waiver of imn~unity extends to claims against the individual employees and 
agents of political xubdivisionr:, including Kootcnai County and the Kootenai County Prosecutor, 
for the negligent or other wrongful u d s  and irmissions of those employees and agents wt~ilc 
wting in the course and scope of thcir crnploy~ncnt or ,lgcncy duties. 
81. Much of the conduct of Walkcr, Haws, Erhland, Elliott and Brady, alleged herein, 
constituted acts and omissions within the purview of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, for which they 
and Kootenai County each have liability to P ~ d d i s  for money damages. 
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82. Acting on behalf of Kootenai County, Walker, ffuws, Erhland and Elliott, or some 
- or them, instigated, pursued and prosecuted first dcgrcc murder charges against Paradis knowing 
that (2) there was ,an absence of evidence supporting prohablc cause to believe the death of 
Paimcr occurred in Idaho, (b) there warr insufficient evidence to give ldaho courts jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of the criminal action and (c) there wm evidcnce, being intentionally 
concealed, that undermined probable cause, jurisdiction and Plaintiff's culpability. 
83. Although wwants were st~ught and obtained by these Defendants for thc mcst, 
detention, restraint and incmration of Paridis, such warrants were not the product of 
independent objective findings by a magistrate, but wcrc invalid, having been unlawfully 
obtained by deceit, through the intentional, deliberate wd  malicious withholding of materiirl, 
exculpatory cvidence by the Defendants and lhrotigh thc presentation of infomalion which was 
either knowingly falsc or fraught with a recklesr; disregard for thc truth and accuracy or such 
informatiot~. 
84. At the timc of thc Plaintiff's preliminary hearing, and subsequeutly at the Xditho 
clistrict coui%iudge's reconsideration of thc magistrate's probable cause clelerminatioti on 
Plainti W's motion to dismiss, there was a further intentional, deliberate and malicious 
withholding ttf malerial cvidcncc by these Defendants and a representation of ittfom~ation and 
arguments ostensibly supporting prc)btnhle causc which was co~npletely without factual support. 
85. In prosmuting thc first degree nlurder charge against Paradis, Haws intentionally 
concealed or recklessly withheld evidence which was exculpatory and impeaching and cithcr 
suhorncd thc perjurous testitnony of Dr. Rrady or delibcratcly clected not to report such perjury 
to the Court whcn it obviously occurred. 
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86. By these acts and omissions, Walker, Haws. Grbland, Elliott and Brady, or some 
of thein, knowingly .and intentionally violatcd Idaho Code, Sections 18-2901 and 18-2902, wl~ich 
makc false imprisonment a crinlinal offens% Idaho Code, Sections 18-5408,5409 and 541 1, 
which make pcrjury and the subornatiotl of perjury criminal offenses, and Idaho Code, Section 
18-5414, whicl~ make i t  ncrimc to give false inlormation to any court. 
87. When, years i&r, Magstrate Craig Kosonen, wl~o had handled thc preliminirry 
hearing on Paradis, lcanied about the evidcncc which the prosecution had withheld, hc expressed 
his dismay publicly, indicating that had he been liilly informed of what rhc prosecution knew hut 
concealed, it is unlikcly he would have round probable cause and bound P u d i s  over ooli thc 
murdcr charge. 
88. 011 a claimuTnegligcrmc against. Walker and all others who were responsible for 
tile policies, practices, training and supervision affecting Koolenai County prosecutors and law 
enforcement personnel, Plaintirr hereby rcalleges and incorporates the allegations of Counts One 
and Two, above. 
89. As the dirwt and proximatc cause of Defendants' deceit and negligence, and the 
false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecutivn or Paradis, Plaintiff htoi suffcrcd 
substantial injury loss and damage, as more specifically alleged hereinbelow. 
COUNT SIX 
(Civil Higllts - Br~dy ,  Elliott and Haws) 
90. Knowing they did not possess, and could not lawfully obtain, evidencc which 
providcd proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Don Parndis murdered Kimberly Palmcr, and that 
he cvmmittcd this alleged crime in Tdaho, Haws, Elliott and Dr. Brady, and perhaps Walker and 
Orblcand, entered into a plan, dcsign and conspir~y lo concoct cvidence against Paradis and 
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prcsent it as if Fact, all in violation oirighw protected by thc laws of the IJnited States, the 
Fo~itTh, Sixth and Fourteenth Anlendincnts of the United States Constitution, and comparable 
provisions of the Idaho Constitution. 
9 1. The theory that Pltlmer aspirated water was m idea corltrivcd by Elliol, adapted 
arrd cmhellishad by Haws and promoted 11.1 and adopted by Dr. Brady, who then transposed the 
theory into his ostensibly informed opinion testimnony for purpose lilr the Gibson and Paradis 
trials. 
92. Wheri this conspiracy arose and was first acted upon, Haws and Elliott wcrc 
performing purcly investigatory fi~nctions which preceded the arrest and dccisicrn lo prosecute 
Paradis. Ncmetheless, thesc Dcfcnctanls were acting undcr color o i  state law. 
93. Whcn Dr. Brady joined this cxtra-judicial conspiracy, to give false testimony, he 
was the contract agent of Kootcnai County and, as such, Irc too was acling under color of statc 
law; indeed, by jointly engilging and acting in  concert with state ofiicids in  the deprivation of 
Plaintiff's civil rights, Dr. Brady lost any pretense of acting simply a n private person. 
9 4  The acts, conduct and o~nissiorls of these Derendrtnts was cxtrcmc, outrageous, 
willful and malicious. In their over-zcaiou8nes~ to assign legal blame fot a horrible, senselcss 
crime, they abzndoned evcry vestige of responsibility and authority, perpetrating a fraud and 
securing the contrivcd conviction of thc Plaintiff. 
5 .  But for the role each of these Defendtints contributed lo the plan and conspiracy, 
Pwadis would have never bcen arrested or chargcd, and mosl certainly would not have been 
prosecuted or convictcd. 
96. As lheproxi~natc resulk of these wro~xgful and illegal acts, Plaintiff has suffered, 
and continues to suffer, substanlial injury, loss and damage, as Inore specifically alleged herein. 
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COUNT SEVEN 
(Tort Ctaimn - Brady) 
97. Plaintiff hereby reallcges and incorporntcs paragraphs 80 through 96 above as if 
sct foith in full bclow. 
98. If in committing the conduct allcged in Count Six, Dr. Brady was acting purely as 
a private person, his conduct was at the very least negligent and mounted to an intenliona1 
inflection of cmotiol~al distress upon Paradis. 
9 Dr. Brady knew the import of his role in thc criminal action pursued against 
Paradis and assumed a duty and responsibility to provide objcctive, tmthful and complett: 
infomi~iiot\ to every participant in the criminal process at every formal and informed stage of the 
judicial proceedings. 
1.00. He miserably breachcd this duty, abandoned every pretcnsc of independence and 
assumed the mantcl and role of eciln advocate, stretching the truth to the breaking point, devising 
and promoting theoiiss lhat violated estilhiished prccepts and standards of his profession md 
ignoring the: findings and scieatific principles of forensic pathology. 
101. His conduct was extreme, outrageous, maliciouc: and dcliberat.e, with tiic purpose 
and effect of obtaining a conviction that hc apprecieciilted could not be oblained without his 
complicit excesses. 
102. Dr. Rrirdy, perhaps more than any othcr single Defendant, caused Don Paradis to 
relinquish his freedom fou over 20 ycsrs, to sufrer the scvcre er~mtional pain of having his 
cxccution scheduled rhrcc times md to permanently lose his ability to puticipeciilte in a free society 
as anornlal human being, all to Plaintiffs substantial loss, injury and damage, is more 
specificdly alleged hereinbelow. 
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COUNT EIGHT 
(Defamation - Brady) 
103. Throughout the numerous and various challcngcs to Plaintiff's conviction. Dr. 
Brady made repeated public stalemenis to a variety of ncws mcdia outlets, describing the 
Sorensic evidcncc which ostensibly supported the conviction of Pitradio. 
104. He made and volunteered these slatements with no privilcgc or obligation to do 
SO. 
105. Repeatedly, Lhe statements he madc wcrc knowingly false, perpetuated the 
contrived and unsuppo~tlble theories discussed herein, and always cast both the Pl'laintiff and his 
claims of innocence in a false light. 
106. One of Dr. Bsady's most notable, defamatory versions of truth occurrcd on a news 
story about ihe case prt>duced by Northwest Rcpoits out of Portband, Oregcil~. 
107. In that story, well after the prosecution and cotrviction of Pnradis 11ad become the 
subjcct of public scrutiny and Dr. Urady's role in that process had become ~uspect, hc publicly 
announced for the first time that he huct iitken samples of Palmer's lung tissue during her autopsy 
and, sincc thc trial, had cxamined them u~~der a microscope, revding the prefience of 
contaminanls, specifically plankton, that hc opirrcd confirmed the aspiration of creek water into 
Palmer's lungs. 
108. According to Dr. Brady, he lllade photographs of the micmscopic views and both 
showed and gave them to Rrblitnd in 1387, with the expectation thcy could bc used in the trkd 
against Evans and perhaps in opposing Peradis' first habeas corpus petition. 
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109. No one involved in [ha Paradis case, including Erbland or lhose from the Idaho 
Attorney Crenertil's office who fought Pmdis' post-conviction petitions, acknowledges any of 
this o c c u ~ ~ n g  or will corroborate Dr. Brady's public statcmcnts in any way. 
110. Other specific in$~'ance~ of Dr. Brady's liefamition of Paradis, we believe, will he 
rcvcalcd and supported by discovery in this casc, and Plaintiff rcscrvcs Lcavc to anlcnd this 
Coniplail~t as such information becomes available. 
111. By this coursc of defamatory conduct, Dr. Brady cootinucd to cast a false cloud of 
unccrtainty ovcr PlaintiftTs claims of innocoace and provided cover For hia own tranfigressic>ns at 
the continued expense and punishment of Pzutidis. 
COUNTS NINE, TEN AND ELEVEN 
112. In 1986, Paradis was granted an cvidentiiiry hearing on his i3rfit habeas carpus 
petition and, in preparation for that hearing, subpoeneedHziws and his files from the 1980-81 
prosecutic~n which, unbeknownst to Pinutit: and his at.torneys at  the time, include the Haws 
Notes. 
113. At the time Hawfi was living in Salt Lake City, Utah, was no longer employed as a 
prosecutor and was working for a private company. 
114. On Novenlber 26,1986, anticipating whcrc thc hcaring might Icad, Haws wrcltc 
Erblmd, who was still wilh the Kootewai County Prosecutor's Office, asking hiin to personaliy 
find and send Haws a copy of all of his file notcs, particularly rcqucsting the notcs of the June 
24,1980 task force meeting where Blliort first dcscribcd Dr. Brady's autopsy rindings. 
115. liaws' revicw of his prior notcs undoubtedly refreshed his recollection, iT not 
confirmod his mcmory, that the Ale notes contained exculpatory evidence and information 
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trieahle to Dr. Brady, which impeached the pathologist's trial tcstimony, which undermined the 
theory uf jurisdictional proof argued by Haws to the court and jury, and which were never 
rcvcaled to Pwadis or his dcfcnse counsel, prior to, during or since Plaintiff's criminal tsial. 
116. Appreciating how the revelation of these file notes in a habcas c,orpus proceedings 
would likcly have vcused Tlaintiffs conviction 1.0 be set asidc, Haws not only continued to hide 
the information, but promoted and assisted suppression of the notcs through a motion to quash 
the subpwna, successfully made by Lynn Thomas, thc Idaho Deputy Attorncy General then 
handling the state's case. 
117. No longer cloaked with the disclosure dile~mils or immunities of a prosecutorial 
advocatc, kliiws clvcrl y recognized that his notes held the key to freedom for Paradis, and knew 
or should have apprcciatcd that he had the responsibility of at least w ordinary and prudent. 
citizen to disclo~e the exculpatory notes to Thonias, the fedcral court, Paradis md his counsel. 
I t8. In breach of thdt duty, Haws madc a negligent, iT not dclibcrate choice, or 
continued secrecy, with rccklcss and willfir1 disregard for thc consequences to Paradis and with 
the outrageous and ~nalicious inlent of perpetuating the profound deprivation of PI'laintifT's 
freedom, therehy inflicting severe emotional distress upon Paadis. 
119. Hild Hpwp electcd and pursued the righi and prudcnt choice of disclosing his 
exculpatory notcs and the evidence they retlcct, it is likely Pilradis would havc been saved the 
punishmel~l of 14 more ycars irt prison, including nine years on dcath row. 
120. Ihroughout his invc>lvemcnt in the Paradis and Mhron cascs, both when serving 
as a prt>Becutor and ,after, IIaws made repaatcd public and extra-judicial statements to a variety of 
news media outlcts. 
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121. He nude and volunteered these sstitements kt> influence puhlic opinion and 
cnhancc his own statute and sclf-imagc, without any cloak of prosecuturiui inmunity and with 
no privilege or obligation to do so. 
122. Repeatedly, it i s  bclicvcd and thus allcgcd, hc made statements tkut were 
knowingly firlse or made with reckless disregard for the iruth, which pqetuatttcrt his contrived 
and unsuppo~ttible theories as discussed herein, : i d  which consistently rust both Plaintiff and his 
claims of innocence in a ralse light. 
123. Plaintiff bclicvcs that discovety in this case will further reveal the detirils and 
specifics instances of Haws' defamation nf Paradis, and leave is rcscrvcd to amcnd this 
Complaint when such infomution becomes available. 
124. As thc dircct and proximatc result of thc foregoing tortuol~s conduct, Plaintiff kus 
suffered, and continues to suffer, loss, injury and damage, as nwre pafliculittly desmibed 
hereinbelow. 
DAMAGES, COSTS AND FEES 
125. Thc following paragraphs arc hcrcby incorporated as to each and every count, 
claim and cause of aciion stated herein. 
126. As a result of the wrongs described herein, Paradis lost every valuabie possession 
he owned. Normal life, that phrwe has meaning lo free citi~enns in this country, stoppcd for 
Don Pwadis on June 23, 11)80. For over 20 yews he was deprived of the ability to earn income, 
build a profitable career, acquire a home, marry, have children, accumulate assets, acquire the 
cducation, skill and work cxpc~~cncc sscntial to cconotnic growth and security and achievc 
almost everything by which civilized societies typically measure material success. 
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126. Sincc his rclcasc from incarceration, Paradis hicv had very little succcss obtaining 
and holding jobs. He is without the skills ncccssary to participate in a modem workforce. 
Despite the judicial invalidation of his conviction, the notorieiy of his casc and thc label of being 
an ex-convict haunt. him at every turn. He has ncvcr obtained, and probably will never oecure, 
amploymcnt wldch provides much more then a subsistence incomc. Having failcd to contribute 
income withholdings for two dccadcs, hc is currently ineligible for any form of Social Sccurjty 
bcncfits. Although IIOW over the age of 54, the pro8pects of rctircmcnt are virtually non-existent 
for Donald Parudis. 
127. Plaintiff has susteined. and will in the future sustain, cconomic losses well in 
excess of thc jurisdictionrl threshold for this Court. 
128. Plaintirf has Further sustained, and wiH in the future sustain, pain, sufl'eting, gr~cf, 
menial anguish, loss of idctitity and othcr non-economic damages well in excess of thc 
jurisdictional threshold for this Court. 
129. By rcason of the matters described herein? Plainliff has heen ccompcllcd to obtain 
legal counsel both to secure his frcedotn from unlawful imprisonment and to pro$ecute this 
action, atid has incurred, and continues to incur, enormous legal fccs and costs that are both an 
economic damage caused by the Defendants' wrongdoing and an expense of this litigation. 
130. Plaint~ff is cntitled to an award of his fees and  cost^ in the successful resolution of 
this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, and every other pn)viriion afstatc and fcdcral 
law afrording such nwnrds. 
131. The conduct altribulllble to the Defendants herein was an cxtrcme deviation fi-om 
, d~~eplable .. standards, committcd with malicc and reckless disregard for the likely consequences, 
by reason or which, Plaintiff' reserves leave to hcrcaftcr mend this Complaint, puwu~nt o Idaho 
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I Code, Section 6-l6M to add a prayer for punitivc damagcs on each Count, claim and cause of 
action and against each Defendant. 
W t W F O R E ,  PlnintiTr prays for relief as follows: 
I A. For eco~lolnic &wages in a sum nor lcss than $5,000,000; I B. For non-economic damages in a sum not less than $15,000,000; 
I C. For prejudgment interest on all damagcs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and I cvety other provision or Federal and statc law providing for such rclicf. I D. For awmd of his reasonable attomcy fccs and expenses; and 
E. For all othct relief, legal and equitable, appropriate to this action. 
DATED tl~is p&Y OI ~ p " ,  Z~U.  
MAUK & HUKGOYNE 
urn -. - 
Williilin L. Mauk, otthc Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DEM,ANI) KOR JURY TRIAL 
Plainliffrcqucsts a jury trial on all clailns and causes triahlc by jury, pursui~~t to Rule 38, 
Federal Rules or Civil Pmcsdr~re. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 30 
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L Y N N m E  L. MCHENRY, J.D. 
CLAIMS MANAGER 
June 30.2003 
Kootenai County 
Erika Ellingson 
501 Government Way 
Coeur dlAlene, ID 83816 
RE: CLAIM NUMBER: 2001019301 
INSURED: Kootenai County 
CLAIMANT: Donald Paradis 
DOL: 0411 012001 
Dear Ms. Ellingson: 
This will acknowledge receipt of the Complaint filed by Donald M. Paradis against 
Kootenai County and its current: and former employees. Glenn Walker, D. Marc Haws, 
Peter Erbland, and George Elliott, filed in the United States District Court for the District 
of Idaho under case number CIV-03-150-S-LMB. 
In reviewing the allegations of the Complaint, it is noted that the actions which give rise 
to this controversy surround Mr. Paradis' arrest and conviction in 1980 and 1981. 
According to the Complaint, Kootenai County emplovees Haws. Erbland and Elliott 
withheld exculpatory hvidence, and conspired with forensic pathologist Dr. William 
Bradv to present false testimonv and evidence to a local maaistrate durina the 
- .  
preliminary hearing, and, ultim&ely, to the jury, resulting in hk conviction."~ccording to 
the Complaint, these actions violated Mr. Paradis' con&tutional rights and were 
- 
undertaken in direct contravention of the United States Supreme Court's rulinas in 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). According to tha~om~laint ,  the ~o i tena i  
County Prosecuting Attorney and the Sheriff displayed and reflected a deliberate 
indifference and conscious disregard to the Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Further, the 
Complaint alleges that, in 1996, handwritten notes authored by Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney Marc Haws were discovered which contained exculpatory evidence which 
could have been utilized at the criminal trial to impeach the testimony of Dr. Brady. 
According to the Complaint, this information would have materially aitered the ouicome 
of the criminal case. The Comolaint alleaes Kootenai Countv failed to adeauatelv 
supervise or train its employees, and, bydoing so, demonstrated a deliberate 
- 
indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional righis secured by the Brady v, Maryland 
decision. The Complaint further contends that Kootenai County employees Haws, 
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Erbland, and Elliott continued their conspiracy with Dr. William Brady to defeat Plaintiff's 
efforts to obtain post-conviction relief. It is alleged the actions of the County and its 
employees were intentional, deliberate, malicious, and negligent. 
According to the Complaint, the alleged wrongful conduct of the County and its 
employees was fully exposed through an evidentiary hearing before Federal Judge 
Edward J. Lodge. Through those proceedings, on March 14,2000, Judge Lodge found 
that Mr. Paradis' constitutional rights to a fair trial had been violated, and, for that 
reason, his conviction was set aside. Judge Lodge's ruling was appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and affirmed on March 5, 2001. See Paradis v. Arave, 240 
F.3d 1109 (gth Cir. 2001). Thereafter, on April 10, 2001, the Kootenai County 
Prosecuting ~domey  dismissed all homicide charges and Mr. Paradis was released. 
Thereafter, on October 9,2001, a notice of tort claim was filed alleging various 
violations of state and federal law. The present Complaint was filed April 9, 2003. 
I direct your attention to the definitions, coverage, and exclusions sections of the 2001 
ICRMP policy, where, at 5 11, Comprehensive General Liability and Law Enforcement 
Liability coverage is provided. The policy reads: 
COVERAGE A. Comprehensive General Liability. We 
agree, subject to the terms and conditions of this Coverage, 
to pay on your behalf those sums which you become legally 
obligated to pay as damages for personal injury or 
property damage which arise out of an occurrence during 
the Policy Period. 
COVERAGE C. Law Enforcement Liability. We agree, 
subject to the terms and conditions of this Coverage, to pay 
on your behalf all sums which you become obligated to pay 
by reason of errors, omissions, or negligent acts arising out 
of the performance of your duties while providing law 
enforcement services or the administration of first aid 
resulting in personal injury or property damage during the 
Policy Period. 
The policy defines controlling terms as follows: 
1. ' "Accident" means an unexpected happening without 
intention or design. 
8. "Occurrence" means an accident or a continuous or 
repeated exposure to conditions which 
result in personal injury or property 
damage during the Policy Period. All 
personal injuries to one or more persons 
andlor property damage arising out of 
an accident or a continuous or repeated 
exposure to conditions shall be deemed 
one occurrence. 
The policy also identifies certain exclusions, which are applicable to this claim as 
follows: 
Liability Coverage under the Comprehensive General 
Liability Insuring Agreements does not apply: 
2. To personal injury or property damage 
resulting from an act or omission 
intended or expected from the 
standpoint of any insured to 
cause personal injury or 
property damage. This 
exclusion applies even if the 
personal injury or property 
damage is of a different kind or 
degree, or is sustained by a 
different person or property, than 
that intended or expected. This 
exclusion shall not apply to 
personal injury resulting from 
the use of reasonable force to 
protect persons or property, or in 
the performance of a duty of the 
insured. 
3. To personal injury or property damage 
resulting from an act or omission 
outside the course and scope of 
employment and any act 
performed with malice or criminal 
intent. This exclusion applies 
regardless of whether any 
insured is actually charged with, 
or convicted of, a crime. 
The ICRMP policy also provides errors and omissions coverage at § IV of the policy. 
The insuring agreement reads: 
COVERAGE A. We agree, subject to the terms and 
conditions of this Coverage, to pay on your behalf all sums 
which you shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of any claim which is first made against 
you during the Policy Period, arising out of any wrongful act 
by you. 
The relevant definitions to E & 0 coverage read: 
The following definitions are applicable to the Errors and 
Omissions Insuring Agreement of this Policy: 
1. "Bodily injury" means physical injury t i  dny 
person, including death, and any 
mental anguish or mental 
suffering associated with or 
arising from such physical injury. 
2. "Claim" means a demand received by 
you for money damages alleging 
a wrongful act by you. No claim 
exists where the only monetary 
damages sought or demanded 
are costs of suit andtor attorney's 
fees. 
3. "Damages" means 
compensation awarded by 
judgment or through settlement; 
and costs, charges and expenses 
incurred in the pursuit or defense 
of a claim, if ordered by the court 
or agreed to through settlement. 
4. "First Made" means the earlier 
of the following times: 
a. When you first give written 
notice to us that a claim 
has been made against 
you; or 
b. When you first give written 
notice to us of specific 
circumstances involving a 
particular person or entity 
which may result in a 
claim. Reports of 
incidents or circumstances 
made by you to us as part 
of risk management or 
loss control services, shall 
not be considered notice 
of a claim. 
5. "Property Damagen means physical damage 
to or destruction of tangible 
property, including loss of use. 
6. "~rongful Act" means the 
negligent performance of or 
failure to perform a legal duty or 
responsibility arising out of public 
office or position. 
The E & 0 Coverage also provides certain exclusions, which read: 
The Errors and Omissions Insuring Agreement does not 
cover any claim: 
2. Arising out of any dishonest, fraudulent, 
criminal, malicious, deliberate or 
intended wrongful act committed 
by you or at your direction. 
3. Resulting from an act or omission 
outside the course and scope of 
employment. 
4. For bodily injury or property damage, as 
defined in this Section. 
5. Resulting from a wrongful act intended or , ' 
expected from the standpoint of 
any insured to cause damages. 
This exclusion applies even if the 
damages claimed are of a 
different kind or degree than that 
intended or expected. 
1 1. Resulting from a continuing wrongful act 
which commences prior to the 
retroactive date set forth in the 
Declarations of this Policy. 
12. Arising out of law enforcement activities or the 
performance of law enforcement 
duties. 
The Plaintiff, by his Complaint, has alleged willful and intentional conduct on the part of 
both Kootenai County and its employees. We recognize the Complaint also alleges the 
County and its employees were negligent. As referenced above, the ICRMP policy 
specifically excludes coverage for any intentional, malicious conduct, or acts taken outside 
the course and scope of an insured's employment, which cause bodily injury or property 
damage. Additionally, the ICRMP policy specifically excludes coverage under the Errors 
and Omissions section for any claims seeking recovery for bodily injuries or law 
enforcement activities. The E & 0 section also excludes coverage for acts which 
commence prior to the retroactive date, which is identified in the policy declarations as 
November 29, 1985. Finally, from the Complaint, it appears the Plaintiff may seek punitive 
damages, which are excluded under the lCRMP policy. 
Because the Complaint does include allegations of negligence, which could potentially 
describe a covered claim under the Comprehensive General Liability Insuring Agreements, 
ICRMP will, in accordance with the terms and conditions of its policy, defend Kootenai 
County and its current and former employees, Glenn Walker, Marc Haws, Peter Erbland, 
and George Elliott. By extending a defense, ICRMP does not waive, and reserves all 
rights under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, and specifically reserves its 
right to deny any obligation to indemnify Kootenai County, Glenn Walker, Marc Haws, 
Peter Erbland, or George Elliott for any claims which are currently pled, and which do not 
describe a covered claim under the terms and conditions of the ICRMP policy. 
Additionally, ICRMP does not waive its right to withdraw its defense of Kootenai County, 
Haws, Erbland, and Elliott, should it be determined that coverage under the ICRMP policy 
does not exist for the claims set forth in the Complaint. 
If you have any questions concerning the above, and our position with respect to ICRMP's 
duty to defend or indemnify Kootenai County, and its former and current employees, 
please advise. 
Clhims Manager . 
cc: John Goedde, Agent 
John Nichols, AMS 
Chris Wotton, Lloyds 
Randy Robinson, Northland 
Richard D. Ferguson, Director 
EXHIBIT C 
R E C E I V E D  
3'85 Washington Street 
Mail Code 103N 
St. Paul, MN 55102 
February 13,2006 CERTIFIED MAIL 
Ms. Lynnette McHenry 
Claim Manager 
ldaho Counties Risk Management Program 
3100 Vista Avenue, Suite 300 
Boise, ID 83705 
Re: Our Insured: ICRMPIKootenai County 
Plaintiff: Don Paradis 
Our Claim Number: 23,AA101263-44 
Date of Loss: June 23, 2980 
Claim made: October 9,2001 
Dear Ms. McHenry: 
This letter acknowledges receipt of the amended Complaint in the matter of Don Paradis v. 
Kootenai Count%, filed in United States District Court fpr the District of Idaho, Case No. CIV03- 
150 on April 9, 2003. 
This matter was referred to Northfield Insurance Company for consideration under Policies 
M I 0 1  127 and AA101263. The policies provide various excess coverages to I.C.R.M.P. as 
follows: 
Policy No. AA101127 provides comprehensive general liability coverage, on an occurrence 
basis, with a policy period of December 31, 1994 to December 31, 1995. 
Policy No. AA101263 provides errors and omissions coverage, on a claims-made basis, 
with a policy period of October I, 2000 to October I, 2001, and a retroactive date of 
November 29, 1985. 
Both coverages are subject to a self insured retention of $150,000. 
That facts and important dates are as follows; 
June 23, 1980, Don Paradis was arrested and incarcerated on a charge of murder. 
1981, Paradis was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. 
e 1996 his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment following claims that investigators 
and prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence. 
April 10, 2001, following appeals, the court commuted Paradis sentence and released him 
from prison. 
October 9; 2001, Paradis filed a Notice of Claim against Kootenai County. 
Ms. Lynnette McHenry 
February 17,2006 
Page 2 
April 9, 2003, Paradis filed suit against Kootenai County prosecutors and deputies for false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and withholding exculpatory evidence in 
violation of his civil rights of due process and unreasonable arrest and seizure. 
1 draw your attention to the ALL LINES AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY (PE-OCC 
JAN. 94), which states: 
GENERAL INSURING AGREEMENTS 
SECTION II -COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY 
INSURING AGREEMENTS 
A - COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY: Underwriters 
hereby agree, subject to the limitations, terms and conditions 
hereunder mentioned, to indemnity the Assured for all sums, 
including expenses, all as more fully defined by the term ultimate 
net loss, which the Assured shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages imposed by law because of bodily injury, property 
damage, personal injury, advertising injury, products liability and or 
completed operations, hosVliquor liability or incidental malpractice 
which result from an occurrence and which occur during the policy 
period. . . . 
C - LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY: Underwriters hereby agree, 
subiect to the limitations, terms and conditions hereunder 
mentioned, to indemnify the Assured for all sums which the Assured 
shall be obligated to pay by reason of errors, omissions or negligent 
acts arising out of the performance of the Assured's duties while 
acting as a law enforcement official or officer in the regular course of 
public employment as hereinafter defined, arising out of any 
occurrence from any cause on account of Personal Injury, Bodily 
Injury, Property Damage, Violation of Civil Rights or First Aid, 
happening during the period of this insurance. . . 
EXCLUSIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTION I1 
THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY - to any claim, whether direct 
or consequential, or for any cause of action which is covered under 
any other Section of this policy or 
A. to personal injury or property damage which the Assured 
intended or expected or reasonably could have expected. 
Please refer to the ALL LINES AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY for 
Ms. Lynnette McHenry 
February 17,2006 
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the definition of "occurrence." 
It is our position there is no coverage for any injuries or damages claimed by Don 
Paradis under SECTION II, COVERAGE A - COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY 
or COVERAGE C - LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY of the ALL LINES 
AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY, because the injuries or damages: 
Did not arise from an occurrence during the period of this insurance; or 
Were expected or intended from the standpoint of Kootenai County or their 
employees. 
Next, please direct your attention to SECTION IV - ERRORS AND OMISSIONS, of the 
ALL LINES AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY, which states: 
INSURING AGREEMENT 
If during the Policy Period, any Claim is first made against the 
Assured for a Wrongful Act, Underwriters will indemnify the 
Assured, for all Loss incurred by the Assured by reason of any 
Wrongful Act . . . 
Please refer to Endorsement No. 14, which states: 
Effective date of this endorsement is October 1, 2000. Endorsement 
No. 14. . . 
Section IV retroactive dates 
Kootenai County - November 29, 1985 for the first $1,000,000 any 
one claim, December 31, 1994 for the next $1,00O,OW any one claim 
and October 1, 2000 for the remaining $4,000,000 any one claim. . . . 
I next refer you to EXCLUSIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTION IV, which states: 
THIS SECTION SHALL NOT APPLY - to any Claim for damages, 
whether direct or consequential or for any cause of action which is 
covered under any other Section of this policy or to any Claim . . . 
B. brought about or contributed to by fraud, dishonesty or criminal 
act of any Assured: . . . 
G. resulting from an occurrence which commences prior to the 
Retroactive Date set out in Declaration 4 of November 29, 
1985 
H. for bodily injury or property damage; 
Ms. Lynnette McHenry 
February 17,2006 
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I. arising out of law enforcement activities; 
Please refer to the ALL LINES AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY for 
the definitions of "claim first made" and "wrongful act." 
It is our position that there is no coverage for Kootenai Colrnty under SECTION IV - 
ERRORS AND OMISSIONS of the ALL LINES AGGREGATE INSURANCE POLICY, for 
any injuries or damages claimed by Don Paradis because: 
* the clairn was not first made against the Assured during the policy period of 
October 1,2000, to October 1,2001; or 
the claim was brought about by fraud, dishonesty or criminal acts; or 
the claim resulted from an occurrence that commenced in 1980 and 1981, prior to 
the retroactive date of November 29, 1985; or 
the claim arose out of bodily injury; or 
the claim arose out of law enforcement activities. 
Because there is no coverage for Kootenai County under the ALL LINES AGGREGATE 
INSURANCE POLICY, Northfield Insurance Company is unable to consider indemnification 
of I.C.R.M.P. for any damages awarded or sums incurred in the defense of Kootenai County 
in this lawsuit. 
Should you'have any questions regarding this matter or wish to discuss this matter further, 
. - please contact me at 651-310-4427. 
Sincerely, 
Erik Martensen 
Technical Specialist 
Northfield lnsurance 
EXHIBIT D 
- 
ICMP ... mote than jut ~ ~ U ~ M C B  
- 
L Y N N E ~ E  L. MCHENRY 
ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL 
&CLAIMS M A N A G E R  
March 2.2003 
Erik Martensen 
Technical Specialist, Specialty Claims 
Northfield Insurance Company 
385 Washington Street 
Mail Code 103 N 
St. Paul, MN 55109-1309 
RE: CLAIM NUMBER: 2001019301 
INSURED: Kootenai County 
CLAIMANT: Donald Paradis 
DOL: 1985-2001 
Dear Mr. Martensen: 
We have received your letter dated Februarv 13, 2006 reaardina the above-entitled 
matter. In your correspondence, Northland lnsurance combany & taking the position 
that, due to various exclusions and conditions within the ICRMP and Northland 
policies, that coverage does not exist in the Paradis litigation for Kootenai County 
and any of that entity's present and former employees. I must advise you that I 
believe your position is mistaken and should be reconsidered. 
As background, I am enclosing for your file, a copy of the reservation of rights letter 
which ICRMP provided to Kootenai County on November 5,2003 when this case was 
first filed. As you can see from the reservation of rights letter, ICRMP took the 
position that many of the claims in the Paradis Complaint were not entitled to 
coverage for various reasons, including the intentional tort exclusions you have cited 
as well as the operation of the retroactive date. However, as noted in the reservation 
of rights letter, the Paradis Complaint is not limited to intentional torts. Instead, the 
Complaint alleges the acts of Kootenai County and its employees were negligent. 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PWGRAM. UNDERWR~ERS O 3100 VISTA AVENUE, SuiTE 3 0 0  9 BOISE. IDAHO 83705  9 PO. BOX 15249 O BOISE. 
PHONE (208) 336.3100 O FAX (208)  336.2100 
Erik Martensen 
March 2,2006 
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According to Mr. Paradis, this negligence caused his false imprisonment and 
resultant emotional distress associated with over twenty years of imprisonment. 
ICRMP took the position that, while it was questionable that a duty to indemnify 
would arise, a duty to defend did exist since the torts of false imprisonment and 
infliction of emotional distress are continuing torts. Because of this, the torts were 
ongoing when Kootenai first became an ICRMP insured in 1985 and continued until 
Paradis was released from prison in April of 2001. It is important to note that, from 
1985 until Mr. Paradis was released in 2001, Kootenai County was, at all times, an 
ICRMP insured. 
In Idaho, an insurer's duty to defend is a separate and much broader duty than its 
obligation to indemnify. Kootenai Co. v. Western Caualty & Sur. Co., 113 
ldaho 908, 750 P.2d 87 (1988). The ldaho Supreme Court has consistently ruled 
that the duty to defend arises upon the filing of a Complaint whose allegations, in 
whole or in part, read broadly, reveal a potential for liability that would be covered by 
the insured's policy. See Amco Ins. Co. v. Tri-Spur lnv. Co., 140 ldaho 733, 101 
P.3d 226 (2004), Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 ldaho 367'48 P.3d 1256 (2002); 
Const. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 135 ldaho 680, 23 P.3d 142 
(2001). Mindful of this standard, ICRMP reviewed the Paradis complaint and, 
considering the allegations of negligence and the existence of a continuing tort, came 
to the conclusion that the complaint, read broadly, described a claim which was 
potentially entitled to coverage under the ICRMP policy. For that reason, ICRMP has 
defended this case under a reservation of rights. 
ICRMP's treatment of the negligence and emotional distress claims as continuing 
torts must also be considered in light of the District Court rulings in the Paradis 
matter resolving various motions to dismiss. In his September29, 2004 
Memorandum Decision and Order, the Honorable 8. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge for 
the United States District Court for the District of ldaho, concluded that various state 
law claims, including emotional distress and false imprisonment were not entitled to 
dismissal under the statute of limitations as those claims constituted continuing torts 
which did not accrue until Mr. Paradis was released from prison. In light of this ruling, 
it is apparent that ICRMP correctly assessed its duty to defend in this case and has 
acted appropriately. This   ling also demonstrates that your decision to deny 
coverage under the Comprehensive General Liability Insuring Agreement is 
erroneous. False imprisonment and emotional distress caused by alleged negligent 
acts describe claims which are potentially entitled to coverage under the ICRMP 
policy. The retroactive date does not bar coverage for these claims as they did not 
accrue until April of 2001. Accordingly, I would ask that you reassess your position 
and withdraw your February 13,2006 denial of coverage. 
Erik Martensen 
March 2,2006 
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I look forward to your prompt response. 
cc: Richard D. Ferguson, Director 
EXHIBIT E 
R E C E I V E D  
MAR 2 O 2006 
ICRMP 
385 Washington Street 
Mail Code 103N 
St. Paul, MN 55102 
March 15, 2006 CERTIFIED MAIL 
Ms. Lynnette McHenry 
Claim Manager 
ldaho Counties Risk Management Program 
3100 Vista Avenue, Suite 300 
Boise, ID 83705 
Re: Our Insured: ICRMPIKootenai County 
Plaintiff: Don Paradis 
Our Claim Number: 23,AAI 01 263-44 
Date of Loss: June 23,1980 
Claim made: October 9,2001 
Dear Ms. McHenry: 
I am in receipt of and thank you foryour letterof March2, 2003, in which you'outline your 
position that Northfield Insurance owes indemnification for the Paradis litigation. As you 
requested, wehave reconsidered our position regarding coverage. , . . . .  ,.. 
, . .. .,.;,.: . . .  - :  ". .. , < . . , . 
. # . . . ,  . . . . . .. ,, . 
That facts and important datesare as follows:' 
* On June 23, 1980, Don Paradis was arrested and incarcerated on a charge of murder. 
In 1981. Paradis was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. 
In 1996; his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment following claims that investigators 
and prosecutors withheld excul~atow evidence. 
On April 10, 2001, following appeals; the court commuted Paradis sentence and released 
him from prison. 
On October 9, 2001, Paradis filed a Notice of Claim against Kootenai County. 
On April 9, 2003, Paradis filed suit against Kootenai County prosecutors and deputies for 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and withholding exculpatory 
evidence in violation of his civil rights of due process and unreasonable arrest and seizure. 
We are aware of the decision by Honorable B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge for the United States 
District Court for the district of Idaho, for which the Judge ruled that Mr. Paridis' claims 
constituted a continuing tort and were not barred by statute of limitation defenses. 
Insurance law is.governed:by.:state insurance contract law, not federal law. The statute of 
limitations principles do not guide d 
insura~~e:cov,eragepurpmses. . ,  . . . . ... : 
:. ; , . . ; . :  . . . . . i!.:;:,. ;. -'.;:.!.::' " ! ' .  .:.' " .'.' 
It is. the ~ause.,of the Ipss..and not:th 
under'the policy. Northfield Insurance is only liable under an occurrence policy for an event or 
. . 
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accident which occurred during the policy period. Northfield lnsurance is not liable for claims 
arising out of an event or accident which occurred prior to the effective date of the insurance 
coverage, even though damages and claims continued to accrue from this cause during the later 
period of coverage. Applachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty MM. Ins. Corp., 507 F. Supp. 59 (D.C. Pa. 
1981). 
Ne~ther the federal civil rights claims nor the state law claims under ldaho law would constitute 
an occurrence during the policy period. Please direct your attention to Kootenai County v. 
Western Casualty & Surety Co., 113 ldaho 908, 914-15, 750 P.2d 87, 93-94 (1988). A county 
sheriff, acting upon a writ of execution, conducted a sale of property, but failed to comply with the 
statutory notice requ~rements, subjecting him to civil penalties payable to the aggrieved party. 
Following the six month redemption period, the sheriff issued the deed for the property to the 
purchasers, as required by statute. However, during this redemption period, Kootenai County 
secured an occurrence policy from Lloyd's and made a claim for coverage under the policy, 
asserting that the delivery of the deed, in conjunction with the earlier improper sale, constituted a 
single integrated occurrence. The ldaho Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the 
only wrongful act and occurrence was the improperly conducted sale. The court stated: 
The improper execution of the sale is not an event covered by the Llovd's wolicv since it 
. . 
occurred almost six months prior to the effective date of the policy. An insurer I's not liable 
for claims arisinq out of an event or accident which occurred wrior to the effective date of 
the insurance coveraqe, even thouqh damaaes and claims continue to accrue from this 
cause durina the later weriod of coveraae. 
Similarly, in City of Erie, Pa. v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 156 (3'* cir. 1997), the court 
concluded that a claim of malicious prosecution occurred when the underlying criminal charges 
were filed, for purposes of determining insurance coverage, and not at the later time that the 
action was ultimately favorably terminated to the benefit of the claimant. 
After further evaluation, we have determined that our position regarding coverage, as outlined in 
our February 13, 2006 letter, remains unchanged. Also should you wish to further discuss this 
matter, please contact me at 651-310-4427 (direct dial line). 
Sincerely, 
Erik Martensen 
Technical Specialist 
Northfield lnsurance 
EXHIBIT F 
- 
ICRMP ..a* thaniat wutance 
- 
L Y N N ~ E  L. MCHENRY 
ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL 
&CLAIMS MANAGER 
June 27,2006 
Erik Martensen 
Technical Specialist 
Northland Insurance 
385 Washington Street 
Mail Code 103N 
St. Paul, MN 55102 
Re: Paradis v. Kootenai County 
ICRMP Claim No. 2001028381 
Northland Claim No. 23,AA101263-44 
Dear Erik: 
As you are aware, ICRMP has throughout this litigation provided a defense to its 
insureds, Kootenai County, Mark Haws, George Elliott, and Peter Erbland in the above- 
referenced litigation. The defense has been extended under a reservation of rights. 
Throughout the litigation, ICRMP has provided Northland with regular reports detailing 
the status of the litigation and the defense costs which were being incurred. 
Under the reinsurance policy purchased from Northland, ICRMP maintained a 
$150,000.00 self insured retention (SIR). The SIR included defense costs. To date, the 
defense costs incurred in the Paradis litigation total $423,305.33. Because the SIR has 
been exhausted, Northland's obligation to reimburse ICRMP for defense costs 
exceeding the SIR has now arisen. Accordingly, I am enclosing an interim billing for 
reimbursement of the litigation costs paid by ICRMP through June 23, 2006. 
Please be advised that pursuant to the Court's ruling on the Motions for Summary 
Judgment filed on behalf of the insureds, all claims against Peter Erbland have been 
dismissed. Additionally, many of the claims against Kootenai County, George Elliott, 
and Mark Haws were dismissed. However, because the Court retained some of the 
causes of action against the County, Mr. Elliott and Mr. Haws, the litigation is ongoing. 
Trial is scheduled for October of 2006 and is expected to last an entire month. 
Due to the exhaustion of the SIR, Northland's obligation to reimburse ICRMP for 
defense costs will continue through trial. Additionally, should the case proceed to trial, 
Northland will be obligated to indemnify ICRMP for any adverse verdict entered against 
Kootenai County, Mr. Elliott, or Mr. Haws finding them liable for a covered claim. 
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Erik Martensen 
June  27,2006 
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In light of the foregoing, ICRMP is inviting Northland to participate in discussions 
surrounding the litigation strategy and potential settlement of the litigation. Considering 
the litigation costs w e  will continue to incur, it is prudent a t  this time to discuss the 
meriis of seeking a mediated o r  negotiated settlement. 
Additionally, a decision needs  to be made concerning whether ICRMP and Northland 
will s eek  reimbursement from the insureds for litigation costs relating to the defense of 
clearly non-covered claims. As you a r e  aware, ICRMP has  defended the entire lawsuit, 
despite the fact there are  claims which are  not entitled to coverage. ICRMP was 
required to proceed in this fashion due  to the well-established principle that where a 
Complaint describes a potentially covered claim, the duty to defend extends to the 
entire Complaint, including the excluded claims. See Primrose Operating Company 
v. National American Insurance Company, 382 F3d. 546 (5" Cir. 2004); United 
Sewices Automobile Association v. Morris, 154 Arizona 113, 741 P2d. (1987). A 
growing numbers of courts have recognized the inequity of this requirement and have 
recognized the insurer's right to seek reimbursement from its insured for defense costs 
relating to clearly excluded claims. 
Due to the fact the SIR has  been exhausted, I invite Northland's input and comment 
concerning whether the insured should be notified that the company intends to seek  
reimbursement for the defense costs. described above. Additionally, in a n  effort t o  
protect Northland's rights in this case,  I welcome your comments concerning future 
defense strategy, including mediation o r  settlement discussions. 
I look forward to your prompt response. 
& Claims Manager 
Cc: Richard Ferguson, Executive Director 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
3100 Vista Avenue, Ste 300 
PO Box 15116 
Boise, ID 83715 
208-246-821 6 
208-246-8200 (fax) 
INTERIM 
REINSURANCE BILLING STATEMENT 
Date: June 23,2006 
Reinsurer: Erik Martensen 
Technical Specialist 
Northland Insurance 
385 Washington Street 
Mail Code 103N 
St. Paul, MN 55102 
Adjuster: Lynnette L. McHenry 
Associate General Counsel & 
Claims Manager 
Claim #s: 2001028381 
2001022516 
2001019301 
2001 022524 
Claimant: Donald Paradis 
Insured: KOOTENAI COUNTY 
Total Paid: $423,305.33 
Less: SIR: ($150,000.00)' 
Less: Deductible: ($ 5,000.00) 
Less: Othec -- 
AMOUNT DUE: $268,305.33 
Please send your check to the Attention of ICRMP Accounting Department. 
Thank you. 
Cc: ICRMP Accounting Dept. 
EXHIBIT G 
P.O. Box 64805 
St. Paul. MN 55164 
July 20,2006 CERTlF lED MAIL 
ICRMP 
Lynette McHenry, Claim Manager 
3100 Vista Avenue, Suite 300 
Boise, ID 83705 
Re: Insured Member: Kootenai County 
Plaintiff: Donald Paradis 
Claim Number: 23AA101263-44 
Occurrence/Arrest Date: June 23,1980 
Dear Ms. McHenry: 
I am in receipt of and thank you for your letter dated June 27,2006 for which you cite 
case law supporting your position and submit an interim reimbursement request to 
Northfield lnsurance Company. 
We have reviewed this matter, including the case law you cited. Our coverage 
position, as outlined in our letter dated March 15, 2006, remains unchanged. I must 
therefore respectfully deny your requept for reimbursement. 
Northfield lnsurance Company acknowledges that ICRMP has invited us to be involved 
in the defense along with ICRMP, and to participate in the voluntary mediation. 
Because there is no coverage, we have no obligation to indemnify ICRMP and we 
therefore decline the opportunities extended. 
!f you would like to further discuss this matter, please contact me at (651) ,3104427 
(direct line). 
Sincerely. 
Erik Martensen, AIC 
Technical Specialist 
Northfield lnsurance Company 
Tel: (800) 328-5972, Ext. 04427 
Fax: (866) 842-91 81 
Donald J. Farley 
ISB #I561 ; djf@hallfarley.com 
Bryan A. Nickels 
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:VV-241.14\Answer.doc 
Attorneys for Defendant Northland Insurance Companies, 
properly identified as Northfield Insurance Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I DAHO COUNTIES RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
UNDERWRITERS, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE 
COMPANIES, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 06171 12 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
(Jury Trial Demanded) 
COMES NOW defendant, Northland Insurance Companies, incorrectly identified in 
plaintiff Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters' Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial ("Complaint"), and whose proper name and identity herein is Northfield Insurance 
Company ("Northfield"), by and through its counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & 
Blanton, P.A., in answer to such Complaint on file herein, answers, alleges, and states as follows: 
&&%ER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 1 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Each and every allegation of the plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim for relief 
against defendant Northfield. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
I. 
Each and every allegation contained in plaintiffs Complaint, and each and every cause of 
action, is denied unless specifically admitted in this defense. 
11. 
With respect to paragraph I1 of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits only 
that it is a corporation engaged in the business of selling insurance in the State of Idaho. 
111. 
With respect to paragraphs I11 and IV of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield 
admits that at all relevant times, it had a Certificate of Authority issued by the Idaho Department 
of Insurance authorizing Northfield to transact the business of insurance in the State of Idaho, 
and has engaged in the business of selling insurance policies within the State of Idaho. 
IV. 
With respect to paragraph IX of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits that in 
April, 2003, Kootenai County and certain employees or former employees of Kootenai County 
were named as defendants in a civil lawsuit filed by Donald Paradis in the United States District 
Court for the District of Idaho. 
v. 
With respect to paragraph XI of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits that 
plaintiff notified Northfield of the Paradis lawsuit and Northfield received a copy of the Paradis 
Complaint. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 2 
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VI. 
With respect to paragraph XI11 of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits only 
that, on or about March 6, 2006, it received a copy of an unsigned letter dated June 30, 2003, 
from Lynette McHenry to Erika Ellingson regarding 1 d a .  Counties Risk Management 
Program's defense of Kootenai County. 
VII. 
With respect to paragraph XVI of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits only 
that Erik Martensen addressed correspondence to Lynnette McHenry by letter dated February 13, 
2006; defendant Northfield further states that the document identified as Exhibit C to plaintiffs 
Complaint speaks for itself. 
VIII. 
With respect to paragraph XVIl of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits 
only that Lynnette McHe~vy addressed correspondence to Erik Martensen by letter dated March 
2, 2003 (which was a typographical error and apparently intended to be dated March 2, 2006), 
and that Erik Martensen addressed correspondence to Lynnette McHenry by letter dated March 
15, 2006; defendant Northfield further states that the documents identified as Exhibit D & E to 
plaintiffs Complaint speak for themselves 
IX. 
With respect to paragraphs XVIII and XU(: of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield 
admits only that that Lynnette McHenry addressed correspondence to Erik Martensen by letter 
dated June 27,2006; defendant Northfield further states that the document identified as Exhibit F 
to plaintiffs Complaint speaks for itself. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 3 
X. 
With respect to paragraph XX of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant Northfield admits only 
that Erik Martensen addressed correspondence to Lynette McHenry by letter dated July 20,2006; 
defendant Northfield further states that the document identified as Exhibit G to plaintiffs 
Complaint speaks for itself. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintifi's claim is barred under the doctrines of laches, waiver, unclean hands, andlor 
estoppel under the circumstances asserted in the Complaint. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate its damages, if any. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has not complied with all conditions precedent to bringing this action or to make 
a claim for benefits under any policy of insurance. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff, through its own acts or omissions, has breached the cooperation clause under 
any applicable policy of insurance. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs alleged damages and the claims and causes of action against the Kootenai 
County defendants in the Paradis lawsuit are and were not covered, or are otherwise excluded, 
under the insurance policy issued to plaintiff by defendant Northfield. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 4 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Defendant Northfield had no contractual duty or legal obligation to defend Kootenai 
County or its employees in the Paradis lawsuit or to participate in any mediation or settlement of 
the Paradis lawsuit. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff, at various time since plaintiff be4an insuring Kootenai County and its 
employees, had other policies of indemnity or reimbursement insurance than the policy or 
policies issued by defendant to plaintiff herein. Such policy or policies of insurance are primary 
to any policy provided to plaintiff by defendant Northfield, andlor any policy provided by 
defendant Northfield is excess or shares any monetary obligation to indemnify or reimburse 
plaintiff on a pro rata basis with such other insurance. In asserting this defense, defendant 
Northfield does not admit that any policy or policies of insurance issued by it provide coverage 
to plaintiff for the defense costs incurred in or settlement of the Paradis lawsuit. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs insureds, Kootenai County and/or its employees, had liability insurance other 
than liability insurance provided by plaintiff, insuring against liability for the event, events, 
occurrence or occurrences which gave rise to the Paradis lawsuit. Plaintiff either had no 
coverage of Kootenai County and its employees, or if it is determined there was coverage, 
plaintiffs insurance of Kootenai County and its employees named in the Paradis lawsuit was 
either excess to or pro rata with such other insurance. 
ELEVENTHDEFENSE 
Defendant's breach of contract, if any, is excused by the plaintiffs preceding material 
breach of contract. 
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TWELFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is barred by the par01 evidence rule andlor by the 
doctrine of integrated contracts. 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff undertook the defense of Kootenai County and its employees and settled with 
Paradis without contractual obligation to do so, and was therefore a volunteer. Defendant has no 
obligation to indemnify or reimburse plaintiff. 
RESERVATION OF DEFENSES 
Defendant, by virtue of pleading a defense above, does not admit that said defense is an 
"affirmative defense" within the meaning of applicable law, and Defendant does not thereby 
assume a burden of proof or production not otherwise imposed upon it as a matter of law. In 
addition, in asserting any of the above defenses, Defendant does not admit any fault, 
responsibility, liability or damage but, to the contrary, expressly denies the same. Discovery has 
yet to commence, the results of which may disclose the existence of facts supporting further and 
additional defenses. Defendant, therefore, reserves the right to seek leave of this Court to amend 
its Answer as it deems appropriate. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY PEES 
In order to defend this action, defendant Northfield has been required to retain the 
services of Hall, Farley, Obenecht & Blanton, P.A. to defend this matter, and is entitled to 
recover its attorney fees and costs incurred herein, pursuant to Idaho Code 8s 12-120, 12-121, 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 6 
and 12-123, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and any other applicable statute, rule, or 
regulation. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant 
Northfield hereby demands trial by jury as to all issues so triable in this matter, by a jury of not 
less than twelve (12) persons. 
WHEREFORE, Northfield Insurance Company prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That plaintiffs Complaint and demand for jury trial be dismissed with prejudice 
and that plaintiff takes nothing thereby; 
2. For judgment against plaintiff for defendant Northfield's costs and attorney fees 
incurred in the defense of this matter; and 
3. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this 2 day of October, 2006. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
~ 6 o r n e ~ s  for Defendant Northfield 
Insurance Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 day of October, 2006, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO ?%%PLA~NT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, 
by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Phillip J. Collaer - / U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP - Hand Delivered 
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700 - Overnight Mail 
P. 0. Box 7426 - Telecopy 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Fax: (208) 344-5510 
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Phillip J. Collaer, IS6 No. 3447 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, ldaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-551 0 
E-Mail: pcollaer@ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
a Minnesota corporation, 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Defendant. 1 
Case No. CV OC 061 71 12 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record, Anderson, 
Julian & Hull, and moves this Court, pursuant to  Rule 56 of the ldaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for entry of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the ground 
. . 
that there is no genuine issue as to  any material fact and that plaintiff' is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
6* 
DATED this a day of November, 2006. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
BY &~.k- - 
Phillip J. Collaer, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this - 17 day of November, 2006, 1 served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT by delivering the same to  each of the following attorneys of record, by 
the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Donald J. Farley U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Bryan A. Nickels C] Hand-Delivered 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & C] Overnight Mail 
Blanton, PA C] Facsimile C] Electronic Delivery 
702 W. Idaho, Suite 700 
PO Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1 271 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
Attorneys for Defendant 
&A. (&lo& 
Phillip J. Collaer 
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Donald J. Farley 
ISB #1561; djf@hallfarley.com 
Bryan A. Nickels 
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W.V.12-241 I4MSJ-Response doc 
Attorneys for Defendant Northland Insurance Companies, 
Properly identified as Northfield Insurance Company 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
UNDERWRITERS, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE 
COMPANIES, 
CaseNo. CV OC 0617112 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the defendant, Northfield Insurance Company ("Northfield"), by and 
through its undersigned counsel of record, and hereby submits its response to Plaintiff Idaho 
Counties Risk Management Program Underwriter's (hereinafler "ICRMP") Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment ("plaintiffs Motion"). For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs Motion 
should be denied. 
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INTRODUCTION 
ICRMP filed its complaint in this action against Northfield alleging that Northfield had 
breached an insurance contract between Northfield and ICRMP. However, plaintiffs Motion 
has nothing to do with the insurance contract between ICRMP and Northfield. Instead, ICRMP 
asks this Court to, in reality, issue an advisory opinion on an issue that is irrelevant and 
immaterial to whether there is or was coverage under the insurance policy issued bv Northfield 
to ICRMP. Plaintiffs Motion asks the Court to rule, one way or the other, whether ICRMP had 
a duty to defend Kootenai County in the Paradis civil rights case brought against Kootenai 
County. Apparently, ICRMP believes that a ruling confirming that ICRMP did, as a matter of 
law or fact, have a duty to defend Kootenai County in the Paradis case, under the liability policy 
ICRMP sold to Kootenai County, somehow enhances or may enhance its claim that Northfield 
breached the insurance policy between Northfield and ICRMP. 
But the policy issued by Northfield to ICRMP is not reinsurance, as ICRMP tries to 
describe. Regardless of whether ICRMP had a duty under its policy of liability insurance issued 
to Kootenai County to defend the county and its former employees and prosecutors in the 
case, the policy of reimbursement insurance between Northfield and ICRMP does not contain a 
duty to defend clause. The reimbursement policy issued by Northfield to ICRMP, and which 
ICRMP alleges in its complaint was breached, is an 'occunence' policy, the terms of which (and 
ICRMP's rights under it) stand alone, unrelated to ICRMP's liability policy insuring Kootenai 
Coutlty and its employees. Only if there is coverage under the terms of the Northfield policy 
issued to ICRMP does Northfield have any obligation to reimburse ICRMP for the monies 
ICRMP expended in defending and settling the Paradis lawsuit. 
As will be demonstrated in this response, and further addressed in a motion for summary 
judgment by Northfield, the reimbursement policy issued by Northfield did not, and does not, 
provide coverage for the Paradis defense costs and settlemcnt paid by ICRMP to Mr. Paradis. 
Consequently, addressing the issue of whether ICRMP had a duty to defend Kootenai County in 
the case, especially at this early stage of this case, serves no purpose to the resolution of 
the issues in this lawsuit between ICRMP and Northfield. 
Furthermore, Northfield has propounded extensive written discovery to ICRMP which 
ICRMP has not yet answered and which may be instructive, or at least disclose facts related to 
Northfield's response to plaintiffs Motion. As set forth in Northfield's Rule 56(f) Motion, 
responses to Northfield's discovery to ICRMP were due on November 28, 2006. Northfield 
granted to ICRMP a one-week extension to December 4, 2006 to respond, believing it would 
have responses and documents from such discovery before the due date for this brief. ICRMP 
has yet to respond, however. Therefore, Northfield reserves the right to supplement this 
response as may be necessary to include further argument and facts related to plaintiffs Motion 
based upon ICRMP's discovery responses. 
ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be denied, or, at a minimum, the 
Court should defer ruling on plaintiffs Motion so that it can be addressed along with 
Northfield's motion for s u a r y  judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN DISPUTE 
As an initial matter, defendant Northfield notes that, as discussed above, the issue posed 
to the Court by plaintiffs Motion is irrelevant to the plaintiffs claim for breach of contract 
against Northfield. As such, a vast majority of the alleged facts identified by ICRMP in support 
of plaintiffs Motion have no bearing or relevancy to the claims in this action, as they primarily 
focus on ICRMP's handling of the Paradis matter under its own policy. Based upon this lack of 
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relevancy - and as Northfield still seeks discovery responses from ICRMP - there are but few 
material facts that Northfield disputes at this juncture.' Most importantly, plaintiff attempts to 
characterize the Northfield policy as "reinsurance," which is incorrect. The particular facts 
alleged by ICRMP in plaintiffs Motion, disputed by Northfield, are as follows: 
1. "Since its inception 119851 through the 2000-2001 policy year, ICRMP purchased 
reinsurance from Northland Insurance Companies ('Northland)." (plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("plaintiffs Memo"), at 2) - As 
discussed more thoroughly below, the Northfield insurance policy issued to ICRMP, which is the 
policy ICRMP alleges in its complaint was breached, is not "reinsurance." Such a 
characterization suggests that the Northfield policy "follows form" and/or "follows the fortune" 
and contains such provisions. Such provisions are not present in the Notihfield Policy. To the 
contrary, the Northfield policy is, instead, a reimbursement insurance policy, subject to its own 
terms and conditions, isolated and separate from any provisions of the ICRMP policy. Further, 
plaintiff has not identified nor otherwise provided copies of any such policies for the claimed 
years. Rather, upon a review of Northfield's records, it appears that Northfield only issued the 
reimbursement policies to ICRMP for 1966-88 and 1994-2001. Affidavit of Brian R. Martens in 
Support of Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Martens 
Aff."), at 172. A copy of the Northfield Public Entity All Lines Aggregate Insurance Policy 
issued to ICRMP for the 2000 - 2001 year is attached to Mr. Martens' affidavit. 
2. "The Pavadis Complaint focused upon the circumstances surrounding Mr. 
Paradis' initial arrest. conviction, and incarceration for the murder of Kimberly Ann Palmer." 
(plaintiffs Memo at 3) -Notably absent from plaintiffs discussion - and exceptionally relevant 
' To the extent necessary, Northfield will address additional specific facts alleged by ICRMP following discovery, 
as requested in Northfield's Rule 56(f) Motion. 
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to this action - is when the acts by Kootenai County and its law enforcement employees and 
prosecutors occurred, which Mr. Paradis claimed in his complaint violated his civil rights and 
resulted in his conviction for murder. Mr. Paradis was initially convicted of first degree murder 
in 1981, and subsequently sentenced to death. Affidavit of Lynnette McHenry in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("plaintiffs Affidavit"), Exhibit 4, 
Memorandum Decision and Order at 2-3. Mr. Paradis' complaint alleges that his first 
appearance in an Idaho court was on November 26, 1980, and that he was incarcerated in various 
places from June 23, 1980 until April 10,2001. Id., Exh. 2, at 775 & 41. The Paradis complaint 
alleged the defendants failed to produce exculpatory evidence in advance of his trial which 
resulted in his murder conviction. Significantly, however, the retroactive date for Northfield's 
reimbursement coverage of ICRMP relating to Kootenai County - for Section IV coverage 
(Errors or Omissions) - is November 29, 1985, approximately four years after the acts 
complained of by Mr. paradis.' Plaintiff has attempted to brush these key dates aside, asserting 
simply that the Paradis action alleged 'continuing torts' (plaintiffs Memo at 4-5) - essentially 
arguing that the actual acts complained of have no meaning in the coverage determination. The 
dates Paradis alleged that Kootenai County withheld evidence and otherwise committed the acts 
giving rise to Paradis' lawsuit are crucial to the understanding of this action, and will be more 
thoroughly addressed in defendant's own motion for summary judgment later in this litigation. 
3. "A copy of the reservation of rights letter was forwarded to Northland Insurance 
Companies." (plaintiffs Memo at 4). Defendant Northfield was forwarded an unsigned copy of 
the referenced June 30,2003, reservation of rights letter by way of correspondence from ICRMP 
dated March 2, 2003 (correctly 2006, as noted by the stamp and the content of the 
2 The ICRMP policy (McHenry Aff., Exh. I)  also contains a retroactive date - for Section IV Errors and Omissions 
liability - of November 29, 1985. 
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correspondence). Martens Aff., Exh. B. Additionally, note that ICRMP did not provide notice 
that it had exhausted its $150,000 self-insured retention until June 27, 2006 - after it had 
incurred a total of $423,305.33 in defense costs. Martens Aff., Exh. C. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Motions for summary judgment should be granted only when no genuine issues of 
material fact exist after the pleadings, deposition, admission and affidavits have been construed 
most favorably to the non-moving party and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Johnson v. Studlev-Preston, 119 Idaho 1055, 1057,812 P.2d 1216, 
1218 (1991). Additionally, the court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non- 
moving party and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West 
Homeowner's Assoc. v. Bear Lake County, 1 18 Idaho 343, 346, 796 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1990). 
Furthermore, all doubts are to be resolved against the moving party and the motion must be 
denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if 
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Kokot, 117 Idaho 963, 966, 793 
P.2d 195, 198 (1990). If the summary judgment proceeding involves the interpretation of 
unambiguous legal documents, the interpretation of those documents is a question of law for the 
trial court. Id If the documents are ambiguous their interpretation is a question of fact for the 
trier of fact. Id. 
ARGUMENT 
A.. Defendant's Motion Does Not Disoense of Any "Claim, Counterclaim or Cross-Claim" 
Between Northfield and ICRMP. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides, in relevant part: 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain 
a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of twenty (20) days 
from the service of process upon the adverse party or that party's appearance in 
the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
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party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in that 
party's favor upon all or any part thereof. 
Plaintiffs Motion fails to meet the ends intended by IRCP 56. It does not dispense with any 
"claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim." Rather, plaintiff simply seeks the Court's ruling that 
plaintiff had its own duty to defend Kootenai County under ICRMP's own policy of liability 
insurance issued to Kootenai County; if plaintiff prevails, no "claim, counterclaim, or cross- 
claim" is resolved, and no judgment of any kind can be entered against defendant. See 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("plaintiffs 
Memo"), at 20 ("The question of whether ICRMP was obligated to defend the Paradis lawsuit 
presents a clear issue of law."). 
The present action relates to plaintiffs claims regarding defendant's alleged duties and 
obligations under the policy defendant issued to ICRMP; to wit, a breach-of-contract claim that 
defendant Northfield has failed to reimburse ICRMP under the policy between Northfield and 
ICRMP. However, the issues addressed in plaintiffs Motion do not establish - nor even address 
- this single claim against defendant Northfield. The plaintiff has not even filed a copy of a 
Northfield policy in conjunction with its motion. To the contrary, plaintiff is asking the Court to 
rule on its own obligations under its own policy ICRMP issued to Kootenai County. 
Defendant's Motion fails to meet the ends posited by I.R.C.P. 56, and should be denied. 
B. Plaintiffs Motion Seeks an Advisorv O~inion of the Court. 
Similar to plaintiffs Motion's failure to meet the requirements of Rule 56, plaintiffs 
Motion, for the same reason, seeks an advisory opinion of the Court, is . ,  to rule on ICRMP's 
duty to defend under the policy issued by ICRMP to Kootenai County. However, under Idaho 
law, advisory opinions are not favored. See, e.g., Gafford v. State, 127 Idaho 472, 477-78, 903 
P.2d 61, 66-67 (1995)("Raising such a claim in the absence of a concrete dispute relating to the 
release provisions would be a futile act since it would constitute a request for an advisory 
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opinion which would be denied by the courts of this state."); Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 
133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006)("Although the Declaratory Judgment Act, Idaho Code Title 10, 
chapter 12, bestows the authority to declare rights, status, or other legal relations, that authority 
is circumscribed by the rule that "a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an 
actual or justiciable controversy exists.")(citing Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 
681 P.2d 988,991 (1984)). Courts are to look at the nature of the action to determine whether or 
not an advisory opinion is being sought: 
[A] controversy in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial 
determination. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference 
or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or 
moot. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations 
of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial 
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, 
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a 
hypothetical state of facts. Where there is such a concrete case admitting of an 
immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the'parties in an 
adversary proceeding upon the facts alleged, the judicial function may be 
appropriately exercised although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may 
not require the award of process or the payment of damages. 
State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 598, 809 P.2d 455, 459 (1991)(re: declaratory actions)(quoting 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227,241-42, 57 S. Ct. 461,464,81 L.Ed. 617 (1937)). 
In the present case, as discussed above, ICRMP seeks a ruling !%om this Court as to its 
duty to defend under the policy ICRMP issued to Kootenai County. However, in this action, the 
question has no bearing on the breach of contract action between ICRMP and Northfield, and 
does not relate to the policy between Northfield and ICRMP; Kootenai County is not even 
present as a party to this litigation to respond to the allegations made by ICRMP. Thus, 
plaintiffs Motion seeks an advisory ruling, and should be denied on those grounds. 
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C. Any defense obligations borne by ICRMP are the result of the ICRMP policy language, 
and do not relate to the language of the Northfield policy. 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that plaintiffs Motion relates only to whether 
ICRMP had a duty to defend Kootenai County under the ICRMP policy, and contains no 
discussion of any such duty under the Northfield policy. Under the ICRMP policy, ICRMP has 
an explicit obligation to defend its insureds for covered claims: 
9. Defense of Claims or Suit. We may investigate or settle any covered claim or 
suit against you, following review and consultation with you. We will provide a 
defense with counsel of our choice, at our expense, if you are sued for a covered 
claim. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay 
equals the Limits of Coverage afforded under this Policy, plus accrued costs of 
defense. 
McHenry Aff., ~ x h .  1, General Conditions, 79 @. 2). The ICRMPIKootenai County policy has 
the standard duty to defend clause found in virtually all comprehensive general liability policies. 
However, the Northfield policy is devoid of any similar duty-to-defend language, making no 
provision for the defense and settlement of claims arising under the ICRMP policy (such as 
Kootenai County's tender of defense to ICRMP for the action). In fact, the Northfield 
policy references only claims covered by the Northfield policy itself, and under the General 
Insuring Agreements, the Northfield policy provides: 
It is understood that all claims under this policy shall be serviced by 1.c.R.M.p.'~ 
Claims Department who shall perform the following duties: 
A. Investigate and settle or defend all claims or losses - it is understood that, 
when so requested, the I.C.R.M.P. Claims Department will afford Underwriters 
any opportunity to be associated with them in the defense or control of any claim, 
suit or proceeding. 
Martens Aff., Exh. A, at p. 5 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Northfield policy provides that: 
For Section 11, . . . "[u]ltimate net loss" shall also include hospital, medical and 
funeral charge and all sums paid as salaries, wages, compensation, fees, expenses 
for doctors and nurses, also law costs, premiums on attachment of appeal bonds, 
expenses for lawyers and investigators and other persons for litigation, settlement, 
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adjustment and investigation of claims or suits which are paid as a consequence of 
any occurrence covered hereunder. 
Id. at p. 40 (emphasis added). In fact, a review of the Northfield policy yields only a reference to 
"an underlying Self-Insured Retention (S.I.R.) of $150,000 each and every loss and/or claim 
and/or occurrence ultimate net loss . . . .", and does not reference coverages under the ICRMP 
policy. Id. at p. 3 (emphasis in original). Thus, lacking language mirroring the ICRMP policy's 
duty-to-defend provision, or even any reference thereto, argument that ICRMP had a duty to 
defend Kootenai County is irrelevant to any coverage under the Northfield reimbursement 
policy, and irrelevant to the relationship between ICRMP and Northfield under the 
reimbursement insurance. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs Motion should be denied, as plaintiffs duty-to-defend arguments 
have no bearing on whether there was coverage of ICRMP under the Northfield policy for 
reimbursement of ICRMP for any of the costs to defend Kootenai County or its employees. 
D. Defendant Northfield's policy is not reinsurance. 
Plaintiffs motion appears to be an attempt to set up a future summary judgment motion 
(or two) regarding the breach of contract action. Implicitly, plaintiffs argument (which is 
anticipated at hearing andlor in plaintiff's summzuy judgment reply) is a two-step transitive 
argument: ICRMP had a duty to defend Kootenai County; ergo, Northfield had an obligation, 
under its policy, to reimburse ICRMP for defense and settlement amounts in the Pavadis action. 
However, this argument suffers a key logical flaw - the Northfield policy is reinsurance. 
Whether the Northfield policy covers ICRMP must be determined by interpreting the language 
of Northfield's policy, not the ICRMPIKootenai County policy attached to plaintiffs Motion. 
In the most general sense, "reinsurance. . . is simply insurance for insurance companies." 
Continental Casualty Co. v. Stronghold Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 16, 20 (2nd Cir. 1996). Ancillary to this 
principle is the principle that reinsurers have no duty to defend. See, e.g., Insurance Co..of State 
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of Pennsylvania v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 516, 523 (91h Cir. 1990)("Reinsurers have 
no duty to defend claims . . . ."). Importantly, reinsurance policies are typically identified by the 
presence of "follow form" and/or "follow the fortune" provisions: 
Reinsurance is purchased by insurance companies to insure their liability 
under policies written to their insureds. Typically, an insurer who has provided 
coverage against a large loss will cede all or part of that risk to other insurance 
companies along with a portion of the premiums. Ceding risk increases the 
insurer's capacity to insure other customers and decreases the likelihood that 
insurer insolvency will result from any large claim. 
There are two types of reinsurance contract: treaty and facultative. Under a 
reinsurance treaty, the reinsurer agrees to accept an entire block of business from 
the reinsured. Once a treaty is written, a reinsurer is bound to accept all of the 
policies under the block of business, including those as yet unwritten. Because a 
treaty reinsurer accepts an entire block of business, it does not assess the 
individual risks being reinsured; rather, it evaluates the overall risk pool. Id. 
Facultative reinsurance entails the ceding of a particular risk or policy. 
Unlike a treaty reinsurer who must accept all covered business, the facultative 
reinsurer assesses the unique characteristics of each policy to determine whether 
to reinsure the risk, and at what price. Thus, a facultative reinsurer "retains the 
faculty, or option, to accept or reject any risk." 
The reinsurance relationship depends on the reinsurer and the reinsured observing 
high levels of good faith. The reinsured must keep its interests aligned with those 
of the reinsurer, . . . and the reinsurer must "follow the fortunes" of the 
reinsured[.] 
Reinsurance certificates usually employ standard forms. A reinsurance 
certificate typically includes a "following forms" provision that expressly limits 
the reinsurance to the terms and conditions of the underlying policy and provides 
that the reinsurance certificate will cover only the kinds of liability covered in the 
original policy issued to the insured. The reinsurance certificate often, as here, 
also includes a "follow the fortunes" clause, which is somewhat broader than the 
"following forms" clause and obligates the reinsurer to indemnify the reinsured 
for any good faith payment of an insured loss. 
"Follow the fortunes" clauses prevent reinsurers from second guessing 
good-faith settlements and obtaining de novo review of judgments of the 
reinsured's liability to its insured. But while a "follow the fortunes" clause limits a 
reinsurer's defenses, it does not make a reinsurer liable for risks beyond what was 
agreed upon in the reinsurance certificate. In that regard, the reinsurer retains the 
right to question whether the reinsured's liability stems from an unreinsured loss. 
A loss would be unreinsured if it was not contemplated by the original insurance 
policy or if it was expressly excluded by terms of the certificate of reinsurance. 
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North River Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (3rd Cir. 1995)(intemal 
citations omitted). A follow-the-form clause will include language akin to: "the liability of the 
Reinsurer specified in Item 4 of the said Declarations shall follow that of the Company and 
except as otherwise specifically provided herein, shall be subject in all respects to all the terms 
and conditions of the Company's policy." Travelers Cas. And Sur. Co. v. Ace American, 392 F. 
Supp.2d 659, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Similarly, a follow-the-fortunes clause will incorporate 
language similar to: "All claims involving this reinsurance, when settled by [Commercial 
Union], shall be binding on [Swiss Re], which shall be bound to pay its proportion of such 
settlements promptly following receipt of proof of loss." Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Swiss 
Reinsurance America, 413 F.3d 121, 124 (lS' Cir. 2005). A "follow the fortunes" clause 
encapsulates the "follow the fortunes" doctrine recognized in some jurisdictions, which generally 
holds that "a reinsurer is required to indemnify for payments reasonably within the terms of the 
original policy, even if technically not covered by it." Travelers Cas. And Sur. Co., 392 at 664, 
n5. The "follow the fortunes" doctrine is not without its own limits: 
But, "[wlhile the 'follow the fortune' clause is certainly a broad one, it is clear 
that the reinsurer is liable only for 'a loss of the kind reinsured."' . . . This 
protection for the reinsurer is based on principles of contractual intent: a reinsurer 
cannot be held liable for a kind of loss that it did not agree to cover. This 
distinction between reinsured and unreinsured risk is particularly important in 
facultative reinsurance where the reinsurer accepts only specific risks. 
North River, 52 F.3d at 1206-07. 
Note, however, that not all jurisdictions agree that the "follow the fortunes" doctrine is 
implied in any reinsurance contract. For example, in Michigan, the Court of Appeals has 
rejected just such a proposition in analyzing a reinsurance policy lacking a "follow the fortunes" 
clause: 
The reasoning and explanation of reinsurance law provided by the 
Michigan Millers Court is particularly instructive in this setting. There, our Court 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Oa0094 
pointed to 19 Couch, Insurance, 2d, 5 80.66, pp. 673-674, to emphasize that "[tlhe 
extent of the liability of the reinsurer is determined by the language of the 
reinsurance contract, and the reinsurer cannot be held liable beyond the terms of 
its contract merely because the original insurer has sustained a loss." Id. at 414, 
452 N.W.2d 841. At another point in Michigan Millers, this Court stated: 
Although it is true that parties may agree to such terms in reinsurance as 
will bind the reinsurer to the settlement or adjustment of loss made between 
the parties to the original insurance, 19 Couch on Insurance 2d, § 80.13, p. 
631, we will not impose liability on the reinsurer for a settlement 
contribution absent such an agreement. 
Such statements respecting reinsurance are completely consistent with a 
plethora of Michigan cases in the field of insurance law. For example, in Lehr v. 
Professional Underwriters, 296 Mich. 693, 697, 296 N.W. 843 (1941), our 
Supreme Court stated: "The liability was limited in the policy. To hold otherwise 
would be to write a new contract for the parties. This we have no right to do." 
After careful consideration, we conclude and hold that the learned trial 
court erred in reading into the reinsurance contract at issue in this case a "follow 
the fortunes" clause that was not agreed to by the parties. 
Michigan Tp. Participating Plan v. Federal Ins. Co., 592 N.W.2d 760,764-65 (Mich:App. 1999). 
This would be consistent with Idaho law, which holds that "[wlhere policy language is found to 
be unambiguous, the Court is to construe the policy as written, 'and the Court by construction 
cannot create a liability not assumed by the insurer nor make a new contract for the parties, or 
one different from that plainly intended, nor add words to the contract of insurance to either 
create or avoid liability."' Purvis v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 213, -, 127 P.3d 
116, 119 (2005). With respect to the Northfield policy, the policy does not provide any "follow- 
form" and/or "follow the fortunes" language, thereby lacking a key hallmark of a classic 
reinsurance policy. See Martens Aff., Exh. A. To the contrary, the Northfield policy provides 
specific terms and conditions, covering very particular risks. For example, for Northfield to have 
any obligation to reimburse ICRMP for defense costs and indemnify above the SIR in the 
Northfield policy, the coverage language in the Northfield policy must apply. Here, as explained 
further below, the occurrence which gave rise to Mr. Paradis' complaint took place years before 
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the Northfield policy was issued. Thus, no conclusion can be reached that Northfield's policy 
constitutes classic reinsurance such that plaintiffs Motion would have any bearing on the issues 
in this matter; to wit, whether the terms of Northfield's policy provide coverage of ICRMP for 
the paradis defense costs and settlement amount paid. 
Moreover, analysis of reinsurer status may also be had by a determination of the extent of 
premium transfer from the underlying insured risks. Classic reinsurance policies typically 
involve the transfer of underlying premiums as a function of the reinsurer's assumption of the 
underlying insurer's risk. As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court: 
In order to spread the risks on policies they have written or to reduce 
required reserves, insurance companies commonly enter into reinsurance 
agreements. Under these agreements, the reinsurer pays the primary insurer, or 
"ceding company," a negotiated amount and agrees to assume the ceding 
company's liabilities on the reinsured policies. In return, the reinsurer receives the 
future income generated from the policies and their associated reserve accounts. 
Reinsurance comes in two basic types, assumption reinsurance and 
indemnity reinsurance. In the case of assumption reinsurance, the reinsurer steps 
into the shoes of the ceding company with respect to the reinsured policy, 
assuming all its liabilities and its responsibility to maintain required reserves 
against potential claims. The assumption reinsurer thereafter receives all 
premiums directly and becomes directly liable to the holders of the policies it has 
reinsured. 
In indemnity reinsurance, which is at issue in this case, it is the ceding 
company that remains directly liable to its policyholders, and that continues to 
pay claims and collect premiums. The indemnity reinsurer assumes no direct 
liability to the policyholders. Instead, it agrees to indemnify, or reimburse, the 
ceding company for a specified percentage of the claims and expenses attributable 
to the risks that have been reinsured, and the ceding company turns over to it a 
like percentage of the premiums generated by the insurance of those risks. 
Both the assumption and the indemnity reinsurer ordinaril pay an up- 
front fee, known as a "ceding commission," to the ceding company. FXI 
- There is a form of indemnity reinsurance known as risk-premium, or 
yearly-renewable-term, reinsurance that does not involve ceding 
commissions. Under risk-premium reinsurance, much like a normal 
insurance policy, the ceding company typically pays an annual premium to 
the reinsurer in return for which the reinsurer promises to reimburse the 
ceding company should identified losses arise. 
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Colonial American Life Ins. Co. v. C.I.R., 491 U.S. 244, 246-48, 109 S. Ct. 2408, 241 1-12 
(1989). These categories address the means by which risk andlor premiums are transferred. In 
the present action, only a premium was paid to Northfield by ICRMP, further demonstrating that 
the Northfield policy is not classic reinsurance, and would only be analogous to risk-premium 
reinsurance - which simply follows the traditional insurance payment models (payment of a 
premium to insure risk). 
Although lengthy discussion, as above, is required to identify the nature of the Northfield 
policy, the distinction between classic reinsurance and the Northfield policy is key in this 
instance, as plaintiffs fundamental argument in this action will be that Northfield must simply 
write a check for whatever amounts ICRMP expended. However, the Northfield policy is not 
classic reinsurance, and instead only insures those risks which are enumerated within 
Northfield's own policy. It is likely this distinction that led the Montana Supreme Court to 
characterize a Northfield Public Entities All Lines Aggregate Insurance Policy as a "secondary 
assurance policy," rather than 'reinsurance.' Northfield Ins. Co. v. Montana Ass'n of Counties, 
10 P.3d 813, 814 (Mont. 2000). Accordingly, it is the coverage provided by the Northfield 
policy, not the actions taken by ICRMP or coverage under the ICRMPIKootenai County policy, 
which is salient to the rights and obligations arising from the Northfield policy which is at the 
center of this lawsuit. 
Accordingly, a ruling on plaintiffs Motion is, again, simply an advisory opinion, as it has 
no bearing on the application of the terms and conditions of Northfield's policy. The Northfield 
policy is not classic reinsurance, and any obligations under ICRMP's policy do not define or 
otherwise set the parameters of the coverage afforded by the Northfield policy. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs Motion should be denied. 
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E. ICRMP did not have a duty to defend. 
Although plaintiff's Motion addresses, only minimally, the relationship between ICRMP 
and Northfield (and otherwise fails to address any component of its breach-of-contract action), 
defendant Northfield responds briefly to the thrust of plaintiff's Motion herein. Despite the 
defense provision provided for in the ICRMP policy, as discussed above, ICRMP did not have a 
duty to defend the Kootenai County individuals in the Paradis action. ICRMP did not seek a 
judicial ruling on whether to defend the Paradis case. It simply made its own decision, for its 
own reasons, under its own policy. 
1. The duty to defend, generallv. 
Plaintiff cites to Kootenai County v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908, 750 P.2d 
87 (1988), in arguing that it was obligated, by the phrasing of the complaint, to provide a defense 
to the Kootenai County defendants. However, the Kootenai County decision certainly did not 
present an unbounded duty to defend proposition, as was explained in the later Black v. 
Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co. decision: 
We have recognized that an insurer has a duty to defend its insured where 
the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, would bring the case within the 
insurance policy's coverage. The basis for this rule is simple. To allow the insurer 
to avoid providing defense on questionable claims would frustrate one of the 
insured's basic purposes in procuring insurance coverage--protection from the 
expenses of litigation. This duty is separate, unrelated, and much broader than the 
insurer's duty to pay damages. However, the insurer's duty to defend is not 
absolute. This Court has recognized that an injured third-party's claims against an 
insured must provide some link to the insurance agreement. Our Supreme Court 
recently adopted a broad statement with regard to when an insurer must provide 
coverage. In County of Kootenai v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 113 Idaho 
908,750P.2d 87 (1988), the Court said: 
[tlhe duty to defend arises upon the filing of a complaint whose allegations, in 
whole or in part, read broadly, reveal a potential for liability that would be 
covered by the insured's policy. [Emphasis original.] 
These cases typify the progressive attitude of the Idaho Courts regarding claims 
for breach of the duty to defend. 
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115 Idaho 449, 455, 767 P.2d 824, 830 (Ct. App. 1989) 115 Idaho at 455 (internal citations 
omitted)(emphasis added). This clarification, that an insurer's duty to defend is not absolute, is 
important, especially in light of a more recent statement by the Idaho Supreme Court: "This 
language [in Kootenai], while admittedly broad, does not require an insurance company to file a 
declaratory judgment in every instance, even though it believes there is no potential for coverage, 
and then tender a defense until the lack of coverage is established." Hovle v. Utica Mut. Ins. 
Co., 137 Idaho 367,371,48 P.3d 1256, 1260 (2002). 
-
2. The ICRMP policy. 
Two points not fully addressed by plaintiff with respect to the ICRMP policy are worth 
noting for the purposes of additional clarification relevant to the discussion herein. 
First, plaintiff asserts that "[blecause Paradis was released from prison in April of 2001, 
the 2000-2001 ICRMP policy was triggered." Plaintiffs Memo at 12. Plaintiff cites no other 
trigger dates for the coverage or even any authority for the proposition, although the acts that Mr. 
Paradis sued upon occurred some 20 years earlier. The effect of this timing issue is discussed 
below. 
Additionally, plaintiff cites only to Section I1 of the ICRMP policy, the Comprehensive 
General Liability ~ec t ion .~  Plaintiff does not appear to rely on any other Sections of the policy. 
Accordingly, as necessary, the discussion herein addresses only the language of that section. 
3. The first Paradis com~laint.~ 
Plaintiff claims that Counts I, IV, V, IX, X, and XI of the first )2aradis complaint 
constitute "continuing torts" which, although commencing years - even decades - earlier, fall 
3 Plaintiff does not, for example, cite Section IV, the Errors and Omissions provision, likely because that section is 
explicitly identified as a "claims-made" section; as plaintiffs aver that Kootenai County first notified them of the 
&g.& suit in or after April 2003, plaintiff would be unable to assert that possible lCRMP coverage under an 
ICRMP policy in effect in 2003 would have any bearing on the Northfield policy of 2000-2001. 
4 Plaintiff identifies onlv Counts I. IV, V. IX. X. and XI as the counts eivine rise to ICRMP's claimed dutv to 
. .  . 
defend. Plaintiffs ~ e m b  at 8-9 & 14-15. As such; only these counts are dkcusied. 
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within the purview of the ICRMP's 2000-2001 coverage, thus requiring ICRMP to defend. 
Plaintiffs Memorandum at 8-9 & 14-15. These Counts addressed the following: 
Count I - Bradv violation - Mr. Paradis alleged that the subject Kootenai County 
defendants failed to provide the defense with exculpatory evidence, and/or caused 
a medical witness (Dr. Brady) to "give false, exaggerated and unsupportable 
testimony". McHenry Aff., Exh. 1, 770. Although alleging an ongoing duty to 
provide the defense with exculpatory evidence, the complaint made clear 
that the exculpatory evidence at issue was gathered prior to Mr. Paradis' 
conviction, and that the testimony of Dr. Brady occurred in 1981. Id at 1732-38, 
& 47-57. 
o Counts IV & V - Negligence, False Arrest, Malicious Prosecution, and False 
Imorisonment - Again, Mr. Paradis alleged that he suffered harm as a result of the 
undisclosed exculpatory evidence (7784-85), and referenced his claims in Count I 
by reference (788). 
Counts IX, X, & XI - Negligence, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 
and Defamation - Here, the allegations made by Mr. Paradis relate to a habeas 
action in 1986, wherein Mr. Paradis contends that Mr. Haws (the Chief Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney) continued to conceal the exculpatory evidence, resulting in 
Mr. Paradis serving another 14 years in prison (771 14-1 19). Additionally, Mr. 
Paradis asserted that: "[t]hroughout his involvement in the Paradis and Gibson 
cases, both when serving as a prosecutor and after, Haws made repeated public 
and extra-judicial statements to a variety of news media outlets" (7120), "which 
perpetuated his contrived and unsupportable theories as discussed herein, and 
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which consistently cast both Plaintiff and his claims of innocence in a false light." 
(7122). 
4. The Paradis Amended Comdaint. 
Plaintiff identifies four counts in the Amended Complaint that plaintiff asserts 
warranted continuation of its claimed duty to defend: Count I, VII, IX, and X. Plaintiff's 
Memo at 10-11. Again, plaintiff focuses on the asserted ongoing nature of these 
violations to assert that coverage was mandated. Id. These Counts addressed the 
following: 
m Count 1 - Failure to Train re: Bradv - Although alleging ongoing deficiencies in 
the training program, a reading of the Amended Complaint clearly demonstrates 
that the only damages alleged related to pre-conviction failures: "100. This 
deficiency in the County's training program and its supervision was closely 
related and causally linked to the constitutional injury suffered by Plaintiff- 
Paradis." (McI-Ienry Aff., Exh. 5, at 7100). 
• Count VII - Nerligent Training and Supervision - In his amended complaint, Mr. 
Paradis alleged that, as a result of the claimed negligent training and supervision, 
he was wrongfully arrested and convicted (7158), resulting in "physical 
deterioration and injury, emotional distress and economic harm" (7159) as a result 
of his confinement (7721 1-214). 
a Count IX - False Light Invasion of Privacy - As in the original complaint, Mr. 
Paradis alleged that Mr. Haws engaged in a series of public statements regarding 
plaintiff beginning in 1986 (7174), and further alleged that Dr. Brady's testimony 
placed Mr. Paradis in a false light (7172). 
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Count X - Negli~ence and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress - Mr. 
Paradis alleged, in this count, that "[dluring the investigatory phase Haws set into 
motion a conspiracy to wrongfully convict Plaintiff-Paradis" (7181), thereafter 
again relating allegations regarding Mr. Haw's failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence in 1980 and 1981, and his public statements regarding the case. 
5. The Paradis allegations do not constitute "continuing torts" covered bv the 
ICRMP policy. 
As described above, the claims made by Mr. Paradis all arise from the actions 
made by the Kootenai County defendants relating to the investigation, prosecution, and 
conviction of Mr. Paradis in 1980 and 198 1. Plaintiff specifically asserts that the continuing 
nature of the alleged violations created a duty to defend by ICRMP: "the Paradis Complaints 
contain allegations of negligence, false imprisonment and violations of civil rights which are 
described as continuing torts involving tortious activity on the part of the ICRMP insureds during 
the relevant policy period", which allegations "triggered a duty to defend under Idaho law." 
Plaintiffs Memo at 4-5. 
In doing so, however, plaintiff attempts to blur the line between the analysis of 
continuous events for statute of limitations questions, versus analysis of continuous events for 
insurance purposes: 
Reliance on the commencement of the statute of limitation is not 
dispositive in determining when a tort occurs for insurance purposes. Statutes of 
limitation and triggering dates for insurance purposes serve distinct functions and 
reflect different policy concerns. Statutes of limitation function to expedite 
litigation and discourage stale claims. Bigansky v. Thomas Jefferson University 
Hosp., 442 Pa.Super. 69,658 A.2d 423,426 (1995). But when determining when 
a tort occurs for insurance purposes, courts have generally sought to protect the 
reasonable expectations of the parties to the insurance contract. Appalachian Ins. 
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.1982). 
Because of this fundamental difference in purpose, courts have 
consistently. rejected the idea they are bound by the statutes of limitation when 
seeking to determine when a tort occurs for insurance purposes. See ACandS, Inc. 000102 
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v. Aerna Cas. and Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir.1985) (statute of limitation 
cases "are not particularly relevant" to determining what event triggers insurance 
coverage); Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1043-44 
(D.C.Cir.1981) (statute of limitation cases "are not at all relevant" and "have no 
bearing" in case seeking to determine when tort occurred for insurance purposes); 
Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 
1220 (6th Cir.1980) (because of differences in underlying policies, statute of 
limitation cases not relevant to determining when asbestos-related tort occurs for 
insurance purposes); Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Zurich American Ins. 
Co., 471 F.Supp. 1011, 1015 (S.D.Ala.1979) ("cases dealing with the 
determination of the date or occurrence of a continuing injury or disease for the 
purpose of applying appropriate statute of limitations are not controlling for 
purposes of determining insurance coverage"); Southern Maryland Agric. Ass'n v. 
Bituminous Cas. Corp., 539 F.Supp. 1295, 1302-03 (D.Md.1982) (date on which 
statute of limitation begins to run not determinative of date when tort of malicious 
prosecution occurs); S. Freedman & Sons v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 396 A.2d 195, 
198-99 (D.C.1978) (statute of limitation "providcs little assistance" and "need not 
determine" when tort of malicious prosecution occurs). For this reason, we do not 
believe the date on which the statute of limitation begins to run on malicious 
prosecution claims should determine when the tort occurs for insurance coverage 
purposes. 
City of Erie, Pa. v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 156, 161-62 (31d Cir. 1997). Despite this, 
plaintiff relies on Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P.2d 749 (1993), for the proposition that the 
"continuing tort" concept triggered a duty to defend in the action. However, the 
decision applied in .the context of statute of limitations analysis, and not in the context of 
triggering insurance coverage, and is of no value to any analysis in this litigation. The same is 
true of the other case law cited by plaintiff - Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981) & 
Green v. Los Anreles County Superintendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1989) - both 
cases relate to statute of limitations questions, and not to the triggering of coverage under 
insurance policies. 
However, plaintiff fails to discuss Idaho caselaw directly on point to this question: 
Kootenai County v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908, 750 P.2d 87 (1988). In Western 
Gas., a county sheriff, acting upon a writ of execution, conducted a sale of property. However, 
in doing so, the sheriff failed to act in accord with the statutory notice periods, subjecting him to 
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civil penalties payable to the aggrieved party. Following the six month redemption period, the 
sheriff issued the deed to the subject property to the purchasers, as required by statute. During 
the redemption period, however, Kootenai County purchased an occurrence policy from Lloyd's 
and attempted to claim coverage, asserting that the delivery of the deed, in conjunction with the 
earlier failure to notify in relation to the sale, constituted an occurrence under the policy. 
However, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the only wrongful act was 
the improperly conducted sale. The court stated: 
The improper execution sale is not an event covered by the Lloyd's policy since it 
occurred almost six months prior to the effective date of the policy. An insurer is 
not liable "for claims arising out of an event or accident which occurred prior to 
the effective date of the insurance coverage, even though damages and claims 
continued to accrue from this cause during the later period of coverage." 
11 3 Idaho at 915 (quoting Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Corn., 507 F. Supp. 59,62 
(W.D. Pa. 1981), aff d 676 F.2d 56 (31d Cir. 1982))(emphasis added). Here, the acts giving rise 
to the complaint relate to actions taken by the Kootenai County defendants in the 
investigation, prosecution, and conviction of Mr. Paradis in 1980 and 1981, all of which occurred 
20 years prior to the effective date of the subject ICRMP policy. The damages complained of by 
Mr. Paradis relate to his incarceration which commenced on June 23, 1980 (McHenry Aff., Exh. 
2, at 15). As such, damages claims that accrued after these initial events do not fall under the 
coverage of liability policies that become effective at a later date (here, the ICRMP 2000-2001 
policy). 
Plaintiff relies on a New York decision, National Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 
128 A.D.2d 332, 515 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1987), to argue that an allegation of false imprisonment 
occurring during a policy's coverage period even if imprisonment occurred at an earlier date, 
requires an insurer to defend. Plaintiffs Memo at 19-20. However, National Casualty is not 
instructive or dispositive for four key reasons: 
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First, National Casualty is a New York decision, which holding would conflict with the 
binding decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Western Cas. 
Second, the National Casualty court noted that "there is nothing in the policy which 
requires, as a prerequisite to ascertaining whether there is coverage, that the injury 
resulting from a causative event be reduced to a single or fixed occurrence in time." 5 15 
N.Y.S.2d at 270. However, under the ICRMP policy, the definition of "occurrence" 
provides, in relevant part, that "All personal injuries to one or more persons andlor 
property damage arising out of an accident or a continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions shall be deemed one occurrence." McHenry Aff., Exh. 1, at p. 14 (emphasis 
added). This language fundamentally shifts National Casualty away from any application 
in this action, as it reduces the claimed injury to a single event - Mr. Paradis' initial 
conviction and incarceration. 
Third, under Idaho law, false imprisonment occurs in the absence of lawful action. 
Griffin v. Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 373, 42 P.2d 297, 301 (1935) ("The true test [of false 
imprisonment] seems to be not the extent of the restraint, nor the means by which it is 
accomplished, but the lawfulness thereof'). In the Paradis complaint, Mr. Paradis only 
alluded to his arrest, prosecution, and conviction in the criminal justice system, and did 
not allude to any extra-judicial actions by any of the Kootenai County defendants. See, 
e.g., Mundt v. U.S., 61 1 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9'h Cir. 1980)("As Harper and James note: 'If 
the imprisonment is under legal process but the action has been carried on maliciously 
and without probable cause, it is malicious prosecution. If it has been extrajudicial, 
without legal process, it is false imprisonment.' 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts 
232 (1956)."). Moreover, even if the initial arrest could be construed as false 
imprisonment, once the judiciary sanctioned Mr. Paradis' detention (e.g., through a bond 
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hearing), the 'occan met the shore' - any false imprisonment would have ceased, and 
instead have become malicious prosecution.5 
4 Fourth, and finally, Mr. Paradis was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 
death. (McHenry Aff., EEx 2, 718) As a felon on death row, Mr. Paradis would have 
been transferred to the custody of the State of Idaho - in fact, Mr. Paradis's complaint 
acknowledges state custody, 15 years of which were spent on death row. See, e g., id. at 
775, 21, & 24. Any 'false imprisonment' (if construed as posed by plaintiff) by the 
Kootenai County defendants would have terminated once Mr. Paradis' custody 
transferred to the State of Idaho (apparently in 1981). Whether Mr. Paradis was 
wrongfully imprisoned by the State of Idaho is beyond the scope of the present dispute, 
and would not have been covered by ICRMP. 
As such, plaintiff cannot argue that the allegations made by Mr. Paradis constituted "continuing 
torts" which would have been covered by the 2000-2001 ICRMP policy. To the contrary, all of 
the events alleged by Mr. Paradis arose long before the commencement of the coverage provided 
by the ICRMP policy, and any subsequent claims andlor damages arising therefrom cannot give 
rise to coverage where none existed at the time of the original occurrence, as per the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision in Western Cas. As no potential for coverage under the ICRMP policy 
was revealed by Mr. Paradis' allegations relating to actions some two decades earlier, no duty to 
defend arose requiring ICRMP to provide a defense. 
5 At least one court has held that, although an action (for purposes of the statute of limitations) for malicious 
prosecution begins to accrue at the time of a favorable termination of a criminal proceeding, coverage under an 
insurance policy is instead triggered when damage begins to accrue - that is, with malicious prosecution, almost 
immediately. See Muller Fuel Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 232 A.2d 168, 175 (N.J. Super. 1967)("In 
a claim based on malicious prosecution the damage begins to flow from the very commencement of the tortious 
conduct-the making of the criminal complaint."). w r  has been favorably cited in Idaho. See National Aviation 
Underwriters, Inc, v. Idaho Aviation Center, 96 Idaho 663, 670,471 P.2d 55, 57 (1970) ("It is well settled that the 
time of the occurrence of an 'accident,' within the meaning of a liability indemnity policy, is not the time the 
wrongful act was committed but the time the complaining party was actually damaged") 
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As such, plaintiff cannot be granted summary judgment on this point. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be 
denied. Oral argument is requested. 
.r" RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of December, 2006. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
000107 
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MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
UNDERWRITERS, 
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JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW defendant, Northland Insurance Companies (whose proper name and 
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("plaintiffs' Complaint") with prejudice, on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of 
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Should the Court deny defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in whole or in part, 
defendant Northfield requests, as an alternative, that the Court enter an order, pursuant to Idaho 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
a Minnesota corporation, 
CaseNo. CVOC0617112 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
NORTHLANDINORTHFIELD 
INSURANCE COMPANIES' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 9, 2003, Donald Paradis filed a Complaint in the Federal District 
Court for the District of ldaho naming as defendants Kootenai County, Glen Walker, 
Marc Haws, Peter Erbland, and George Elliott as defendants. See Complaint, 
Exhibit A. These individuals, as well as Kootenai County, were ICRMP insureds. 
When the Complaint was filed, Kootenai County was insured by ICRMP. It 
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forwarded a copy of the Complaint to the ICRMP Claims Department. See Affidavit 
of Richard B. Ferguson, 73. 
ICRMP, upon receiving the Paradis Complaint, forwarded a copy of the suit 
papers to  its reinsurer, NorthlandINorthfield Insurance Companies. See Affidavit of 
Richard B. Ferguson, 73. ICRMP also reviewed the allegations in the Paradis 
Complaint for potential coverage. A decision was made that a duty to  defend 
existed. Kootenai County and the other defendants were advised of this decision 
and provided a reservation of rights letter. See Complaint, Exhibit B. 
NorthlandINorthfield received a copy of the reservation of rights letter. - Id. 
Because of potential conflicts of interest, ICRMP, exercising its discretion 
over the management of the litigation, retained separate attorneys for Kootenai 
County, Mr. Haws, and Mr. Elliott. Again, NorthlandINorthfield was advised of this 
decision. NorthlandINorthfield did not object to  this approach. - See Affidavit of 
Richard B. Ferguson, 75. 
For the next two  years, the Paradis litigation developed. 
NorthlandINorthfield received regular reports from ICRMP advising it of the status 
of the litigation and the defense costs which were being incurred on behalf of the 
ICRMP insureds. See Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 14. The defense that was 
being extended t o  the insureds was a complete defense of all claims in the Paradis 
Complaint. - Id. Again, throughout this time, NorthlandINorthfield never voiced any 
concerns or objections that multiple law firms were being used to  defend the 
insureds or that a complete defense was being provided. - Id., 714,5. 
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On February 13, 2006, nearly two years after the Paradis litigation 
commenced, NorthlandlNorthfield advised ICRMP that it would be taking the 
position that coverage did not exist for any of the claims described in the Paradis 
Complaints. Complaint, Exhibit C. Correspondence was exchanged between 
ICRMP and NorthlandlNorthfield addressing the coverage issues. Through that 
process, Northland/Northfield was advised that the Honorable Lynn B. Winrnill, the 
federal judge assigned to  the liability case, had issued a ruling which characterized 
a number of the Paradis claims as continuing torts. It was ICRMP's position, at 
that time, that the existence of a continuing tort describing negligence, false arrest, 
false imprisonment, or violations of Mr. Paradis' constitutional rights described 
potentially covered claims which obligated ICRMP to provide a defense. 
Complaint, Exhibit D. NorthlandlNorthfield, through its claims handler (Eric 
Martensen) summarily dismissed the legal reasoning of Judge Winmill concluding 
that a continuing tort did not exist and, for that reason, coverage would not arise. 
See Complaint, Exhibit E. 
Shortly after NorthlandlNorthfield made the decision to deny coverage, the 
ongoing defense costs associated with the litigation caused ICRMP t o  consider the 
possibility of mediating a settlement. See Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 18. A t  
that point, the defense costs had reached $400,000, exceeding the self-insured 
retention owed by ICRMP under the NorthlandlNorthfield policy. It was anticipated 
that through trial the defense costs, which would include the expenses relating to  
expert witnesses, would exceed $2,000,000. @. In light of the considerable 
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exposure ICRMP faced for future defense costs, coupled with the possibility of an 
adverse judgment being entered against its insureds, ICRMP made the decision that 
mediation should be pursued. - Id., q9. Although it was not obligated to  do so, 
ICRMP solicited Northland/Northfield's input and participation in settlement 
discussions and mediation. Complaint, Exhibit 7. NorthIandlNorthfield ratified 
its earlier breach of contract by restating its previous position that coverage did not 
exist and advising ICRMP it would not participate in mediation or settlement. See 
Complaint, Exhibit G. 
Thereafter, the case was mediated and a favorable settlement reached. See 
Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 71 I. The settlement required ICRMP to  pay 
$800,000, which was less than the anticipated costs to litigate the case through 
trial. , 9 ,  I I .  The settlement also extinguished the insureds' exposure to a 
claim for attorneys' fees from the attorneys who had represented Mr. Paradis 
through the habeas corpus litigation. The potential exposure for that aspect of the 
constitutional claims alone exceeded $2,000,000. See Affidavit of Richard B. 
Ferguson, 7 12. 
ICRMP has, for many years, purchased reinsurance from Northland and its 
subsidiary Northfield. - See Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 72. ICRMP purchases 
reinsurance in order to  reallocate a portion of the risk it assumes when it issues an 
insurance policy to an insured such as Kootenai County. Id.. - By purchasing 
reinsurance, ICRMP reduces the amount of reserves it is required to maintain which 
allows it the financial security to issue additional insurance policies or make 
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investments. - Id. 
Throughout its longstanding relationship with NorthlandINorthfield, ICRMP 
has routinely provided a complete defense to  its insureds when they are sued for 
covered and non-covered claims. Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 73. Until 
the Paradis litigation, NorthlandINorthfield has never sought to  allocate its 
reimbursement obligation by refusing to  pay for attorneys' fees expended in cases 
involving covered and non-covered claims. - Id. Additionally, NorthlandINorthfield 
has never refused or attempted to  allocate its reimbursement obligation relating to 
settlement monies paid to resolve suits where covered and non-covered claims are 
pled. Id. - In all of these cases, once ICRMP's SIR is exhausted? a billing for 
reimbursement is presented to NorthlandINorthfield. That billing is paid without 
any request for allocation or apportionment. Id. 
II. 
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE NORTHFIELD AND ICRMP INSURANCE POLICIES 
From the time of its formation and including the 2000-2001 policy year, 
ICRMP has purchased reinsurance from Northland Insurance Companies. Northfield 
Insurance Company is a subsidiary of Northland. 
The Northfield policy at issue in this case identifies the named reinsured as 
ICRMP. The policy reads: 
NAMED REINSURED: ICRMP COUNTIES RISK 
MANAGEMETN PROGRAM, A JOINT POWERS 
AUTHORITY and ail Boards, Departments, Divisions, 
Commissions, Authorities, and any other activities under 
the supervision or control of the J.P.A. whether now or 
hereafter constituted. 
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See Northfield Policy, Pg. 1. 
The policy extends various coverages, including comprehensive general 
liability (Section II) and errors and omissions coverage (Section IV). The policy 
limits are defined at pages 2-3. Potential payments to ICRMP are described as a 
component of the "ultimate net loss" and are qualified by ICRMP's self-insured 
retention of $1 50,000. See Northfield Policy, Pg. 3. The term "ultimate net loss" 
is defined and includes the "total sum" ICRMP becomes obligated to  pay by reason 
of personal injury or property damage claims either through adjudication or 
compromise. The definition recognizes the "total sum" owed by Northfield would 
include salaries, wages, law costs, expenses for lawyers and investigators, or other 
persons for litigation settlement, adjustment, and investigations or claims or suits. 
See Northfield Policy, Pg. 40. 
The Northfield policy identifies the ICRMP claims department as the entity 
charged with the responsibility and duty of defending and settling all claims. See 
Northfield Policy, Pg. 5 (111, Service Organization). In that portion of the policy, 
Northfield is given the opportunity to  be associated with the defense or control of 
any claim or suit. However, the NorthlandINorthfield policy does not contain 
language giving NorthiandINorthfield the right to override settlement decisions that 
are made by the ICRMP Claims Department. - Id. ICRMP is also required to furnish 
monthly claims reports to Northfield. @!- Northfield is required to  promptly 
reimburse ICRMP for any and all payments made in excess of the SIR. See 
Northfield Policy. Pg. 39. 
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Coverage under the comprehensive general liability insuring agreement of the 
Northfield policy is extended as follows: 
A - COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY: 
Underwriters hereby agree, subject to the limitations, 
terms and conditions hereunder mentioned, to indemnify 
the Assured for all sums, including expenses, all as more 
fully defined by the term ultimate net loss, which the 
Assured shall become legally obligated to  pay as damages 
imposed by law because of bodily injury, property 
damage, personal injury, advertising injury, products 
liability andlor completed operations, hostlliquor liability 
or incidental malpractice which result from an occurrence 
and which occur during the policy period. 
C - LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY: Underwriters 
hereby agree, subject to  the limitations, terms and 
conditions hereunder mentioned, to indemnify the 
Assured for all sums which the assured shall be obligated 
to  pay by reason of errors, omission or negligent acts 
arising out of the performance of the Assured's duties 
while acting as a law enforcement official or officer in the 
regular course of public employment as hereinafter 
defined, arising out of any occurrence from any cause on 
account of Personal Injury, Bodily Injury, Property 
Damage, Violation of Civil Rights or First Aid, happening 
during the period of this insurance accept as covered 
under Section II A and B. 
See Northfield Policy, Pg. 13. 
The term "personal injury" is defined at Page 14 of the Northfield policy as 
follows: 
PERSONAL INJURY - The term "personal injury" 
wherever used herein, shall mean Bodily Injury, Mental 
Anguish, Shock, Sickness, Disease, Disability, Wrongful 
Eviction, Malicious Prosecution, Discrimination, 
Humiliation, Invasion of Rights of Privacy, Libel, Slander, 
or Defamation of Character; also Piracy and any 
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Infringement of Copyright or of Property, Erroneous 
Service of Civil Papers, Assault and Battery, 
Disparagement of Property, False Arrest, False 
Imprisonment, and Detention. 
The term "occurrence" is defined at page 6 as follows: 
For Section II, "occurrence" means an accident or a 
happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure 
to  conditions which result in personal injury or damage to  
property during the policy. All personal injuries to one or 
more persons and/or property damage arising out of an 
accident or a happening or event or a continuous or 
repeated exposure to  conditions shall be deemed to  be 
one occurrence. 
The comprehensive general liability insuring agreement in the relevant ICRMP 
policy contains very similar, if not identical, insuring language as appears in the 
Northfield policy. Under the ICRMP policy, coverage under the comprehensive 
general liability insuring agreement is extended as follows: 
COVERAGE A - Comprehensive General Liability. We 
agree, subject to the terms and conditions of this 
Coverage, to pay on your behalf those sums which you 
become legally obligated to  pay as damages for personal 
injury or property damage which arise out of an 
occurrence during the Policy Period. 
COVERAGE C - Law Enforcement Liability. We agree, 
subject to the terms and conditions of this Coverage, to  
pay on your behalf all sums which you become obligated 
to pay by reason of errors, omissions, or negligent acts 
arising out of the performance of your duties while 
providing any law enforcement services or the 
administration of first aid resulting in personal injury or 
property damage during the Policy Period. 
See ICRMP Policy, Pg. 14. 
-
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The term "occurrence" is defined at page 14, 78, of the ICRMP policy as 
follows: 
"Occurrence" means an accident or a continuous or 
repeated exposure to  conditions which result in  personal 
injury or property damage during the Policy Period. All 
personal injuries to one or more persons and/or property 
damage arising out of an accident or a continuous or 
repeated exposure to  conditions shall be deemed one 
occurrence. 
The term "personal injury" is defined at page 15, 79, of the policy as 
follows: 
"Personal Injury" means bodily injury, mental anguish, 
shock, sickness, disease, disability, wrongful eviction, 
malicious prosecution, discrimination, humiliation, 
invasion of rights or privacy, libel, slander or defamation 
of character, piracy and any infringement of copyright'or 
property, erroneous service of civil papers, assault and 
battery and disparagement of property. As respects to  
Coverage C only, personal injury shall also mean false 
arrest, false imprisonment, detention and violation of civil 
rights arising out of law enforcement activities. 
Reading the two policies together, and focusing on the general liability 
insuring agreements, Northfield has agreed to  indemnify ICRMP, its "named 
reinsured", for all sums and expenses which are included in the term "ultimate net 
loss" which ICRMP becomes legally obligated to  pay because of bodily injuries or 
personal injuries arising out of an occurrence during the policy period. This would 
extend to claims involving the violation of civil rights, malicious prosecution, 
humiliation, invasion of rights, privacy, defamation of character, false arrest, false 
imprisonment, and detention. - See Northfield Policy, Pg. 14 (definition personal 
injury). Under the Northfield policy, the defendant is required to  reimburse ICRMP 
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for "law costs" which include "expenses for lawyers and investigators and other 
persons for litigation, settlement, adjustment, or investigation of claims or suits". 
Reimbursement must occur promptly after ICRMP exhausts its self insured 
retention. 
If one reviews the insuring agreement and definitions relating to the 
comprehensive general liability coverages offered by the ICRMP and the Northfield 
policies, it becomes very clear the insuring language is very similar, if not identical. 
Both policies provide coverage for "occurrences" that cause property damage or 
"personal injury". Both policies define "personal injury" to  include violations of civil 
rights, malicious prosecution, defamation, false arrest, false imprisonment, and 
negligence. The Northfield policy specifically contemplates reimbursing ICRMP for 
"law costs" which are defined as costs ICRMP incurred defending potentially 
covered claims or settlements arising under the comprehensive general liability 
insuring agreement; For the purposes of this motion, the Court must determine 
whether a potentially covered claim existed. If it did, ICRMP is entitled to the 
recovery of its defense costs, as well as the settlement monies paid. 
111. 
DUTY TO DEFEND 
In the briefing NorthlandINorthfield has provided this Court, the defendant 
has advanced an interpretation of an insurer's duty to  defend that is restricted and 
is inconsistent with the holdings of the Idaho appellate courts and many other 
jurisdictions. In the memorandum in opposition to ICRMP's motion for summary 
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judgment, Northfield makes the generalized statement that an insurer's duty to 
defend is not absolute. See Memorandum in Opposition, Pg. 16. Other than 
restating the general rule that an insured must establish an affirmative link to  
coverages afforded by the policy, Northfield provides no other guidance for this 
proposition, other than the conclusion that it feels that coverage would not exist 
because the events surrounding Mr. Paradis' conviction took place prior to the 
issuance of the Northfield policies. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has consistently ruled that an insurer's duty to 
defend and its corresponding duty to  indemnity are separate obligations. See City 
of ldaho Falls v. Home Indemnity Co., 126 ldaho 404, 888 P2d. 383 (1995). The 
duty to defend is a separate and much broader obligation. See Hirst v. St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co., 106 ldaho 792, 683 P2d. 440 (Ct. App. 1984). The duty to 
defend arises upon the filing of a complaint containing allegations that, in whole or 
in part, read broadly, reveals a potential for liability that would be covered by the 
insured's policy. See Hoyle v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 137 ldaho 367, 48 P3d. 
1256 (2002). See also ICRMP's memorandum in support and reply memorandum 
in support of its motion for summary judgment. 
When there are covered and non-covered claims contained in the same 
lawsuit, the insurer is obligated to provide a defense to  the entire suit. See Annot., 
41 A.L.R. 2d. 434 (1955). The obligation to  provide a complete defense arises 
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pled nolo contendre to  allegations involving child molestation. The insurer filed a 
declaratory judgment action alleging the actions of the teacher did not fall within 
the policy's coverage and were excluded as criminal or intentional acts. The trial 
court agreed ruling that all of the teacher's acts were either sexual or intentional in 
nature. On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed noting that the 
allegations in the complaint "although lacking in specificity ... evidences a possibility 
that Gary Lee [the teacher1 would be held liable for damages within the coverage of 
the policy stemming from Lee's negligent non-sexual 'conduct in his public 
relationship with Barbara." - Id. at 797. The court rejected the insurance 
company's argument that the predominant factor of the case was the non-covered 
criminal and intentional acts by writing: 
The argument misconceives the role of the court in 
determining the duty to  defend. We look not to whether 
non-covered acts predominate in the third party's action, 
but rather to where there is any potential for liability 
under the policy (Gray, supra, 65 Cal. 2d. at pgs. 275- 
276). Since the insurer has a duty t o  defend the entire 
third party action if any claim encompassed within it 
potentially may be covered (absent allocation, as noted 
above), the mere fact that Horace Mann could not 
indemnify Lee for the molestation did not eliminate its 
duty to defend other possibly covered claims. 
Id. at 797-798 (emphasis in original). 
- 
The holdings of the California Supreme Court in Horace Mann are consistent 
with Hirst v. St. PaulFire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 792, 683 P2d. at 440  (Ct. 
App. 1984). In Hirst, the insured (Dr. Donohue) was sued for allegedly drugging 
his patient, who was a minor, and performing sexual acts upon the child against his 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO NORTHLANDINORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION FO 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 13 %00126 
will. The insurer refused to defend on the grounds the allegations of sexual 
misconduct did not involve covered claims. When the coverage issue reached the 
Court of Appeals, the court concluded that St. Paul had breached its duty to 
defend the doctor. The court specifically found that the original complaint alleged 
the doctor had "committed various acts of negligence and professional 
malpractice". The court recognized that although the allegations of negligence and 
professional malpractice were later determined to not be supported by the record, 
they did describe claims broad enough to  include potential liability for a covered 
claim which triggered St. Paul's duty to  defend. The fact the original complaint 
also contained non-covered claims arising from the allegations of sexual 
molestation did not diminish the insurer's obligation to defend the entire suit. 
Although an insurer must defend all claims in a suit, it is generally recognized 
that it may withdraw the defense once there is no longer any potential future 
liability for a covered claim. See Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 178 F2d. 
750 (2nd Cir. 1949). The timing of a withdrawl was explained by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Meadowbrook v. Tower Ins. Co., Inc., 559 NW2d. 41 1 (1997) 
where the court wrote: 
Although we have concluded that insurers may withdraw 
from a defense once all arguably covered claims have 
been dismissed, we must determine at what point the 
dismissal of the defamation claims became final. An 
insurer's duty to defend claims arguably within the 
policy's coverage extends until it can be concluded as a 
matter o f  law that there is no basis on which the insurer 
may be obligated to  indemnify the insured. Woida v. 
North Star Mut. Ins. CO., 306 NW2d. 570, 574 (Minn. 
1981 ). As a result, the duty to  defend extends through 
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the appellate process. - See F.A. Appleman Ins. Law and 
Practice, Section 4688 at 200 (Burdall Ed. 1979) (the 
insurer's obligation to defend the suit against the insured 
does not end with a successful verdict in the trial court, 
but includes the defense of any appeals that the claimant 
may make). See also City of West Haven v. Commercial 
Union Ins. Co., 894 F2d. 540, 545-46 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
See 559 NW2d at 418 (emphasis in original). See also Commerce & Industry Ins. 
-
Co. v. Bank of Hawaii, 73 Hawaii 322, 832 P2d. 733 (1992) (insurer may not 
withdraw from its insured's defense until a final judgment has disposed of the 
covered claims). 
Applying these principles to the present case, the Court must examine the 
legal and factual allegations in the complaints filed by Donald Paradis, treat them as 
being factually true, and compare those allegations against the coverages in the 
ICRMP and Northfield policies to determine whether they described potentially 
covered claims. See Hoyle, 137 Idaho at 372-372. If there is a single allegation in 
the Paradis complaints which described a potentially covered claim, ICRMP was 
obligated t o  defend the entire lawsuit, including the non-covered claims. The 
obligation to  defend continued until all covered claims were dismissed and any 
potential appeal had expired. As outlined below, the Paradis complaint describes a 
number of potentially covered claims which required ICRMP to defend the entire 
lawsuit. 
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THE COMPLAINTS FILED BY DONALD PARADIS DESCRIBE POTENTIALLY 
COVERED CLAIMS 
In the memorandum filed in support of its motion for summary judgment, 
ICRMP outlined the allegations in the first Paradis complaint that described 
potentially covered claims. Memorandum in Support, Pgs. 7-8. These claims 
alleged that Mr. Paradis' civil rights were violated when he was convicted of the 
murder of Kimberly Palmer. Paradis also alleged the ICRMP insureds continued to 
violate his civil rights for the many years following his conviction. See Paradis 
Complaint, 768. The alleged ongoing civil rights violations surrounded the 
contention that exculpatory evidence was withheld during the time Paradis was in 
prison challenging his conviction through various habeas corpus proceedings. 
Paradis further alleged this course of illegal conduct constituted negligence, false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. Paradis Complaint, 
Counts IV and V. Finally, Mr. Paradis alleged that defendant Haws made a 
negligence choice to withhold evidence and thereafter continue his secrecy after 
Paradis was convicted and incarcerated. See Paradis Complaint, 71 18. Paradis 
also alleged that Haws made untrue statements to  the press up to  the time he was 
released from prison. - See Paradis Complaint, 722. 
These allegations described potentially covered claims under both the 
Northfield and ICRMP definitions of "personal injury". In both policies, personal 
injury is defined to include emotional distress or mental anguish caused by 
negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, violations of civil rights, defamation, 
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and invasion of privacy. Northfield Policy, Pg. 14; ICRMP Policy, Pg. 15, 79. 
The only question is whether the Paradis Complaint alleged that any of these 
constitutional violations or torts occurred during the time Northfield was providing 
reinsurance to  ICRMP. 
The First Amended Complaint was filed by Mr. Paradis following the 
resolution of various motions to dismiss filed by the ICRMP insureds. In his order 
resolving these motions, Judge Winmill concluded that the claims for false arrest, 
false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress accrued on April 
10, 2001, the date Mr. Paradis was released from prison. See Order, Pg. 45. The 
judge based his ruling on Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850 P2d. 749 (1993) 
writing: 
The longer statute of limitations for a false arrestlfalse 
imprisonment cause of action is distinguishable from the 
defamation claim in Lewis v. Gupta, because false 
arrestlfalse imprisonment, unlike defamation, is deemed a 
"continuing tort". 
See Opinion, Pg. 44, N. 17 
- 
The Court did not address the negligent training or negligent supervision 
claims against Kootenai County noting that Paradis had alleged a pattern and 
practice of permitting Brady v. Maryland violations and other wrongful acts in the 
context of his civil rights claims. However, because of a lack of clarity in these 
allegations, rather than grant the County's Motion to Dismiss on immunity or 
statute of limitations grounds, the Court directed Paradis to  amend the Complaint 
to  clarify his claims. - See Order, Pgs. 48-49. 
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After Judge Winmill ruled on the Motions to Dismiss, Mr. Paradis filed the 
First Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, he restated his claims for 
civil rights violations, and claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. 
Throughout the Amended Complaint Paradis very carefully described his claims as 
continuing torts. The relevant portions of the Amended Complaint state: 
92. The duty to  disclose and the duty to train in the 
requirements of disclosing exculpatory evidence to  
criminal convicts under Brady is a continuing duty and 
does not cease with the conviction and incarceration of 
the criminal .defendant. 
97. Despite the requirements of the Brady doctrine and 
the known implications of such requirements affecting 
the rights of criminal defendants and the duties and 
activities of law enforcement personnel, in 1980 and 
1981 - and indeed, continuing for years thereafter ... the 
customs, policies and practices of Kootenai County, 
particularly its prosecuting attorney and sheriff, displayed 
and reflected a deliberate indifference to  and conscious 
disregard for the constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants generally, and the plaintiff in particular. 
98. Defendants Kootenai County and Walker, 
respectively, failed to  provide Kootenai County police 
officers and prosecuting attorneys with adequate training 
or supervision in the requirements of Brady v. Maryland 
and the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. 
See First Amended Complaint, TjlJ92-98 (emphasis added). 
-
The state law negligence claims incorporated the continuing tort allegations 
and alleged an ongoing pattern and practice of negligent training and supervision. 
Amended Complaint, Count VII. Finally, at Count X, Paradis alleged ongoing 
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and continuing negligence on the part of Mr. Haws surrounding his alleged failure 
to  disclose evidence which would have exonerated Paradis. These allegations were 
not limited to the criminal trial. Instead, according to Paradis, Haws continued to 
conceal evidence while he was in prison attempting to  challenge his conviction 
through the appellate and habeas corpus litigation. See Count X, 11 88. The fact 
the Paradis claims extended to  his incarceration is highlighted by the allegations in 
71 9 0  of the First Amended Complaint which states: "In fact, Plaintiff Paradis was 
scheduled for execution on three different occasions when Haws continued to 
conceal his notes and knowledge." 
These allegations, as with the first Complaint, described potentially covered 
claims under the definition of "personal injury" in both the Northfield and ICRMP 
policies. The Amended Complaint also, unambiguously, alleged ongoing tortious 
and unconstitutional conduct on the part of the ICRMP insureds occurring after Mr. 
Paradis was incarcerated which continued until he was released from prison in April 
of 2001. The legal question, for purposes of coverage, is whether the allegation of 
continuing torts and continuing violations of civil rights describe an "occurrence" as 
that term is defined in both the ICRMP and Northfield policies. 
A. The Amended complaint describes an occurrence which caused personal 
injury during the Northfield and ICRMP policy periods. 
in its motion, Northfield argues it is not obligated to reimburse or indemnify 
ICRMP for any costs relating to  the defense or settlement of the Paradis litigation. 
To support its position, Northfield argues that all of the constitutional and state law 
claims were limited to  the events surrounding Mr. Paradis' arrest in 1980 and his 
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conviction in 1981. - See Defendant's Brief, Pg. 22. Northfield argues that because 
the arrest and conviction took place in the early 1980's, the "occurrence", which is 
the trigger for coverage under the general liability section of both the Northfield and 
ICRMP policies, took'place no later than 1981. See Defendant's Brief, Pg. 25. 
Northfield then argues coverage would not attach to  damages that were caused by 
the events that occurred in 1980 and 1981. 
The flaw in this argument is Northfield's failure to consider the actual 
allegations contained in the Paradis Complaints. As outlined in Section Ill, supra, 
an insurer's duty to  defend is determined solely by the factual allegations and legal 
theories pled in the liability complaint. - See Hoyle at 371-372; see also Amco Ins. 
Co. v. Tri Spur Investment Co., 140 Idaho 733, 738, 101 P2d. 226, 231 (2004). 
Those allegations must be read broadly, assumed to be true, and then compared 
against the coverages available in the insurance policy. Extrinsic facts or unpled 
legal theories cannot be considered to create or defeat an insurer's duty to  defend. 
See Hoyle at 373. If the allegations in the Complaint, read broadly, create a 
potential for coverage, an insurer must provide a defense. Id.. -
The Amended Complaint filed by Mr. Paradis specifically alleged that the 
ICRMP insureds were obligated to  disclose exculpatory evidence after the time he 
was convicted. - See Amended Complaint, 792. The Amended Complaint also 
alleges this was a continuing duty that was breached during the time Paradis was 
incarcerated. Id. at 7797-98. Paradis further alleged these continued violations of 
state and federal law caused him to suffer additional damages which did not end 
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until he was  released from prison. See Amended Complaint, t j~101,  139, 180, 
198, 21 1, 21 4. These allegations, a s  they apply t o  the constitutional and the state 
law claims for false imprisonment and false arrest were recognized by Judge 
Winmill in the underlying liability case t o  be continuing torts. See Opinion. Pg. 44, 
N. 17. Contrary t o  the argument of Northfield, Mr. Paradis did not allege the 
tortious actions of the ICRMP insureds ended when he was  convicted. Instead, 
Paradis alleged the ICRMP insureds continued t o  breach their legal duties and, a s  a 
result, he continued to  suffer damage throughout his incarceration. 
A continuing tort was  described by the ldaho Supreme Court in Curtis v. 
Firth, 123 ldaho 598, 850 P2d. 749 (1993) a s  involving "...a series of acts  over a 
period of time, rather than a single act  causing severe emotional distress." - Id, a t  
604 . A plain reading' of the allegations in the amended liability complaint reveais 
Mr. Paradis was  alleging the ICRMP insureds engaged in a series of acts  over a 
period of time, rather than a single ac t  (his conviction), which caused him severe 
emotional distress. On that basis, the  coverage issue must be resolved by asking 
whether the  fact a continuing tort which began in 1980 and ended in April of 2001 
would meet the definition of an occurrence a s  that  term appears in the Northfield 
and ICRMP insurance policies. 
1. Continuing torts are "occurrences" a s  the term is defined in a general 
liability insuring agreement. 
The Northfield policy defines an occurrence a s  "...an accident or a happening 
or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to  conditions which result in 
personal injury or damage t o  property during the policy period." The definition 
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further states that damages arising out of a continued or repeated exposure will be 
deemed a single occurrence. See Northfield Policy, Pg. 6. The definition of 
"occurrence" in the ICRMP policy is nearly identical to the definition utilized in the 
Northfield policy. See ICRMP Policy, Pg. 14, 78. The two policies are therefore 
consistent and afford the same coverage. The plain language of this definition 
clearly contemplates coverage will extend to  continuing torts. A "continuous or 
repeated exposure to  conditions", i.e. ongoing tortious conduct, is consistent with 
the standard for a continuing tort set forth in Curtis v. Firth, supra, where the court 
held the continuing tort involves a "series of acts over a period of time". Clearly, a 
continuing tort would constitute an occurrence under the Northfield and ICRMP 
policies. 
In Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 142 Wis. 2d. 
673, 419 NW2d. 255 (1987) the insured, Wisconsin Electric Power Company 
(WEPCo) installed a three-phase power supply to the dairy farm of the plaintiff, 
Daggett. Shortly after its installation, the Daggetts noticed unusual behavior on 
the part of their cows which resulted in a decline in milk production, failure to  
breed, ill health, and sometimes death. In 1981, eleven years after the power 
supply was installed, it was determined the damages to the plaintiff's cattle were 
caused by stray voltage from the three-phase power supply installed by WEPCo. 
Suit was filed in 1983 seeking to  recover the damage caused to the Daggetts' 
cows. At  trial, the jury awarded damages in excess of $1,000,000. Before 
judgment was entered, WEPCo and the plaintiffs entered into a settlement whereby 
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the power company agreed to pay slightly more than $1,000,000 over a period of 
years. WEPCo's insurance carriers, including Cal Union, approved of the 
settlement. Thereafter, WEPCo and the insurers entered into discussions aimed to  
allocate the loss. A compromise was reached to allocate on a pro rata basis. Cal 
Union would not agree to  the compromise because it felt it was not obligated to 
provide coverage or indemnity to WEPCo. This position was based upon the fact 
that Cal Union did not issue an insurance contract t o  WEPCo until 1977, seven 
years after the defective three-phase power supply had been installed. On that 
basis, Cal Union argued an occurrence had not happened during the policy period. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected this argument writing: 
We agree with the reasoning of the Keene decision. Cal 
Union's policy states "[tlhe word "occurrence" ... means 
... a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which 
result in ... property damage neither expected or intended 
by the assured. All ... exposure to ... the same general 
conditions existing and/or emanating from one location or 
source shall be deemed one occurrence. A perfectly 
reasonable interpretation of this language, and the 
interpretation advance by WEPCO, is that as long as 
there is harmful exposure to dangerous conditions, the 
occurrence is continuing. As in Keene, while any part of 
the single injurious process continues, the occurrence 
continues. 
See 401 9 NW2d. at 681. 
-
In the Wisconsin Electric Power Co. case, the tortious act, the continuing 
stray voltage, was ongoing from the time the power supply was installed until the 
insured, WEPCo, corrected the problem. In other words, WEPCo continued to  
engage in tortious activity which continued to  expose the plaintiff's cattle to stray 
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voltage causing the plaintiff to  suffer ongoing property damage over an eleven-year 
period. Because of the continuing nature of the tort, tortious activity did occur 
during the time WEPCo was insured by Cal Union. For that reason, the allegations 
against WEPCo described an occurrence as defined by the insurance policy. See 
also County of Suffolk v. Travelers Ins. Co., 267 F .  Supp. 2d. 288 (E.D. N.Y. 
-
2003) (a continuing nuisance claim triggers the duty to  indemnify and defend under 
a comprehensive general liability policy defining an occurrence as "an accident, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily or 
property damage neither expected or intended from the standpoint of the 
[county]"). 
The affect of a continuing tort in  the context of a claim brought under 42 
U.S.C. 31983 was recognized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Williams v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F2d. 918, 924 (gth Cir.) cert. denied. 459 U.S. 971 
(1982). The court characterized the ongoing illegal actions of the defendant as a 
continuing violation which arose in the context of a continuing policy and practice 
of discrimination. To prevail under a continuing violation theory, the plaintiff was 
required to show a policy or practice that operated at least, in part, within the 
statute of limitations time period. 
In this case, according to  Mr. Paradis, the ICRMP insureds continued to  
engage in unconstitutional and tortious activities surrounding the withholding of 
exculpatory evidence and failing to  supervise employees long after he was 
incarcerated. According to Paradis, this tortious activity continued until he was 
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released from prison. These allegations describe a continuing tort and a continuing 
constitutional violation which would meet the definition of an occurrence as 
defined by the Northfield insurance policy. Based upon the allegations in the 
Paradis Complaint, the entire pattern of tortious activity from 1980 until Mr. 
Paradis was released from prison constituted a single occurrence. Because the 
occurrence took place, in part, during the Northfield policy period, coverage exists. 
In Unigard Ins. Co. v. USF&G, 1 1 1  Idaho 891,728 P2d 780 (Ct. App. 19861, 
the court was asked to decide whether a series of repetitive events causing 
multiple incidences of damage could constitute a single occurrence under a general 
liability insurance policy. The case involved damage caused to  various units at a 
mini storage facility located in Pocatello, Idaho. The insured's employee performed 
snow clearing services at the property. During a four-hour period where the 
employee was plowing snow, he damaged the overhead doors on 98 separate 
storage units. The insurance company took the position that each damaged door 
was the result of a separate occurrence which triggered a separate $500 
deductible for each event. Because of the amount of damage to  each door was 
less than the $500 deductible, Unigard refused to pay. 
On appeal, the court recognized the various approaches taken by courts in 
cases involving multiple occurrences. The court concluded the most useful 
approach has been the "continuous process" test which focuses upon the 
underlying cause rather than the individual events damage. The critical inquiry was 
described as being whether or not the damage causing process was continuous and 
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repetitive. See1 11 ldaho at 893. This caused the court to write: 
The question remains whether the damage was caused 
by a single occurrence. We hold that it was. The cause 
of damage - the negligence of Campbell's employee - 
was continuous and repetitive. He inflicted 98 similar 
injuries during the four-hour course of snow clearing 
activity. Under the continuous process test, there was 
but one "occurrence". Campbell was responsible for only 
one deductible. See 1 1  1 ldaho at 894. 
The fact the ldaho courts have adopted the continuous process analysis is 
critical in this case. It is consistent with the holdings in Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of 
North America, 667 F2d. 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) cert. denied. 455 U.S. 1007 
(1 982) involving asbestos litigation. In that case, the court concluded that the 
asbestos exposure and resultant disease was a continuous process which 
constituted a single occurrence triggering coverage on all liability policies which 
were in place throughout the occurrence. The court concluded that once the 
insurer's policy was triggered, it was required to  defend and indemnify its 
policyholder to the extent of its entire policy limits even though part of the injury 
may have occurred outside its policy period. 
A similar analysis was utilized in Dioceses of Winona v. Interstate Fire & 
Casualty Co., 89 F3d. 1386 (ath Cir. 1996) involving longstanding and repeated 
sexual abuse by a pedophilic priest. The Dioceses was sued for its negligent 
supervision of the priest. The abuse of the plaintiff began in October of 1979 and 
continued until February of 1987. The court described the occurrence as "the 
continuous and repeated exposure of Mrozka [liability plaintiff1 to  the negligent 
supervision of Father Adamson by both the Diocese and the Archdiocese. Because 
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the negligence of the insured took place, at least in part, during the policy period 
causing the plaintiff t o  suffer injury, coverage existed. 
A similar conclusion was. reached in National Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Mt. 
Vernon, 128 AD2d. 332, 51 5 NYS2d. 267 (1  987) involving a claim for false 
imprisonment where the plaintiff was wrongfully incarcerated for two  years. The 
insurer refused to defend the action arguing the arrest occurred before the effective 
date of the policy. This argument was rejected with the court writing: 
Contrary to  National's contentions, the language of the 
occurrence clause herein ascribes no temporal relevance 
to  the cause of the event preceding the covered injury, 
but rather premises coverage exclusively upon the 
sustaining of specified injuries during the policy period. 
Thus, the pertinent policy provision provides coverage for 
an "occurrence" and, thereafter, states that an 
occurrence means "an event ... which results in personal 
injury ... sustained during rhe policy period ." (emphasis 
added). Indeed, as one commentator has stated in 
discussing a similar provision, "[the] policy will not 
depend upon the cause of event of occurrence, but will 
be based upon the injuries or damage which result from 
such an event and which happened during the policy 
period. It will not be material where the cause of the 
event happened during "before the policy period". 
Obriest, New Comprehensive Liability Insurance Policy, 
General Liability Insurance: 1973 Revisions a t  39; see 
& Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 
F2d. 56, 61-62; Bartholomew v. Ins. Co. of North 
America, 502 F. Supp. 246, 252 aff'd Bartholomew v. 
Appalachian Ins. Co., 655 F2d. 27; American Motorists 
Ins. Co. v. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d. 222; 
Deodato v. Hartford Ins. Co., 143 NJ, super, 396, 363 
A2d. 361 affirmed 154 NJ supra 263, 81 A2d. 354; 
Acorn Ponds v. Hartford Ins. Co., 105 A2d. 723, 724; 
Annot. 27 ALR 4th 382). We note, moreover, that there 
is nothing in the policy which requires, as a prerequisite 
to ascertain whether there is coverage, that the injury 
resulting from a causative event be reduced t o  a single or 
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fixed occurrence in time. Nor does the policy distinguish, 
in terms of coverage, between compensable injuries 
which are continuous in nature and those whose 
occurrence is discrete and noncontinuous or requires that 
a personal injury take place in its entirety during the 
policy period. These omissions are particularly significant 
in that the policy specifically recognizes that an injury can 
be caused by "continuous or repeated exposure to  
conditions" (see -Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co., 667 F2d. 
1034, 1049, cert denied, 455 U.S. 1007). Accordingly, 
the operating event triggering the exposure, and thus 
resulting in coverage under the policy, is the sustaining of 
a specified injury during the policy period. 
See 51 5 NYS2d. at 270. 
-
In this case, the allegations in the Paradis Complaints described continuing 
and repeated events surrounding Mr. Paradis' conviction and subsequent 
incarceration all of which caused him to  suffer personal injuries throughout the time 
he was incarcerated. Consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in 
Unigard Ins. Co., this continuing process describes a single occurrence which 
began in 1980 and ended in April of 2001 when Paradis was released from prison. 
As alleged by Mr. Paradis, the occurrence was ongoing and he was suffering bodily 
injuries during the ICRMP and Northfield policy periods. For that reason, a potential 
for coverage arose. ICRMP recognized this fact, honored its obligation to  defend 
its insureds, and is now entitled to reimbursement from its reinsurer, Northfield. 
Accordingly, Northland's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied 
THE NORTHFIELD POLICY IS A POLICY OF REINSURANCE 
In its brief, Northfield argues the policy of insurance it sold to  ICRMP was 
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not reinsurance. It bases this argument on the lack of a "follow the form" or a 
"follow the fortunes" clause in the policy. See Memorandum in Support of 
Summary Judgment, Pgs. 47-49. 
The initial 'flaw in this argument is the fact the Northfield policy 
unambiguously describes its relationship with ICRMP as being based upon 
reinsurance. On the first page of the policy, Northfield identifies ICRMP as: 
NAMED REINSURED: IDAHO COUNTIES RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, a JOINT POWERS 
AUTHORITY, and all Boards, Departments, Divisions, 
Commissions, Authorities, and any other activities under 
the supervision or control of the JPA whether now or 
hereafter constituted. 
Northfield Policy, Pg. 1. 
To the extent Northfield is now suggesting ICRMP is not its reinsured, it has 
conceded its policy is ambiguous as, it has shown the policy is subject to more 
than one interpretation. See Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 ldaho 443, 
65  P3d. 184 (2003). Any ambiguity must be strictly construed against Northfield 
and in favor of its assured, ICRMP. See Farmers Inc. Co. v. Talbot, 133 ldaho 
428, 987 P2d. 1043 (1999); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 ldaho 138, 627 
P2d. 317 (1 981) ("...insurance policies are to  be construed most liberally in favor 
of recovery, with all ambiguities being resolved in favor of the insured"). 
Northfield's argument also fails to appreciate the purpose of reinsurance and 
fails to  recognize its policy accomplishes the traditional goals of reinsurance. The 
Northfield policy accepts a substantial portion of the risk ICRMP assumed when it 
underwrote the policy that was issued to  Kootenai County and its other insureds. 
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Purchasing reinsurance insulates ICRMP from exposure for a large loss, allows it to  
lower its reserves and be financially capable of writing other insurance policies or 
making investments. See Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 72. 
Reinsurance is a contractual arrangement whereby one insurer transfers all or 
a portion of the risk it underwrites by purchasing an insurance policy from another 
insurer. See Colonial American Life Ins. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 491 
U.S. 244 (1989). The purpose of reinsurance is its function as a mechanism for 
the reallocation of risk from the insurer that originally underwrites a risk to another 
insurer. Kemper Reinsurance Co. v. Corcoran (In re Midland Ins. Co.), 79 NY2d. 
253, 590 NE2d. 1186 (1992). The availability of reinsurance enables an insurer, 
such as ICRMP, to accept risks that would otherwise be beyond its underwriting 
capacity by allowing it to "lay off" on a reinsurer a portion of the risk of loss. On 
that basis, reinsurance enables insurers to spread the risk of catastrophic losses 
among a larger pool of insurers. See Excess and Casualty Reinsurance Assoc. v. 
Ins. Commissioner of Cal., 656 F2d. 491 (9'h Cir. 1981). Reinsurance also permits 
an insurer to reduce the amount of reserves it would otherwise be required to  
maintain. Kemper Reinsurance Co. v. Corcoran fin re Midland Ins. Go.), 79 NY3d. 
253, 582 NYS 58, 590 NE2d. 1188 (1992) (reinsurance "permits a primary insurer 
to  reduce the amount of the legally required reserve held for the protection of 
policyholders and to increase the company's ability to  underwrite other policies or 
make other investments). 
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Under an indemnity reinsurance agreement, once the ceding insurer pays a 
claim, the reinsurer becomes obligated to  indemnify the ceding insurer in 
accordance with the reinsurance contract. See China Union Lines, Ltd. v. 
American Marine Underwriters, inc., 755 F2d. 26 (2"d Cir. 1985). The reinsurer is 
not obligated to pay for losses that are not covered by the underlying policy. See 
American Ins. Co. v. North American Company for Property and Casualty Ins., 697 
F2d. 7 9  (2"d Cir. 1982). However, a reinsurer cannot second guess the good faith 
liability determinations made by its reinsured or the reinsured's good faith decision 
to  waive defenses to  which it may be entitled. Christiania General ins. Corp. v. 
Great American Ins. Co., 979 F2d. 268 (2nd Cir. 1992). The "follow the fortunes" 
doctrine will compel the reinsurer "to indemnify for payments reasonably within the 
terms of the original [underlying] policy, even i f  technically not covered by it." - Id. 
at 280. 
A. Follow the form clauses 
Excess insurers and reinsurers typically agree to provide coverage under the 
same terms and conditions of the underlying liability policy. In order to assure 
consistency or what is termed "concurrency" between the coverages afforded by 
the primary and reinsured policy, the reinsurance certificate frequently contains 
language which is referred to  as a "following the form" clause. In that instance, 
the reinsurance contract is construed as offering the same terms, conditions and 
scope of coverage as exist in the reinsured policy in the absence of explicit 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO NORTHLANDINORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION FO 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 31 . Sl0014G 
language in the policy of reinsurance to the contrary. See Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 822 F. Supp. 1328, 1337 (S.D. N.Y. 1995). 
The fact a follow the form clause does not exist in the Northfield policy does 
not lead to  the conclusion that the policy is not one of reinsurance or that the 
coverages in the Northfield policy are not the same as those provided in the ICRMP 
policy. Here, as outlined in Section II, above, the insuring language in the general 
liability insuring agreements in the Northfield and ICRMP policies utilize very similar 
language. Despite the fact the Northfield policy does not contain a follow the form 
clause, the defendant has, by virtue of the fact it utilized nearly identical language 
t o  that which appears in the ICRMP policy, achieved concurrency which is the 
purpose of including a follow the forms clause in a reinsurance certificate. 
Northfield's attempt to characterize the policy as something other than reinsurance 
because it does not contain a follow the form clause ignores the plain language of 
coverages afforded by its own policy. The ICRMP and Northfield policies offer the 
same coverages which has allowed ICRMP to reallocate a portion of its risk under 
the policy it sold to Kootenai County to Northfield. In other words, Northfield has 
reinsured the original risks ICRMP assumed when it wrote the policy Kootenai 
County later purchased. 
B. Follow the fortunes doctrine. 
Contrary to  the argument of Northfield, the obligation of a reinsurer to  honor 
the good faith settlements of its reinsured is not dependent upon the existence of a 
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"follow the fortunes" or "follow the settlements" clauses. To the contrary, the 
"follow the fortunes" doctrine arises by operation of law even in the absence of a 
"loss settlements" clause in the reinsurance contract. This rule was addressed in 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. N.Y. 
1995) in a case that arose out of the Dalcon Shield litigation. In the subsequent 
dispute between the primary insurer, Aetna, and its reinsurer, The Home, the court 
described the follow the fortunes doctrine as follows: 
The purpose of the follow the settlements doctrine is to  
prevent the reinsurer from "second guessing" the 
settlement decisions of the ceding company. Absent 
such a rule, an insurance company would be obligated to 
litigate coverage disputes with its insured before paying 
any claims, lest it first settle and pay a claim, only to  risk 
losing the benefit of reinsurance coverage when the 
reinsurer raises in court the same policy defenses that the 
original insurer might have raised against its insured. 
New York Marine Ins. Co. v. Protection Ins. Go., 18 F. 
Cas. 160, 160-61 (CC Mass. 1841) (Story, J.). This 
doctrine adjusts the incentives present in the reinsurance 
relationship in order to promote good faith settlements by 
the ceding company. 
See 882 F. Supp. at 1346. 
-
As noted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Bellefonte Reinsurance 
Co. v. North American Company for Property and Casualty Ins., 903 F2d. 91 0 (2"d 
Cir. 1990) the "follow the fortunes" doctrine "...burdens the reinsurer with those 
risks which the direct insurer bears under the direct insurer's policy covering the 
original insured." at 912. Finally, in  Mentor Ins. Co. v. Norges Brannkasse, 
996 F2d. 506, 51 7 (2nd Cir. 1993), the court wrote: 
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The follow the fortunes [or follow the settlements] 
principal does not change the reinsurance contract; it 
simply requires payment where the cedent's good-faith 
payment is at least arguably within the scope of the 
insurance coverage that was reinsured. 
Applying these principals, the Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. The Home Ins. 
Co. court concluded that the "follow the fortunes" doctrine applied in all contracts 
of reinsurance even in the absence of an explicit "loss settlements" clause writing: 
The weight of authority appears to  favor Aetna's 
. . 
position, although the authorities admittedly do not speak 
with one voice. For example, Geranthewohl opines that 
the "fundamental follow-the-fortunes principal" generally 
applies irrespective of whether it is expressed in the 
contract of insurance, i.e. in a loss settlement clause. 
See Geranthewohl, supra, 32.5.1 at 466. See also Henry 
-
T. Kramer, The Nature of Reinsurance, in Reinsurance I 7 -  
12 (Strain ed. 1980) (duty to follow fortunes "may or 
may not be expressed in an agreement of reinsurance but 
nevertheless exists for all"). 
See 882 F. Sup p. at 1 349. See also International Surplus Ins. v. Underwriters at 
- 
Lloyd, 68 F .  Supp. 917, 920  (S.D. Oh. 1994) (reinsurer bound by the "follow the 
fortunes" doctrine even in the absence of explicit language in the reinsurance 
contract). 
The obligation that NorthlandINorthfield honor the good faith settlement or 
defense decisions entered into by ICRMP is consistent with the provisions in the 
Northfield policy. At  page 5 of the policy, the ICRMP Claims Department is 
charged with the responsibility of servicing all claims under the policy. The 
following duties are assigned to ICRMP: 
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It is understood that all claims under this policy shall be 
serviced by I.C.R.M.P.'s Claims Department who 
perform the following duties: 
A, Investigate and settle or defend all claims or losses - it 
is understood that, when so requested, the I.C.R.M.P. 
Claims Department will afford Underwriters an 
opportunity to  be associated with them in the defense or 
control of any claim, suit or proceeding." 
See Northfield Policy, Pg. 5 (emphasis added). 
The duties given ICRMP by this language are broad and mandatory. It 
requires ICRMP make decisions regarding the defense and settlement of claims. 
While Northfield is given the "opportunity to be associated", the policy does not 
give it the right to  second guess, after the fact, decisions made by ICRMP's Claims 
Department concerning whether to  settle a claim or how to conduct the defense. 
Its right to be associated with the settlement process envisions that Northfield 
would have a voice in the decision, but would not have the ability to  veto 
settlement decisions. The Northfield policy does not simply give ICRMP the choice 
of managing the claims, it states ICRMP "shall perform the following duties" which 
it then identifies as the investigation, settlement or defense of claims. Finally, and 
most important, the language in the Northfield policy is not attempting to identify 
who would have the obligation to  manage claims insured solely by the ICRMP 
policy. Instead, the above quoted language is referring to  the management and 
settlement of claims insured by the Northfield policy. This language unambiguously 
empowers the ICRMP Claims Department to bind Northfield on issues concerning 
the defense and settlement claims. In application, this policy language requires 
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Northfield to  "follow the fortunes" of reasonable settlement decisions made by the 
ICRMP Claims Department. 
In the present case, Northfield, like any other reinsurer, is bound by the good 
faith settlements of its reinsured, ICRMP. Under the "follow the fortunes" doctrine, 
so long as the settlement between ICRMP and Donald Paradis was undertaken in 
good faith after a reasonable investigation and was, at least arguably, with in the 
scope of the coverage that was reinsured, Northfield must honor its obligation to 
indemnify ICRMP in accordance with the reinsurance policy. 
As an alternative argument, Northfield appears to  suggest it is not obligated 
to  reimburse or indemnify ICRMP for litigation costs associated with the defense of 
any non-covered claims. Initially, it must be noted that throughout the many years 
that ICRMP has purchased reinsurance from Northfield, the defendant has never 
attempted to apportion its reimbursement of litigation costs based upon a decision 
by ICRMP to  provide a complete defense to  a suit involving covered and non- 
covered claims. See Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 53. As outlined in Section 
II, above, it is a well-established legal principal that when a casualty insurer's duty 
t o  defend arises, it is required to defend all claims in the liability complaint including 
non-covered claims. Throughout the relationship which has existed between 
ICRMP and NorthlandINorthfield, ICRMP has, on many occasions, honored this 
obligation and extended a complete defense to its insureds under a reservation of 
rights. Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 93. Throughout its relationship with 
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NorthlandiNorthfield, as in the present case, ICRMP provided the defendant routine 
reports whereby it was apprised of the status of the litigation and the costs which 
are being incurred. &, q3. When a case was resolved, assuming the SIR was 
exhausted, NorthlandlNorthfield was presented a bill for reimbursement which has 
always been paid without any question of whether the defense costs that were 
being reimbursed applied to  non-covered claims. & at 3. In this case, 
NorthlandINorthfield was advised at the beginning of the Paradis litigation that 
ICRMP would extend a complete defense pursuant to  a reservation of rights. See 
Complaint, Exhibit B; see also Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 774, 5. 
NorthlandINorthfield expressed no objections and did not take any position on 
coverage until February 13, 2006, nearly two  years after the Paradis Complaint 
was filed. - See Complaint, Exhibit C. 
This course of dealing is consistent with the general principals of reinsurance 
which requires the reinsurer to indemnify and reimburse the ceding company, such 
as ICRMP, for settlements and defense costs. See North River Ins. Co. v. ClGNA 
Reinsurance Co., 52 F3d. 11 9 4  (3'd Cir. 1995) (reinsurer obligated t o  reimburse for 
defense costs that were reasonably within the scope of the original policy's 
coverage). It is also consistent with the language in the Northfield policy that vests 
the ICRMP Claims Department with the discretion and obligation to  manage and 
settle claims. See Northfield Policy, Pg. 5 (11 Service Organization). 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO NORTHLANDINORTHFIELD INSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 37 000150 
Reimbursement for costs associated with providing a complete defense is 
also required by the express language in the Northfield policy. Under the 
comprehensive general liability insuring agreement, Northfield agrees to 
"...indemnify the assured [ICRMPI for all sums, including expenses, all as more fully 
defined by the term ultimate net loss, which the assured [ICRMPI shall become 
legally obligated to  pay as damages imposed by law ..." (emphasis added). The 
Northfield policy further defines ultimate net loss to  include reimbursement for 
"...expenses for lawyers and investigators of claims or suits..." (emphasis added). 
As outlined above, an insurer becomes legally obligated to incur defense costs 
when a liability complaint or suit is filed against its insured which contains 
allegations describing a potentially covered claim. See Section II, supra. At  that 
point, the insurer is obligated to defend the entire suit including covered and non- 
covered claims. Under the plain language of the Northfield policy, ICRMP became 
legally obligated to  pay for "law costs" incurred by the insureds when Mr. Paradis 
filed complaints which described potentially covered claims. Northfield did not 
include any language in its policy allowing it to  apportion its obligation to  reimburse 
for defense costs which were properly incurred in defending the entire suit. See 
-
American Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. B&L Trucking and Const. Co., 134 Wn2d. 413, 951 
P2d. 250 (1 998) (in the absence of an allocation clause insurer is not to apportion 
damages arising from a single occurrence spanning a number of years). The court 
cannot add language to  the insurance policy to  either create or avoid liability. 
Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875, 878-79, 655 P2d. 82, 85-86 (1982); 
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Purvis v. ProgressiveIns. Co., 142 Idaho 213, 216, 127 P3d. 116, 119 (2005). in  
the absence of policy language allowing NorthlandINorthfield the ability to  
apportion its reimbursement, it cannot, after the fact, question the reasonable 
defense costs ICRMP incurred. 
In this case, the ICRMP and Northfield policies provide for the same 
coverages. Northfield, as a reinsurer, is obligated to honor the good faith 
settlements of its reinsured, ICRMP. For these reasons, Northfield is required to 
reimburse ICRMP for ail defense costs incurred in the defense of the ICRMP 
insureds, as well as for the settlement paid to  Donald Paradis. Accordingly, 
Northfield's motion should be denied. 
NORHTLAND, BY ITS DENIAL OF COVERAGE, HAS BREACHED ITS CONTRACT 
WITH ICRMP AND CANNOT CONTEST THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ICRMP 
HAS NEGOTIATED 
The undisputed facts in this litigation establish that when the Paradis lawsuit 
was first filed, NorthlandtNorthfield was notified. See Affidavit of Richard B. 
Ferguson, 74; Complaint, Exhibit B. NorthlandINorthfield was provided copies of 
the Complaints and regular reports concerning the status of the litigation, as well 
as the costs that were being incurred. See Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 74. 
Two years after the lawsuit was filed, NorthlandINorthfield sent ICRMP a letter 
stating its position that coverage did not exist and that it would refuse to  indemnify 
ICRMP under the Northfield policy. - See, Complaint, Exhibit C; see also Affidavit of 
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Richard B. Ferguson, 1/7. As outlined in the sections above, it is ICRMP's position 
that a potential for coverage existed which triggered ICRMP's duty to  defend. 
The impact of an insurer incorrectly refusing to  provide coverage and thereby 
breaching the contract between itself and the insured was addressed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Exterovich v. Burress, 139 ldaho 439, 8 0  P3d. 1040 (2003) with 
the court writing: 
A liability insurer such as ICRMP has two  duties: the 
duty to defend and the duty to  indemnify. The duty to 
defend arises upon the filing of a complaint containing 
allegations that, in whole or in part read broadly, reveal a 
potential for liability that would be covered by the 
insured's policy. Hoyle v, Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 ldaho 
367, 48 P3d. 1256 (2002). If the insurer breaches its 
duty to  defend and the insured settles a claim covered by 
the policy, the insurer has a duty to indemnify its insured 
for the amount of that settlement so long as a potential 
liability for the insured existed which resulted in a 
reasonable settlement in view of the size of possible 
recovery and the probability of the claimant's success 
against the insured. City of ldaho Falls v. Home 
lndemnity Co., 1206 ldaho 604, 888 P2d. 383 (1995). 
An insurer's duty to defend and indemnify are separate 
duties. ld. 
See 139 ldaho at 441. 
In Exterovich, while the Supreme Court recognized that an insurer may, after 
previously denying coverage, assume its duty to  defend. However, the insurer is 
bound by any admissions made by the insured which were part of a reasonable 
settlement. 4 at 442. This conclusion restated the court's prior ruling in City of 
ldaho Falls v. Home lndemnity Co., 126 ldaho 604, 888 P2d. 383 (1 995) where 
the court held that an insurer was not entitled to relitigate an underlying action 
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following a settlement where the insurer had breached the contract between itself 
and its insured. & a t  610. 
In this case, NorthlandlNorthfield cannot relitigate nor can it dispute the 
settlement reached between ICRMP and Mr. Paradis. Prior to  the time the case 
was mediated, Northfield had already breached its contract with ICRMP by taking 
the position, two  years after the litigation had been ongoing, that coverage did not 
exist and that it would not reimburse or indemnify ICRMP pursuant to  the 
Northfield policy. See Complaint, Exhibit C. The February 13, 2006 letter denying 
coverage was a material breach of the Northfield policy which relieved ICRMP from 
any obligation that may have existed to  obtain Northfield's consent to  future 
settlements. Despite this, ICRMP afforded Northfield the opportunity to  cure its 
breach by soliciting its involvement in strategy decisions surrounding possible 
mediation. See Complaint, Exhibit F; Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson, 710. 
Northfield continued with its prior position refusing to  attend mediation thereby 
ratifying its earlier breach of contract. See Complaint, Exhibit G; Affidavit of 
Richard B. Ferguson, 11 0. 
As outlined above, the potential coverages afforded by the ICRMP and 
Northfield policies under the comprehensive general liability insuring agreements 
were identical. Additionally, as outlined above, the Paradis Complaints described 
potentially covered claims which triggered ICRMP's duty to  defend and Northland1 
Northfield's potential obligation to  reimburse. It cannot be seriously questioned 
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that the decision to  mediate the Paradis lawsuit was reasonable in light of the 
possibility for a multi-million dollar verdict against the ICRMP insureds. The amount 
of the Paradis settlement is also reasonable in light of the exposure and the fact, by 
virtue of the release agreement, ICRMP was able to  shelter its insureds from the 
multi-million claim which was later made by the attorneys who had represented Mr. 
Paradis in the habeas corpus litigation. Affidavit of Richard 6. Ferguson, 812. 
The undisputed facts in this case establish that had the Paradis case gone to trial, 
there was a potential the ICRMP insureds would be held liable for a covered claim. 
Their potential exposure for covered and non-covered claims was catastrophic. 
The settlement was reasonable in light of the potential exposures ICRMP and its 
insureds faced. In fact, ICRMP was able to resolve the case for less than its 
anticipated cost to  continue the defense through trial. See Affidavit of Richard 
Ferguson, 71/9, 1 1. Because Northland/Northfield breached its reinsurance contract 
with ICRMP, it cannot, at this stage, dispute the reasonableness of the settlement. 
Accordingly, NorthlandINorthfield's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to 
absolve it from responsibility for the Paradis settlement should be denied. 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2007. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
.b& 
Phillio J. Collaer, Of the Firm 
~ t t d r n e ~ s  for plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI-IE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
UNDERWRITERS, 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE 
COMPANIES, 
Defendant. I 
CaseNo. CV OC 0617112 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT NORTHLAND 
INSURANCE COMPANIES' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW defendant, Northland Insurance Companies (whose proper name and 
identity herein is Northfield Insurance Company) (hereinafter "defendant Northfield"), by and 
through its undersigned counsel of record, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and 
hereby submits this reply in support of its motion for summary judgment, seeking this Court's 
order dismissing plaintiff Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters' ("ICRMP") 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("plaintiffs Complaint") with prejudice, on the grounds 
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, 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that defendant Northfield is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff has identified no genuine issues of material fact. 
In the summary judgment context, "[tlhe burden of proving the absence of material facts 
is upon the moving party." Baxter v.  crane^, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). 
However, "[tlhe adverse party ... 'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Id. "In other words, the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial." Id. '"A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 
of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Foster v. Traul, 
141 Idaho 890,893, 120 P.3d 278,281 (2005). 
In the present case, although outlining its own statement of facts, plaintiff does not assert 
that there is any genuine issue of material fact with respect to the facts identified by Northfield. 
Instead, plaintiffs facts are directed primarily to two areas: first, the actions taken by ICRMP in 
defending its own policy; and second, Northfield's actions prior to ICRMP's exhaustion of its 
self-insured retention ("SIR"). 
On the first subject, plaintiff identifies its own decisions regarding its own policy; for 
example: 
"ICRMP also review the allegations in the Paradis Complaint for potential coverage." 
"A decision was made that a duty to defend existed." 
"Kootenai County and the other defendants were advised of this decision and provided a 
reservation of rights letter." 
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"Because of potential conflicts of interest, ICRMP, exercising its discretion over the 
management of the litigation, retained separate attorneys for Kootenai County, Mr. Haws, 
and Mr. Elliott." 
"It was ICRMP's position, at that time, that the existence of a continuing tort describing 
negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, or violations of Mr. Paradis' constitutional 
rights described potentially covered claims which obligated ICRMP to provide a 
defense." 
"In light of the considerable exposure ICRMP faced for future defense costs, coupled 
with the possibility of an adverse judgment being entered against its insured, ICRMP 
made the decision that mediation." 
Plaintiffs Response to Northland/Northfield Insurance Companies' Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Plaintiff's Memo"), at 2-4. However, none of these questions are relevant to 
Northfield's motion now before the Court. ICRMP is an insurer, with its own policy, and its 
own duties ancillary to such policy. See Exterovich v. City of Kellong, 139 Idaho 439, 441, 80 
P.3d 1040, 1042 (2003)("A liability insurer such as ICRMP has two duties: the duty to defend, 
and the duty to indemnify."). No actions or decisions taken by ICRMP relevant to its own policy 
issued to Kootenai County have any bearing on questions of coverage under the Northfield 
policy. Accordingly, plaintiffs identified facts do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to Northfield's policy. 
Regarding the second category of facts identified by ICRMP, these apparently attempt to 
establish some variety of estoppel against Northfield; for example: 
Regarding the retention of multiple attorneys, "Northland/NorthfieId did not object to this 
approach." 
Regarding the use of multiple attorneys, "Again, throughout this time, 
NorthlandNorthfield never voiced any concerns or objections that multiple law firms 
were being used to defend the insureds or that a complete defense was being provided." 
"NorthlandNorthfield ratified its earlier breach of contract by restating its previous 
position that coverage did not exist and advising ICRMP it would not participate in 
mediation or settlement." 
0 "Throughout its longstanding relationship with NorthlandNorthfield, ICRMP has 
routinely provided a complete defense to its insured when they are sued for covered and 
non-covered claims." 
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"Until the Paradis litigation, Northlandblorthfield has never sought to allocate its 
reimbursement obligation by refusing to pay for attorneys' fees expended in cases 
involving covered and non-covered claims." 
"In all of these cases, once ICRMP's SIR is exhausted, a billing for reimbursement is 
presented to Northlandblorthfield. That billing is paid without any request for allocation 
or apportionment." 
Plaintiffs Memo at 2-5. 
None of the above factual or conclusory assertions address whether or not a particular 
claim is covered under Northfield's policy, which is the subject matter of this litigation. 
Northfield's handling of prior other cases or claims involve fact-specific analysis of the 
particulars of such claims under the terms of the particular Northfield policy implicated by the 
claim, and is not, obviously, to be construed as carte blanche for any and all claims ICRMP may 
make against a Northfield policy. Moreover, until ICRMP advises Northfield that its SIR has 
been exhausted (which ICRMP did not do until June 27, 2006, after it had already exceeded its 
SIR layer by $273,305.33 (Complaint, Exh. F)), Northfield has no duty to reimburse, nor even 
any "duty to speak" with respect to its own policy, a principle recognized in the analogous 
excess insurer context. See, e.g., All City Ins. Co. v. Sioukas, 378 N.Y.S.2d 71 1 (N.Y. A.D. 
1976)CAnd since it did not have a policy affording coverage to the respondent until the primary 
coverage had been exhausted, it had no duty to serve a notice of disclaimer upon the respondent 
or upon his highly experienced attorneys."); St. Paul Fire Ins. Co. v. Children's Hosp. Nat'l 
Medical Center, 670 F. Supp. 393, 402 (D.D.C. 1987)rThe issue here, however, is whether St. 
Paul had a duty to disclaim coverage or reserve rights under the excess policies at the time it 
assumed the defense of the Lee claims under the primary policy, or at some other time prior to 
judgment. We conclude that, prior to the time the verdict was rendered, St. Paul had no such duty 
to speak with respect to the excess policies."); Richmond, "Rights and Responsibilities of Excess 
Carriers," 78 Denver Univ. L.R. 29, 44-45 (2000) ("An excess carrier typically has no duty to 
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defend its insured until the limits of underlying coverage are exhausted . . . the majority position 
also makes sense because an insurer's duty to defend is expressly contractual, and if there is no 
policy language requiring an insurer to defend, there can be no duty to do so."). 
As such, the facts identified by plaintiff are not "material", such as would raise a genuine 
issue of material fact sufficient to defeat Northfield's motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and, as discussed below and in 
Northfield's prior briefing, summary judgment should be granted. 
B. The acts for which ICRMP seeks coverage predate Northland's coverage, and Northland has 
no contractual obligation to reimburse ICRMP. 
The claims alleged by Mr. Paradis arise out of a single nucleus of allegations - the 
investigation, arrest, and conviction of Mr. Paradis in 1980 and 1981. The crux of Mr. Paradis' 
claims is the non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence by the Paradis defendants at the time of his 
conviction, and that the Paradis defendants continued to withhold such evidence. All of these 
allegations predate Northfield's 2000-2001 policy, and even predate Kootenai County's 
participation in ICRMP, which was not even created until 1985. 
The guiding Idaho case in this matter is Kootenai County v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 
113 Idaho 908,750 P.2d 87 (1988). The holding of the Idaho Supreme Court is clear: 
An insurer is not liable "for claims arising out of an event or 
accident which occurred prior to the effective date of the insurance 
coverage, even though damages and claims continued to accrue 
from this cause during the later period of coverage." 
113 Idaho at 915 (quoting Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Corn., 507 F. Supp. 59,62 
(W.D. Pa. 1981), aff d 676 F.2d 56 (31d Cir. 1982))(emphasis added). In its brief, Plaintiff relies 
on cases that address accrual dates for the purpose of determining statute of limitations 
application. These cases have no bearing on the triggering of insurance coverage, a critical 
point that, for example, the Third Circuit has emphasized. City of Erie, Penns~lvania v. 
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Guarantv Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 156, 161-62 (31d Cir. 1997) ("Reliance on the commencement 
of the statute of limitation is not dispositive in determining when a tort occurs for insurance 
purposes. Statutes of limitation and triggering dates for insurance purposes serve distinct 
functions and reflect different policy concerns."); accord, Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. 
Zurich American Ins:Co., 471 F.Supp. 1011, 1015 (S.D.Ala.1979) ("cases dealing with the 
determination of the date or occurrence of a continuing injury or disease for the purpose of 
applying appropriate statute of limitations are not controlling for purposes of determining 
insurance coverage"), 
One of the primary reasons to distinguish between insurance and statute of limitations 
triggers is what is known as the "unwary insurer." As the Third Circuit explained: 
The other theme is that reliance on the "time of favorable termination" to trigger 
liability has unwise policy implications, for it allows tortfeasors with information 
about their own potential iiability to shift the burden to unwary insurance 
companies. As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted, " ... a contrary 
rule might well enable plaintiffs to lull an unwary insurer into extending coverage 
after they perceive an impending difficulty from a suit in which they are already 
engaged." Royal Indemnity, 979 F.2d at 1300. See also Royal Indem. Co. v. 
Werner, 784 F.Supp. 690, 692 (E.D.Mo.1992) ("Under this interpretation an 
individual who sees that his lawsuit may spawn a malicious prosecution claim 
cannot pwchase insurance and shift his obligation to an unwary insurer."); 
Harbor Insurance Co., 211 Ca1.Rptr. at 910 (Under minority rule, "tortfeasor 
could purchase a policy such as this after committing the tort and thereby enjoy 
excess coverage for its yet-to-be unfolded consequences."); Muller, 232 A.2d at 
175 ("To hold that coverage existed in such a case would mean that such a 
tortfeasor could purchase coverage a day before the injured person was acquitted 
in the criminal proceeding and thus shift the burden of damages to an unwary 
insurance company."). 
. . .  
The concerns about "the unwary insurer" are well-founded. Malicious prosecution 
is an intentional tort-the plaintiff must prove malice in order to prevail. As a 
theoretical matter, of course, a municipality that intends maliciously to bring 
criminal charges against a person may shift the burden of liability to an unwary 
insurance company even under the majority rule, by purchasing an occurrence 
policy the day before charges are filed. See Roess, 383 F.Supp. at 1235. 
Notwithstanding this observation, we believe it is more likely that an 
unscrupulous insured would purchase insurance after rather than before the 
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initiation of a questionable prosecution. This counsels adoption of the majority 
rule. 
Id. at 160-61. This is exactly what has happened here. What plaintiff proposes is a textbook 
example of the "unwary insurer": Northfield being subjected to a claim which occurred 20 years 
earlier. ICRMP does not assert that Kootenai County's insurer($) prior to the formation of 
ICRMP - the insurers at the time of the alleged bad acts -are responsible for coverage. ICRMP 
does not assert that any other insurer after the formation of ICRMP - for any other policy year - 
is responsible for coverage while Mr. Paradis remained in prison, while the allegedly responsible 
individuals continued to withhold exculpatory evidence. Rather, ICRMP baldly asserts - 
contrary to Idaho law and the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Western Casual*/ - that the only 
insurer responsible for the $1.2+ million in damages and defense fees and costs is the insurer 
who had the misfortune to issue a policy for the time that Mr. Paradis happened to be released, 
more than 20 years after he was arrested. 
The allegations in the Paradis Complaint and First Amended Complaint allege acts 
occurring in 1980 and 1981, acts that are intentional in nature', or acts committed by individuals 
after having left the employment of Kootenai County (such as defendant Haws, who left county 
1. Which, under the Northfield policy, are excluded: 
TI-IIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY - to any Claim for damages, whether 
direct or consequential, or for any cause of action which is covered under any 
other Section of this policy or 
A. to personal injury or property damage which the Assured intended or 
expected or reasonably could have expected but this exciusion shall not apply to 
personal injury resulting from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or 
property. 
Affidavit of Brian Martens in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Martens Aff."), Exh. A, at p. 16. 
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employment in 1983); or were simply in furtherance of, or justification for, the original failure 
to disclose exculpatory evidence in 1980-81. None of the alleged acts fall within the coverage 
provided by the 2000-2001 Northfield policy, or any prior policy. Plaintiff points to language in 
the Paradis Amended Complaint which alleges violations of the duty to train and duty to 
disclose (per w) that were "continuing for years" after 1980 and 1981. Plaintiffs Memo at 
18. This argument fails for two reasons: first, these allegations, at most, assert only "damages 
and claims" that continued to accrue after arising out of an event or accident which occurred 
prior to Northfield's policy coverage, for which coverage is precluded by virtue of Western 
Casualt.~ second, any ongoing "failure to disclose/failure to train" terminated with the discovery 
of the exculpatory evidence (the Haws notes) in January 1996 (Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385, 
392 (9th Cir. 1997)) - again, years before the Northfield policy was issued. 
ICRMP undertook a gratuitous defense of the Kootenai County defendants regarding the 
1980 & 1981 occurrences, and is now attempting to make Northfield pay for ICRMP's own 
decision. Indeed - in a point not addressed by plaintiff - ICRMP itself initially denied the 
Paradis claim because the acts did not occur when it insured Kootenai county: 
The date of loss for this claim is June 24, 1980 (the date that Deputy Prosecutor 
Hawes learned of the exculpatory evidence and did not turn it over to Paradis's 
attorneys). This date could be stretched to the date of Paradis's conviction on the 
murder charge, which would have occurred in 1981, but that would still be well 
outside the retroactive date of the Policy. 
2. Plaintiff focuses on the later allegations against defendant Haws as justification for providing a defense, such as 
"continuing negligence on the part of Mr. Haws surrounding his alleged failure to disclose evidence which would 
have exonerated Paradis" and as "Haws continued to conceal evidence while he [Paradis] was in prison attempting 
to challenge his conviction through the appellate and habeas corpus litigation." Plaintiffs Response to 
Northland/Northfield Insurance Companies' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs Memo") at 19. However, 
it is undisputed that Mr. Haws left the employment of Kootenai County in 1983 (even prior to the formation of 
ICRMP), and acts alleged after that date could not have occurred while acting as an employee of the county, and 
thus, he would not be an insured under  an^ ICRMP policy for acts undertaken by hi after 1983. Aff~davit of 
Counsel in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Counsel Aff."), Exh. DD, at 11. 121:s-7; Counsel Aff., Exh. 
E,fjll3. 
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Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Company's Motion 
for Summary Judgment ("Counsel Aff."), Exh. K (November 20, 2001 letter from Richard 
Ferguson, ICRMP, to Dennis Molenaar, Kootenai County). Plaintiff defends its defense in the 
Paradis litigation with an almost absolutist view: "Northfleld makes the generalized statement 
that an insurer's duty to defend is not absolute. Other than restating the general rule that an 
insured must establish an affirmative link to coverages afforded by the policy, Northfield 
provides no other guidance for this proposition[.]" Plaintiffs Memo at 11. More correctly, this 
"generalized statement" is an express statement of law made by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
"However, the insurer's duty to defend is not absolute." Black v. Fireman's Fund American Ins. 
Co., 115 Idaho 449, 455, 767 P.2d 824, 830 (Ct. App. 1989). The Idaho Supreme Court later 
-
explained that the generally broad duty to defend, under Idaho law, "clbes not require an 
insurance company to file a declaratory judgment ;.: every instance, even though it believes there 
is no potential for coverage, and then tender a defense until the lack of coverage is established." 
Hovle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 371, 48 P.3d 1256, 1260 (2002). An insurer is 
simply not bound to defend in every instance an insured is sued. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
ruled that, while a broad duty to defend exists, an insurer has the right to parse the allegations 
underlying a complaint to determine whether a duty to defend exists in a specific case: 
The FSI Complaint makes no express claim for negligence. Hoyle and HA11 argue 
that a broad reading of the FSI complaint reveals a potential claim for negligence, 
evidenced by the use of the words "including but not limited to" and the 
allegations including breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of statutory duties, implied contract, 
and conversion. 
These arguments are unpersuasive. Every claim in the FSI complaint alleges the 
acts in question were committed in a "fraudulent, improper and illegal" manner. 
Despite this, Hoyle and HA11 go on to argue that the word "improper" includes 
negligence. This is also unpersuasive because in every instance it is used, it is 
paired with the term "fraudulent." Also, the term "improper" is in no way 
synonymous with the word "negligent." Hoyle and HA11 argue Idaho law, namely 
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Kootenai County, requires the complaint to be read in whole or in part, and the 
district court failed to follow the latter part of this disjunctive rule. While 
Kootenai County does require the Complaint to be read in whole or in part, there 
are no parts of the complaint that reveal any potential claims for negligence. The 
use of the terms "improper", "illegal", "inconsistent with general industry 
standards", and "including but not limited to", read in part, are still insufficient to 
find a claim of negligence. 
Hoyle and HA11 also point to paragraph 71 of the FSI complaint, citing the 
language which alleges numerous "failures" to take certain actions. While this 
language sounds similar to that of a claim for negligence, this "failure" language 
clearly comes under a claim for breach of contract, in which Hoyle and HA11 
breached the contract by their failure to act. 
Hoyle and HA11 assert the claims for implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and the breach of a fiduciary duty encompass negligence. An implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim sounds in contract. When an errors 
and omissions policy, such as the policy in the instant case, excludes intentional 
acts from coverage, an intentional breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing claim, as alleged by FSI, does not give rise to the duty to defend. See 
Intermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 125 Idaho 182, 186, 868 P.2d 
5 10, 5 14 (Ct.App. 1994). Furthermore, although the breach of a fiduciary duty 
sounds in tort, and can be actionable for either intentional or negligent breaches of 
such duties, it is clear from the complaint that FSI is not alleging the breach of 
these duties were committed in a negligent manner. The complaint specifically 
alleges these duties were breached by "fraudulent, improper and illegal business 
activities and pursuits." Thus, FSI's claim for the intentional breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty does not give 
rise to a duty to defend. See Id. 
14oyle and HA11 assert the facts behind FSI's pleading reveal negligent acts. Even 
if the facts behind the FSI complaint might disclose negligent acts, it is irrelevant. 
This Court has previously rejected this argument in Construction Management v. 
Assurance Company of America, 135 Idaho 680,23 P.3d 142 (2001). Pursuant to 
Construction Management, an insurer does not have to look beyond the words of 
the complaint to determine if a possibility of coverage exists. Id. at 684, 23 P.3d 
at 146. 
Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho at 372-73. 
The broader, and indeed only, point with respect to defense in this case is whether 
defense costs are reimbursable as covered claims under Northfeld's policy. Under the 
Northfield Policy, ICRMP was required to defend all claims that might involve the Northfield 
Policy: 
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It is understood that all claims under this policy shall be serviced 
by I.C.R.M.P.'s Claims Department who shall perfonn the 
following duties: 
A. Investigate and settle or defend all claims or losses - it is 
understood that, when so requested, the I.C.R.M.P. Claims 
Department will afford Underwriters any opportunity to be 
associated with them in the defense or control of any claim, suit or 
proceeding. 
Martens Aff., Exh. A, at p. 5 (emphasis added). Reference by plaintiff to the ICRMP policy in 
the duty to defend context - and the election to defend under that policy by ICRMP - is simply 
of no relevance to the present action. Further, plaintiffs suggestion that defendant acquiesced in 
ICRMP's defense (including costs and selection of attorneys) of ICRMP's own SIR, for purposes 
of application to the Northfield Policy (e.g., Ferguson Aff., 774-5), is incorrect; ICRMP elected 
to defend its own policy of its own accord, which decision is of no bearing on Northfield's 
obligation to reimburse for claims within the scope of Northfield's policy, and which was a 
defense ICRMP intended on defending, irrespective of the Northfield's position.3 
The question is whether or not the claims are covered by the Northfield policy; as 
discussed above, they are not4 Accordingly, Northfield has no obligation to reimburse ICRMP 
for defense costs, let alone the cost of a settlement for an occurrence which is not covered under 
Northfield's policy. ICRMP's own analysis of its own policy or duties has no bearing on 
Northfield's coverage. Accordingly, Northfield should be granted summary judgment because 
3. Note, again, that Northfield was apparently not notified of the exhaustion of ICRMP's SIR until June 27, 2006, 
aper ICRMP had expended $423,305.33 in defense costs, exceeding its SIR layer by $273,305.33. Complaint, Exh. 
F. 
4. In the Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Ferguson 
Aff."), Mr. Ferguson suggests that Northfield acceded to the defense provided to the Paradis defendants. Ferguson 
Aff., 714-5. Of course, Northfield's obligation to reimburse, if any, would have only been triggered by the 
exhaustion of ICRMP's SIR of $150,000. However, Northfield was not notified of any such exhaustion until 
lCRMP had expended $423,305.33 in defense costs, exceeding its SIR layer by $273,305.33. Martens Aff., Exh. C. 
To the extent Northfield may have been denied an opportunity to manage defense costs upon the exhaustion of 
ICRMP's SIR by virtue of the delayed notice of the potentially reimbursable costs, Northfield should not be 
responsible for any such costs incurred prior to tender. 
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the events, happenings, and failure to disclose evidence by the Paradis defendants were not a 
covered occurrence under any Northfield policy. 
C. The Northfield policy is not reinsurance 
In a continuing effort to avoid the fatal effect of Kootenai Countv v. Western Casualty, 
ICRMP argues that the Northfield policy provides coverage as reinsurance. 
In support of its claim, plaintiff identifies a single instance in the Northfield policy where 
the word "Reinsured" is used in an introductory passage. Plaintiffs Memo at 29. From this, 
plaintiff asserts that an ambiguity has arisen, requiring the entire insurance contract to be 
construed in ICRMP's favor, despite plaintiffs apparent concession that the Northfield policy 
has no follow-the-form provision, and no follow-the-fortunes provision. This is a nonsensical 
reading of the policy, and disregards Idaho law. See, e.g., Cascade Auto Glass. Inc. v. Idaho 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d 751, 754 (2005) ("In construing an 
insurance policy, the Court must look to the plain meaning of the words to determine if there are 
any ambiguities. This determination is a question of law. In resolving this question of law, the 
Court must construe the policy "as a whole, not by an isolated phrase.") (emphasis added) 
(internal citations omitted). In the present case, the plaintiff has proposed an almost complete 
evisceration of the terms of the Northfield policy, not by focusing on a single isolated phrase, but 
on a single isolated word. Such a result is patently absurd, and this Court should reject plaintiffs 
argument. 
1. There is no follow-theyorms provision. 
Plaintiff concedes that there is no follow-form language in the Northfield policy. 
Plaintiffs Memo at 32 ("The fact a follow the form clause does not exist in the Northfield 
policy. ..."). Instead, plaintiff argues that the language is "very similar," implicitly asserting that 
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the net result is a rewriting of the Northfield policy, in its entirety, into a policy governed by the 
language of the ICRMP policy and ICRMP's own interpretation thereof. 
This disregards the language of Northfield's policy, which does not even reference the 
ICRMP policy, as a traditional reinsurance (or excess) policy would do. Martens Aff., Exh. A. 
Moreover, a comparison of the language of the two policies demonstrates that the coverages are, 
in fact, different in key areas. For example, with respect to the definition of "occurrence" under 
Section I1 coverage, the ICRMP policy provides, in relevant part, that: 
All personal injuries to one or more persons and/or property damage arising out of 
an accident or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be 
deemed one occurrence. 
Counsel Aff., Exh. I, at p. 14 (emphasis added). The Northfield "single occurrence" provision, 
however, incorporates more than just "accidents" and "continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions": 
All personal injuries to one or more persons and/or property damage arising out of 
an accident or a happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions shall be deemed to be one occurrence. 
Martens Aff., Exh. A, at p. 6 (emphasis added). Thus, the breadth of the Northfield "single 
occurrence" provision dictates that a wider swath of claims arising from a common nucleus of 
facts is deemed to be a single occurrence. 
Similarly, Northfield's intentional act exclusion, which is also at issue in this litigation, is 
broader than that provided by ICRMP. ICRMP's policy provides, under the Section I1 
exclusions: 
Liability Coverage under the Comprehensive General Liability Insuring 
Agreements does not apply: 
. . .  
2. To personal injury or property damage resulting from an act or omission 
intended or expected from the standpoint of any insured to cause personal 
injury or property damage. This exclusion applies even if the personal injury or 
property damage is of a different kind or degree, or is sustained by a different 
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person or property, than that intended or expected. This exclusion shall not apply 
to personal injury resulting from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or 
property, or in the performance of a duty of the insured. 
Counsel Aff., Exh. I, at p. 16 (emphasis added). Again, the parallel Northfield policy exclusion 
is broader in what is excluded: 
THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY - to any Claim for damages, 
whether direct or consequential, or for any cause of action which is 
covered under any other Section of this policy or 
A. to personal injury or property damage which the Assured 
intended or expected or reasonably could have expected but this 
exclusion shall not apply to personal injury resulting from the use 
of reasonable force to protect persons or property. 
Martens Aff., Exh. A, at p. 16 (emphasis added). 
The policies may be parallel in structure and some language, but the Northfield policy is 
not a duplicate of the ICRMP policy. The Northfield policy simply cannot he construed to be a 
subservient echo of the ICRMP policy, especially in the absence of any follow-the-form 
provision or any mention of the ICRMP policy, within the terms of the Northfield policy.5 
Accordingly, plaintiff's argument on this point fails. 
2. There is no follow-the;fortunes provision, nor does the follow-theyorms doctrine 
api.lv. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that no follow-the-fortunes provision appears in the Northfield 
policy. Rather, plaintiff asserts that it should be imputed. The Michigan Court of Appeals 
addressed a similar argument and rejected it: 
5. Although not expressly stated, the tenor of portions of the briefmg and Ferguson Aff. suggests a "reasonable 
expectation" argument - that is, that ICRMP thought it was purchasing reinsurance, and that Northfieid is foreclosed 
from disputing coverage based upon that expectation. However, Idaho does not recognize the "reasonable 
expectations" doctrine. See Rvals v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 302, 304, 1 P.3d 803, 805 (2000) 
("The traditional rules of  contract construction avoid the danger of a court creating a new contract between the 
parties by relying on the notion of reasonable expectations."); accord Walls v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 119 Idaho 160, 
804 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1991). Additionally, such an argument rings hollow, given that the plaintiff itself is an 
insurer, and not an unsophisticated layman - if plaintiff had wanted a standard follow-the-form, follow-the-fortunes 
reinsurance policy, it certainly could have purchased such a policy. 
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Although the "follow the fortunes" doctrine is applicable in those instances where 
such a clause is part of the agreement, we are confronted in this appeal with the 
broad contention that such a provision is to be read into every reinsurance 
contract. In advancing this proposition, the court below relied heavily on Int'l 
Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters & Underwriting Syndicates at 
Lloyd's of London, 868 F.Supp. 917 (S.D.Ohio, 1994), wherein a federal district 
court in Ohio ruled that even in the absence of express contract language, "the 
'Follow the Fortunes' doctrine applied to all reinsurance contracts." Id. at 920. As 
authority to support its ruling, the federal district court cited three cases. 
However, we note that in each of those cases, the reinsurance contract at issue 
contained specific language indicating incorporation of the "follow the fortunes" 
doctrine. See Mentor Ins. Co. (UK) Ltd. v. Brannkasse, 996 F.2d 506,516 (C.A.2, 
1993) ("The parties agree that the contract contains a 'follow the fortunes' 
clause."), Unigard Security Ins. Co., Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 762 F.Supp. 
566, 586 (S.D.N.Y., 1991) ("The Certificate binds Unigard to 'follow the 
fortunes' of North River on the Owens-Coming risk by providing that '[all1 claims 
covered by this reinsurance when settled by worth River] shall be binding on the 
Reinsurers, who shall be bound to pay their proportion of such settlements.' "), 
and Christiania General Ins Corp of New York, supra at 280 ("The parties' 
contract states that '[tlhe reinsurance provided under this certificate shall follow 
coverage of [Great American's] policy."). 
FNl. Under California law, the doctrine may be implied in a contract of 
reinsurance by evidence that a custom or usage exists to "follow the 
settlements" of the reinsured. Nat? American Ins. Co. of Calfornia v. 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 93 F.3d 529,537 (C.A.9, 1996). 
In this appeal, MTPP concedes that the reinsurance contract at issue "does not 
contain a specific 'follow the fortunes' clause." Moreover, MTPP is unable to 
point to any Michigan authority for support of its position that such a provision 
should be read into the policy. Indeed, we find that Michigan guidance points in 
the opposite direction. In Michigan Miners, supra, this Court addressed a dispute 
between two insurance companies under a contract of reinsurance. The reasoning 
and cxplanation of reinsurance law provided by the Michigan Millers Court is 
particularly instructive in this setting. There, our Court pointed to 19 Couch, 
Insurance, 2d, 5 80.66, pp. 673-674, to emphasize that "[tlhe extent of the liability 
of the reinsurer is determined by the language of the reinsurance contract, and the 
reinsurer cannot be held liable beyond the terms of its contract merely because the 
original insurer has sustained a loss." Id. at 414, 452 N.W.2d 841. At another 
point in Michigan Millers, this Court stated: 
Although it is true that parties may agree to such terms in reinsurance as 
will bind the reinsurer to the settlement or adjustment of loss made between 
the parties to the original insurance, 19 Couch on Insurance 2d, 5 80.13, p. 
631, we will not impose liability on the reinsurer for a settlement 
contribution absent such an agreement. [ Id. at 41 7-4 18,452 N. W.2d 841 .] 
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Such statements respecting reinsurance are completely consistent with a plethora 
of Michigan cases in the field of insurance law. For example, in Lehr v. 
Professional Underwriters, 296 Mich. 693, 697, 296 N.W. 843 (1941), our 
Supreme Court stated: "The liability was limited in the policy. To hold otherwise 
would be to write a new contract for the parties. This we have no right to do." See 
also Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Churchman, 440 Mich. 560, 566-567, 489 N.W.2d 
431 (1992); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 438 Mich. 197, 207, 476 
N.W.2d 392 (1991); Fragner v. American Community Mut. Ins. Co., 199 
Mich.App. 537, 542-543, 502 N.W.2d 350 (1993); North River Ins. Co. v. 
Endicott, 151 Mich.App. 707,712,391 N.W.2d 454 (1986). 
After careful consideration, we conclude and hold that the learned trial court erred 
in reading into the reinsurance contract at issue in this case a "follow the fortunes" 
clause that was not agreed to by the parties. 
Michigan TD. ~Gicipating Plan v. Federal Ins. Co., 592 N.W.2d 760,764-65 (Mich. App. 1999). 
The Michigan court's refusal to rewrite an insurance agreement to disregard agreed-to 
contractual terms echoes Idaho law: "Where policy language is found to be unambiguous, the 
Court is to construe the policy as written, 'and the Court by construction cannot create a liability 
not assumed by the insurer nor make a new contract for the parties, or one different from that 
plainly intended, nor add words to the contract of insurance to either create or avoid liability." 
Purvis v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 213,216, 127 P.3d 1 16, 119 (2005). 
This is especially true where the policies lack concurrency of coverage. For example, in 
applying the follow-the-fortunes doctrine, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York stressed: "Thus, assuming concurrency of coverage, when a ceding company enters 
into a settlement that is grounded on a reasonable interpretation of its own policy, the reinsurer 
may not avoid liability by raising policy defenses and objections that were available to the 
cedent," having earlier remarked that "concurrency between the insurance and reinsurance 
policies is a what makes reinsurance work[.] Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. 
Supp. 1328, 1337 & 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (also discussing the necessity of a "mirror image 
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b h a n g e  in the policy of reinsurance" if the underlying policy is changed; otherwise, the 
"operation of concurrency breaks down."). 
In the present case, there is no follow-the-fortunes provision, so Idaho law does not 
permit one to be grafted in; further, the follow-the-fortunes doctrine would be otherwise 
inapplicable as there is not a concurrency in coverage between the ICRMP and the Northfield 
policies. Accordingly, plaintiffs argument on this point fails, and defendant should be granted 
summary judgment6 
D. Plaintiffs continuing. tort analysis is inavvlicable to the action at bar. 
As previously explained by defendant, reliance upon continuing tort analysis in the 
statute of limitations context is of no aid in an insurance coverage-trigger context. Compare 
Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9" Cir. 1982) (cited by plaintiff, but noting 
that "the relevant strain of continuing violation doctrine is that a systematic policy of 
discrimination is actionable even if some or all of the events evidencing its inception occurred 
prior to the limitations veriod.")(emphasis added) with City of Erie, Pennsvlvania v. Guarantv 
Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.2d at 161-62 ("Reliance on the commencement of the statute of limitation is 
not dispositive in determining when a tort occurs for insurance purposes. Statutes of limitation 
and triggering dates for insurance purposes serve distinct functions and reflect different policy 
concerns."). 
Plaintiff maintains its argument that a continuing tort theory applies to the allegations 
made in this action via reliance, in large part, upon cases premised on long-latency injuries, such 
6. Plaintiff also disputes Northfield's right to reimburse for covered claims, but not for uncovered claims. Again, 
the Northfield policy provides for reimbursement of expended defense costs for "claims under this policy." Martens 
Aff., Exh. A, v. 5. Although avvarentlv an oven auestion in Idaho. other iurisdictions allow for limitine 
- .. v 
reimbursement to only covered claims. see, e.g., Cornm\rcial Ca~ital  ~ k k c o w .  &c. v. St. Paul Mercurv Ins. Co., 
419 F. Supp.2d 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Lockwood Intern.. B.V. v. Volm Bag Co.. Inc., 273 F.3d 741 (7' Cir. 2001). 
However, at this stage in the litigation, this question is likely premature, as it is largely a question limited solely to 
an evaluation of any damages. 
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as toxic torts. At least one court has explained why a claim such as malicious prosecution is not 
analogous to asbestos/toxic tort-type claims: 
Our Supreme Court has thus far adopted the "multiple trigger" theory to 
determine the occurrence of injury for insurance coverage purposes only in cases 
involving toxic torts. See J H  France Refractories v. Allstate Insurance Co., 534 
Pa. 29, 626 A.2d 502 (1993). The "multiple trigger" theory is applied in latent 
disease cases, like asbestosis or mesothelioma, because such injuries may not 
manifest themselves until a considerable time after the initial exoosure causing ,., 
injury occurs. The overriding concern in latent disease cases is that application of 
the D'Auria "first manifestation" rule would allow insurance companies to 
terminate coverage during the long latency period (of asbestosis); effectively 
shifting the burden of future claims away from the insurer to the insured 
(manufacturers of asbestos), even though the exposure causing injury occurred 
during periods of insurance coverage. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. ofNorth 
America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C.Cir.1981). 
Here, we are not faced with a situation where the injuries, occasioned by the ton, 
lay dormant for extended periods. When the allegedly wrongful suit is filed, the 
injuries caused by the tort-humiliation, damage to reputation, suspense, physical 
hardship and legal expenses-manifest themselves and become evident to a 
reasonable defendant and, by implication, to the initiator of the wrongful 
proceedings. Moreover, there is no intervening time period between the filing of 
the allegedly wrongful suit and the manifestation of the injury that would allow a 
risk aversive insurance company to terminate coverage.FN7 
FN7. Our research has not uncovered a single jurisdiction that has adopted 
the "multiple trigger" approach in a case involving inalicious prosecution. 
We conclude that the "first manifestation" rule applies and now hold that the tort 
of Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings occurs for the purpose of determining 
insurance coverage when the allegedly wrongful suit is filed. Because neither the 
INA nor Selective policies were in effect at the time the allegedly wrongful suit 
was filed, neither is required to defend and indemnify appellants in the underlying 
suit for Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings. 
We additionally note that strong policy considerations underpin our decision to 
apply the "first manifestation" rule to cases involving Wrongful Use of Civil 
Proceedings. The adoption of a "multiple trigger" approach or one which triggers 
insurance coverage at the "time of favorable termination" would allow a 
tortfeasor with knowledge of his own potential liability to shift this burden to an 
unwary insurance company. Such an outcome would contravene the well- 
established rule that a person may not insure against an injury that has already 
occurred. See Appalachian Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 676 
F.2d 56 (3rd Cir.1982). 
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Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 710 A.2d 82, 87-88 (Pa. 
Super. 1998). 
Plaintiff first relies on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision in Wisconsin Electric 
Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 142 Wisc. 2d 673, 419 N.W.2d 255 (1987). The facts 
outlined in that matter demonstrate that it is a long-latency trespasslnuisance variety of action: 
Although the facts of this case are complicated, they are not in dispute. In 1970, 
WEPCo installed a three-phase power supply to the dairy farm of Wallace and 
Joan Daggett (the Daggetts). Shortly after this new electrical source was installed, 
the Daggetts began noticing unusual behavior on the part of their cows including 
nervousness, a decline in milk production, failure to breed, ill health and 
sometimes death. In 1981, the cause of these problems was determined to be 
stray voltage from the new three-phase power supply. In 1982, WEPCo altered 
the power system and the problems with the dairy cows ended. 
419 N.W.2d at 675-76 (emphasis added). In fact, the court noted the difficulty in identifying the 
precise date of injury: 
The term "occurrence" as applied to the present case is ambiguous. In the usual 
case, there is little dispute as to when an injury occurs when dealing with a 
common injury or accident. However, with this type of injury, there is 
considerable dispute as to when the injury is deemed to occur. It is therefore 
our duty to determine what a reasonable person in the position of the insured 
would have understood the words to mean. 
Id. at 680 (emphasis added). 
Such an analysis is equally true of Keene Corn. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 
F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), an asbestos case relied upon by plaintiff and by the Wisconsin 
Electric court. In that case, the court discussed the difficulty in identifying a trigger date in 
analyzing insurance coverage: 
The language of each policy at issue in this case clearly provides that an "injury," 
and not the "occurrence" that causes the injury, must fall within a policy period 
for it to be covered by the policy. Most suits brought under this type of policy 
involve an injury and an occurrence that transpired simultaneously, or, at least, in 
close temporal proximity to one another. In cases involving asbestos-related 
disease, however, inhalation-the "occurrence" that causes the injury-takes 
place substantially before the manifestation of the ultimate injury-asbestosis, 
mesothetioma, or lung cancer. Furthermore, although it is not known how little 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES' MOTION F O ~  0 0 17 5 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 19 
exposure is required to cause disease, inhalation may occur over a long period of 
time. As a result, inhalation may continue through numerous policy periods, the 
disease may develop during subsequent policy periods, and manifestation may 
occur in yet another policy period. For an insured such as Keene, different 
insurers are likely to be on the risk at different points in the development of each 
plaintiffs disease. Moreover, part of the development may occur at a time when 
no insurer was on the risk. Asbestos-related diseases, which are certainly covered 
by the policies, therefore differ from most injuries and hence present a difficult 
problem of contractual interpretation. 
667 F.2d at 1040 (emphasis added). 
Nor do extrapolations of Idaho decisions assist plaintiff in this matter. Plaintiff relies, in 
part, on Unigard Ins. Co. v. USF&G, 111 Idaho 891,728 P.2d 780 (Ct. App. 1986), where the 
court examined whether the damaging of 98 doors in a four hour period would constitute a single 
occurrence or multiple occurrences for the purposes of determining the number of deductibles 
that might be applicable (whether one per door, or one for the entire incident). The court 
explained: 
The most recent formulation, and the approach that we find most u se l l  for cases 
of the present type, has been termed the "functional event" or "continuous 
process" test. It focuses not upon the individual events of damage but upon the 
underlying cause. The critical inquiry is whether or not the damage-causing 
process was continuous and repetitive. 
11 1 Idaho at 893. In fact, the court's application of the continuing process test supports 
defendants' position in this matter. The crux of this action is the alleged bad acts by the 
defendants in the Paradis litigation in withholding exculpatory evidence from Mr. Paradis 
beginning before the trial, which resulted in Mr. Paradis being wrongfully imprisoned for 
approximately 20 years. The "underlying cause," the focus of any such continuous process test, 
is the allegedly wrongful actions taken over 25 years ago, long before the inception of ICRMP, 
and before the issuance of any Northfield policy. Moreover, the court cautioned: 
We recognize, of course, that neither the continuous process approach nor any 
other approach derived from case law should be applied if the insurance policy 
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itself contains a dispositive definition of "occurrence" or "accident." As 
mentioned earlier, the policy in this case does not contain such a definition. 
11 1 Idaho at 894. In the present case, "occurrence" is defined in the Northfield Policy. Martens 
Aff., Exh. A, at p.6. Specifically, the policy provides: 
For Section 11, "occurrence" means an accident or a happening or event or a 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in personal injury or 
damage to property during the policy period. All personal iniuries to one or more 
persons and/or property damage arising out of an accident or a happening or event 
or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be deemed to be one 
occurrence. 
Id (emphasis added). Thus, Unigard also supports Northfield's position, not plaintiffs. 
Plaintiff also cryptically cites two opinions that are cross-ways with its position that the 
2000-2001 Northfield policy is the policy which must cover all of the claimed damages, despite 
Mr. Paradis' assertion that the wrongful acts commenced with his arrest in June 1980. In 
Dioceses of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8" Cir. 1996), the court 
applied Minnesota law to find that the repeated sexual abuse of a child constituted "one 
continuing occurrence." Id at 1391. In doing so, the court held that multiple insurers could be 
held responsible for policies covering certain portions of time during the 1979-1987 span of the 
abuse. Id at 1395-96. In doing so, the court went on to note: 
The parties agree that Mrozka's abuse began in October 1979 and continued until 
February 1987. Thus, it is undisputed that Mrozka suffered "actual injury" in all 
policy periods, tri gering the coverage of all such policy periods. See NSP, 523 
N.W.2d at 663.&' We have determined, however, that there was no covered 
"occurrence" for purposes of insurance coverage for the Archdiocese after 
December 1980, thus, the only insurance coverage triggered are those in effect 
from October 1979 through December 1980: Aetna's through August 30, 1980, 
and Lloyd's and Interstate's commencing September 1, 1980. 
FN11. Furthermore, as we discussed in footnote 5, supra, the court in NSP 
also held that in situations in which multiple policies involved where 
there was one continuous occurrence, the courts should apply one full 
SIR or limit to each separate policy period. 523 N.W.2d at 664. Thus, 
under the rationale set forth in NSP, the Archdiocese must assume the 
retained limit with respect to each of the triggered policies. 
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Under NSP, where insurers are held consecutively liable, and there is no evidence 
allocating the timing of actual damages, the proper method is to allocate damages 
pro rata by each insurer's "time on the risk." 523 N.W.2d at 662 (citing Insurance 
Co. of N. Am, v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.1980), 
amended, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109, 102 S.Ct. 
686, 70 L.Ed.2d 650 (1981)). Each triggered policy, therefore, bears a share of the 
total damages proportionate to the time period it was on the risk relative to the 
time period coverage was triggered. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1224. 
The Archdiocese must bear its share of the liability risk for the period in which it 
had no insurance coverage-that is, after December 1980. Id 
Adamson's abuse of Mrozka lasted 89 months, from October 1979 through 
February 1987. Aetna insured the Archdiocese from September 1979, through 
August 1980; thus, it is "on the risk" for eleven of 89 months. Lloyd's and 
Interstate insured the Archdiocese from September 1980 through December 1980, 
which is the time when Adamson's abuse of Mrozka was no longer an occurrence 
for the purposes of coverage. Thus, Lloyd's and Interstate are "on the risk" for 
four of 89 months. 
A judgment was rendered against Aetna for $41,422. This is not contested on 
appeal. The math used to reach the verdict was based on the Archdiocese being 
responsible for 45 percent of the state court verdict of $924,570 FN'2 resulting in 
the sum of $416,056.50. When this sum is proportioned over 89 months, the 
allocation per month is $4,674. When multiplied by the eleven months Aetna was 
on the risk the overall liability is $51,422. Subtracting the Archdiocese's $10,000 
SIR, the amount owed by Aetna is $41,422. 
Id. at 1396. Thus, Dioceses actually contemplates a scenario where, if applied here, would 
implicate all policies - including Kootenai County's pre-ICRMP coverage - commencing with 
Mr. Paradis' damages, rather than the single policy damage assignment forwarded by plaintiff in 
this action. Even assuming the application of the Minnesota "continuing occurrence theory" in 
the present case, Mr. Paradis claimed damages from June 1980 (the date of his arrest) until April 
2001 (the date of his release), a period of 20 years & 10 months (250 months total). The 
amounts expended in defense and settlement here total approximately $1,223,305.33. 
(Complaint, $XXI & Exh. F:) The amount allocated per month would be $4,893.22; the 
Northfield policy at issue would put Northiield "on risk" for 12 of the 250 months, for a total on- 
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risk allocation of $58,718.64. As ICRMP's SIR ($150,000) would be triggered for that policy 
period, Northfield would owe no reimbursement arn~unts .~ 
Despite the logic of the risk allocation found in the Dioceses case, there is nothing under 
Idaho law that would suggest its rationale would or should be adopted here. Instead, in this case, 
the entire controversy and the Paradis complaints go back to the failure to disclose and his 
consequent conviction. He was ultimately released and exonerated of murder because of the 
initial failure to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence. 
Finally, the Curtis v. Firth decision is not as broad as plaintiff suggests, as demonstrated 
by the recent McCabe v. Craven decision by the Idaho Court of Appeals. P.3d -, 2007 
WL 1229095 (Ct. App., April 19,2007). In McCabe, an inmate was held for 228 days beyond 
the expiration of his sentence; he filed suit alleging a variety of claims, including cruel and 
unusual punishment, and due process and equal protection, based upon his claims that he had 
been wrongfully imprisoned. Id. at *l. Complicating the inmate-plaintiff s claims was the fact 
that he filed two years from the last date of his incarceration; the district court held that his 
claims had been barred by the statute of limitations, based upon an earlier claimed discovery 
date. Id. at *2. The Court of Appeals clarified the breadth of its application of continuing tort 
concepts: 
7. Countv of Suffolk v. Travelers ins. Co., 267 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) appears to support a similar result. 
In that matter, suit, was filed regarding alleged property damage as the result of a sea wall allegedly poorly 
constructed some 35 years earlier. Id. at 290-9 1. The court ultimately found an issue of material fact with respect to 
several policy years from two separate insurers, rather than a single policy to which the damage could be 
attributable. Additionally, note that the policies at issue in Countv of Suffolk appear to lack the "occurrence" 
definition proviso that "All personal injuries to one or more persons andlor property damage arising out of an 
accident or a happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be deemed to be one 
occurrence" as is present in the Northfield policy. Note that this was a special caveat raised by the 
Casualtv Ins. Co. v. Citv of Mt. Vernon, 128 A.D.2d 332, 515 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1987) decision, wherein the court 
carefully noted that ""there is nothing in the policy which requires, as a prerequisite to ascertaining whether there is 
coverage, that the injury resulting from a causative event he reduced to a single or fixed occurrence in time." 515 
N.Y.S.2d at 270. The other deficiencies regarding Mount Vernon have previously been addressed by defendant. 
See Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed December 12,2006, at 22-24. 
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As we explain, McCabe's allegedly wrongful incarceration presents tortious 
conduct that is serial in nature, although a recurring wrong does not in itself 
justify characterization as a continuing tort.FNS ee Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 
603-04, 850 P.2d 749, 754-55 (1993). In continuing tort or continuing wrong 
cases, it is the cumulative effect of a continuous chain of tortious activity that 
causes injury, id., and the wrongful acts must be so numerous and continuous that 
it is impractical to allocate damages across them. Heard, 253 F.3d at 318-19. 
"Since usually no single incident in a continuous chain of tortious activity can 
'fairly or realistically be identified as the cause of significant hann,' it seems 
proper to regard the cumulative effect of the conduct as actionable." Curtis, 123 
Idaho at 603, 850 P.2d at 754 (quoting Page, 729 F.2d 818, 821-22 
(D.C.Cir.1984)). 
FN5. The Idaho Supreme Court has characterized the doctrine of continuing 
violation as a doctrine of accrual and has cited with approval to its 
description by one federal court. See Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 603, 
850 P.2d 749, 754 (1993) (quoting Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 
821-22 (D.C.Cir.1984)). Our point of accrual analysis being the same under 
section 1983 and the ITCA, we therefore uniformly apply the common law 
doctrine of continuing violation to McCabe's federal and state claims. 
The wrongful incarceration alleged here is not the type of continuing conduct 
irreducible to particular wrongful acts. McCabe reasonably could have 
commenced his action on the first day of wrongful imprisonment (or when he 
reasonably should have discovered the injury), rather than waiting until after his 
last day of imprisonment. Unlawful imprisonment is unlike the uncompleted 
construction project or the intentional infliction of emotional distress justifying 
application of the continuing tort doctrine in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 
P.2d 685 (1981) and Curtis. Thus, McCabe cannot bring suit for damages from 
any wrongful acts occurring outside the statute of limitations period. 
Our holding is in line with Cobbley v. City of Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 59 P.3d 959 
(2002), which involved a series of ongoing, discrete nuisances caused by dust 
from speeding cars. While the Cobbley Court recognized that a continuing 
nuisance is in some ways analogous to a continuing tort, the Cobbley Court 
implicitly recognized an important difference. In true continuing tort cases such as 
Farber and Curtis, where the wrongful acts are not reasonably reducible to 
individual causes of actions, the plaintiff can capture acts outside the filing period 
so long as any portion of the cumulative conduct occurs within the statutory 
limitations period. This "reach back" effect was not applied, however, to the 
continuing nuisance in Cobbley and should not apply to other serial violations 
consisting of fairly identifiable and actionable wrongs, each of which cause 
discrete injury. Cobbley, 138 Idaho at 158-59, 59 P.3d at 963-64. 
In National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-121 (2002), the 
United States Supreme Court similarly distinguished a series of discrete acts, such 
as weekly discriminatory paychecks, from a hostile working environment in 
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which the injurious employment practice cannot be said to occur on any particular 
day. Under this dichotomy, the Court held that "discrete discriminatory acts are 
not actionable if time barred,FN6 even when they are related to acts alleged in 
timely filed charges." Id. at 113. 
FN6. As the Court reminded, "this time period for filing a charge is subject 
to equitable doctrines such as tolling or estoppel." National R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) 
For purposes of accrual, we conclude that each day of allegedly wrongful 
imprisonment in the instant case was analogous to receiving a discriminatory 
paycheck or enduring another day of a continuing nuisance. Each new day that 
McCabe was wrongfully imprisoned represents another day on which the 
statute of limitations begins to rumFN7 Having waited until two years after 
the last day of his imprisonment to file his complaint, McCahe's action may 
proceed on his claim for damages but only for one day of wrongful 
imprisonment-March 7,2003. 
FN7. This is not to suggest that the wrongfully imprisoned are permitted to 
sleep.on their rights while accruing damages. Because the writ of habeas 
corpus for sentence miscalculation, I.C. § 19-4203(2), provides a means for 
relief from wrongful imprisonment, the affirmative defense of laches may 
be asserted when necessary to prevent abuse of our holding here. 
Id at *3-4 (emphasis added). Thus, McCabe demonstrates that Idaho views the continuing tort 
concept - in the statute of limitations context - more narrowly than proposed by plaintiff. 
However, discussion of Curtis and McCabe is an academic point, as neither Curtis nor McCabe 
has any application in an insurance-trigger context, unlike the more specific (and controlling) 
Western Casualty decision. Kootenai County v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 1 13 Idaho at 1 13 ("An 
insurer is not liable 'for claims arising out of an event or accident which occurred prior to the 
effective date of the insurance coverage, even though damages and claims continued to accrue 
from this cause during the later period of coverage.')(emphasis added). 
Accordingly, this Court should reject plaintiffs argument on this point. 
E. Northfield has not waived anv right to dispute the settlement amount, but more 
imvortantlv. that claim or issue raised bv ICRMP is not material to whether there is 
coverage under the Northfield policv. 
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Lastly, plaintiff asserts that because Northfield has contested any obligation to reimburse 
ICRMP for the Paradis matter, it has waived any right to contest the reasonableness of the 
Paradis ~ettlement.~ ICRMP's argument on this point is nothing more than a "red herring," 
attempting to divert attention from the issue of whether there is coverage under Northfield's 
policy. If there is no coverage or obligation to reimburse ICRMP for any amount expended, an 
argument that because Northfield denied coverage prohibits it from contesting the amount of 
settlement is quite irrelevant. 
In any event, in making such argument, plaintiff relies upon Exterovich, 139 Idaho 439 
(2003), which addressed the consequences of an insurer's refusal to defend in light of an 
insured's admission of liability. The applicability of the Exterovich holdings in the present 
action is somewhat dubious, given that: a) Exterovich addressed only the consequence of a 
failure to defend - here, Northfield has no duty to defend; b) Exterovich only addresses an 
admission of liability, and not the actual money amounts expended in settlement - here, plaintiff 
seeks to expand Exterovich to foreclose discussion of the settlement amounts; and c) Exterovich 
still requires that a settlement be "reasonable": "The breach of the duty to defend does not 
prevent the insurer from later providing a defense, although in this case ICRMP would be bound 
by the City's admission of liability as long as it was potentially liable and such admission was 
a reasonable settlement." Id. at 442. The right of an insurer to dispute the reasonableness of a 
settlement is simply not foreclosed following a denial of coverage. See, e.g., Nova v. A.W. 
Coulter Trucking, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 589-90 (Cal. App. 2006) ("We note that Zurich will not 
be deprived of an opportunity to contest the amount of the settlement in a subsequent action for 
bad faith. When an insurance carrier has denied coverage and a defense, 'a reasonable settlement 
8. Plaintiff does not, apparently, dispute Northfield's right, if found to have breached its reimbursement duty, to 
challenge the reasonableness of the defense fees and costs incurred in the defense of the Paradis action. 
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made by the insured to terminate the underlying claim against him may be used as presumptive 
evidence of the insured's liability on the underlying claim, and the amount of such liability."'); 
Connecticut Indemn. Co. v. Perrotti, 390 F. Supp. 2d 158, 170 (D. Conn. 2005)("'It is well 
settled that when an insurer improperly fails to defend an insured who subsequently settles the 
case with the injured party, the insurer is estopped from raising the issue of the insured's liability 
as a defense to the action arising from an insurer's failure to defend. ... Nevertheless, the 
[insured] is required to prove that the settlement - whether it be by stipulated judgment or 
otherwise -was reasonable."'); Detroit Edison Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 301 N.W.2d 832, 
836 (Mich. App. 1980) (" Because Edison did not enter into the settlement with Tocco until after 
the declaratory judgment action had been decided in circuit court, Mutual has not had an 
opportunity to present evidence to show that the settlement was unreasonable or made in bad 
faith or that there was no liability. Before a judgment for the amount of the settlement is entered 
against Mutual, -Mutual should be allowed to attempt to make such a showing. . . . In view of the 
ambiguity in the complaint against Edison as to whether supervisory or non-supervisory 
negligence was being alleged, Mutual should also be permitted to attempt to show that, even 
though Edison was liable to Tocco, Edison's liability was not covered by the policy issued by 
Mutual."). As further explained by the Third Circuit, in the reinsurance context: 
But while a 'follow the fortunes' clause limits a reinsurer's defenses, it does not 
make a reinsurer liable for risks beyond what was agreed upon in the reinsurance 
certificate. In that regard, the reinsurer retains the right to question whether the 
reinsured's liability stems from an unreinsured loss. A loss would be unreinsured 
if it was not contemplated by the original insurance policy or if it was expressly 
excluded by terms of the certificate of reinsurance. 
North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (31d Cir. 1995). 
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For an analogous Idaho example, although this action does not involve any breach of the 
duty to defend by Northfield, Idaho has been loath to impose estoppel as a punitive measure to 
grant fees and costs where an insurer has refused to defend: 
The Hirsts urge that we should adopt an alternative to the Afcan approach. 
They cite what might be characterized as the "Illinois rule." That rule holds that 
where the insurer violates its duty to defend, the insurer is estopped to deny 
coverage-thereby invoking the following broad measure of damages to the 
insured: (1) the costs of defending the suit; (2) the amount recovered from the 
insured, either by way of judgment or settlement; and (3) any additional damages 
caused by the insurer's breach of contract. See, for a recitation of the elements of 
the Illinois rule, Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 at 1184 (7th 
Cir. 1980). 
We decline to adopt the Illinois rule. We question the propriety of utilizing 
a form of estoppel as a punitive measure against an insurer for breach of a 
contractual duty to defend. Rather, we believe the sanctions for that breach should 
be governed by ordinary principles of contract law. In Idaho, the purpose of 
awarding damages for breach of contract is to fully recompense the non-breaching 
party for its losses sustained because of the breach, not to punish the breaching 
party. Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796,606 P.2d 90 (1980). 
Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 792,799,683 P.2d 440,447 (Ct. App. 1984) 
In Mr. Ferguson's affidavit, plaintiff attempts to make an initial showing of the 
reasonableness of the settlement. However, as previously explained to the Court, plaintiff has 
not provided defendant with a number of long-outstanding discovery items related to the 
litigation and settlement of the Paradis matter, including: 
1) All exhibits to the depositions taken in the Paradis matter; 
2) A fully executed copy of the Paradis settlement agreement between 
Kootenai County and Mr. Paradis; 
3) Copies of correspondence between the parties to the Paradis matter 
relating to such settlement; 
4) Copies of the settlement agreement(s) in the Paradis action relating to Mr. 
Haws and Mr. Elliott; and 
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5) Mediation statements from the Paradis matter. 
See also Memorandum in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Companies' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, at pp. 49-50. Although plaintiff wishes to demonstrate the reasonableness 
of the settlement at this juncture, plaintiff has withheld documents necessary to analyze that 
issue, rendering defendant unable to fully and fairly respond to such assertions. Further, based 
upon the documents currently in hand, there is a suggestion that the settlement was unreasonable: 
although Paradis was settled for $800,000 under the 2000-2001 ICRMP policy, such policy only 
provides for $500,000 each loss/occurrence combined single limit for Section IIA & C (and 
Secton IV) coverages "for claims brought pursuant to Title 6, Ch. 9, Idaho Code" (the Idaho Tort 
claims act -Mr. Paradis filed a Notice of Tort Claim with Kootenai County on October 9, 2001 
(Counsel Aff., Exh. D, at 117)), potentially reflecting a payment by ICRMP in excess of its own 
limits, especially where, as here, ICRMP asserts that all damages are attributable to a single 
"occurrence" during the ICRMPINorthfield coverage period (2000-2001). Counsel Aff., EEx I, 
at D-2. Additionally, as discussed earlier, Northfield's obligation to reimburse, if any, would 
have been triggered by the exhaustion of ICRMP's SIR of $150,000 - however, Northfield was 
not notified of any such exhaustion until on or about June 27,2006, after ICRMP had expended 
$423,305.33 in defense costs, exceeding its SIR layer by $273,305.33. Complaint, Exh. F. 
Moreover, these issues are not salient to the scope of defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, and should be ignored at the summary judgment stage of proceedings. See, e.g., 
Proeressive Ins. Co. v. Universal Cas. Co., 807 N.E.2d 577, 589-90 (Ill. App. 2004) ("However, 
the considerations affecting the voluntariness of a settlement, such as whether an excess insurer's 
anticipation of liability was reasonable and whether the settlement was arrived at in good faith, 
are, like the issue of notice, questions of fact not appropriately determined at the summary 
judgment stage of the proceedings."). 
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As such, the Court should disregard plaintiffs arguments on this point, and grant 
defendant's motion for summary judgment 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, defendant Northfield should be granted summary judgment, 
and plaintiffs Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Northfield's policy simply does 
not provide coverage of ICRMP for the Paradis action, ICRMP's costs of defense, or any 
amount above its SIR which ICRMP paid. 
e DATED this day of May, 2007. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
UNDERWRITERS, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, I Case No. CV-OC-Obi-) P la 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants. 
Hearing Date: May 17,2007 
Attorneys: Plaintiff-Donald J. Farley (Hall Farley) 
Defendants-Phillip J. Collaer (Anderson, Julian, & Hull) 
Hearinn Purpose: Defendant Northland's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Before the court for decision is Defendant Northland's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
I. FACTSANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND: 
This case arises out of an insurance coverage dispute. The central controversy arises 
from a lawsuit filed in Federal Court by Donald M. Paradis against various Idaho Counties Risk 
Management Program Underwriters' ("ICRMP) insureds, including Kootenai County, and other 
individuals. During the relevant periods, ICRMP purchased what it is calling reinsurance from 
Defendant Northland' ("Northland). ICRMP defended its insureds in the Paradis lawsuit under 
a reservation of right's. Northland has denied coverage, taking the position that the Northland 
policy does not cover the occurrence in question. 
ICRMP was created in 1985 and sold insurance to its member insureds. During that 
period ICRMP purchased what it describes as "rein~urance"~ from ~ o r t h l a n d . ~  In 2003, Donald 
Paradis filed a complaint in the Federal District Court for the District of Idaho alleging, inter 
alia, false arrest, false imprisonment, detention, and negligence, all of which were alleged 
violations of his federally protectedcivil rights and state law. Following the filing of the Paradis 
Complaint, Kootenai County forwarded the Complaint to ICRMP for its review and 
determination on a duty to defend. Upon review of the Complaint, ICRNlP determined that 
based on the facts and legal theories alleged there was a legal duty to defend on the claims of 
negligent and intentional inflictions of emotional distress and failure to train. The duty to defend 
was held with a reservation of rights which was forwarded to Northland. 
' Northland Insurance Company is also identified as Northfield Insurance Company. For purposes of this motion, 
the Court will use Northland to reference both in keeping with the symmetry of the pleading caption. 
2 ICRMP describes the supplemental insurance as reinsurance while Northland would characterize the insurance 
olicy as reimbursement insurance. 
'ICRMP argues that this insurance was purchased from its inception while Northlaud argues that company records 
indicate that policies were issued to ICRMP for 1986-1988 and 1994-2001. 
After ICRMP undertook the defense of the Paradis litigation, motions to dismiss were 
filed and granted in part in that case. The Court therein declined, however, to dismiss the 
constitutional claims and the state law claims which were based upon continuing torts. Soon 
thereafter, Mr. Paradis filed an amended complaint clarifying the legal theories and factual 
allegations against the ICRMP insureds. ICRMP's determination that it had a duty to defend did 
not change.4 
Before the Court is Defendant Northland's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a 
determination that there was no "occurrence" during the Northland Policy period and as such, no 
duty to indemnify f i r  either the settlement or defense. This Court has previously deteimined on 
summary judgment that ICRMP had a duty to defend in the Paradis action.. 
11. DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS: 
In bringing the motion for summary judgment, Northland's focus is on the alleged lack of 
coverage for the ICRMP Paradis settlement and the costs incurred in the defense of that action. 
Specifically, Northland argues the claims in Paradis which were resolved by settlement - Count 
I ($1983: Failure to Train re: Brady) against Kootenai County; Count X(1) (Negligent Infliction 
of Emotional Distress) against Haws; and Counl X(2) (Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress) against Haws- are not covered under either Section I1 or Section IV~ of the Northland 
Policy. Northland also argues the defense costs incurred by ICRMP are not covered under the 
Northland Policy, either for the period following the filing of the first Paradis Complaint or the 
P ICRMP found that a duty to defend resulted only on three of the surviving claims, Count I ( 5  1983: Failure to Train 
re: Brady) against Kootenai County; Count X(1) (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) against Haws; and 
Count X(2) (Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress) against Haws. These are the only Counts considered by the 
Court. 
During oral arguments all parties agreed that Section IV is not at issue and therefore the Court will not address 
whether Section IV was triggered or the impact of that Section on this action. 
period following the filing of the First Amended Complaint in Parudis. Finally, Northland 
attempts to characterize the policy as a reimbursement policy because the Northland Policy lacks 
the hallmarks of reinsurance, in that it does not contain follow-the-form, or follow-the-fortunes 
clauses of the ICRMP policy, so claims made against it must instead be analyzed under the 
Northland Policy's own coverage terms and conditions. 
111. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS: 
Initially, ICRMP reiterates the duty i t  had to defend Kootenai County against the 
Paradis complaint! ICRMP then argues that the Amended Complaint describes an occurrence 
which caused personal injury during the Northland and ICRMP policy periods. Specifically, 
ICRMP argues that the resulting injuries were continuing torts which are covered "occurrences" 
as defined in the general liability insuring agreement. Finally, ICRMP argues that the Northland 
policy contains all of the classic hallmarks of reinsurance. That is, that the policy achieved 
concurrency between the coverage's afforded by the primary and reinsurance policy, that 
Northland policy required ICRMP to "investigate and settle or defend all claims or losses." 
(Northfield Policy, p. 5). 
IV. LEGAL STANDARD: 
Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings, 
affidavits, and discovery documents ..., read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002) 
During the course of the hearing, Northland conceded that it would withdraw the defense of ICRMP2s duty to 
defend in the Purndis case. This stipulation has been reduced to an Order Granting Plaintiff's Partial Motion f o ~  
Summary Judgment dated May 29,2007. 
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the 
nonmoving party has failed to show an element essential of her case as to which the nonmoving 
party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 
(1986).~ 
The burden of proving the absence of material fact is placed upon the moving party. 
Thoinas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557, 562 (2002); 
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868, 452 P.2d 362, 365 (1969); 
Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572,577.97 P.3d 439,444 (1969); Thomson, 137 Idaho at 476, 
50 P.3d at 491. In Celotex, the U.S. Supreme Couri held that there is no need to negate the 
nonmoving party's case; instead, the moving party's burden is discharged when she shows there 
is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Meanwhile, the 
adverse party may not rest on "mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must respond, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). See Thomas, 138 Idaho at 205; Thomson, 137 Idaho at 
476, 50 P.3d at 491; Blickenstaff, 140 Idaho at 577, 97 P.3d at 444. The adverse party must 
make more than just "conclusory assertions" and, indeed, a mere scintilla of evidence is not 
enough. Blickenstafi 140 Idaho at 577,97 P.3d at 444. 
In making its determination, the court must consider all affidavits, depositions, and 
interrogatories in conjunction with the pleadings and, in effect, "pierce the formal allegations." 
Petricevich, 92 Idaho at 868. Evidence should be considered in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party (Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)), meaning 
7 Summary judgment, as a procedural mechanism, is not to be regarded as a "disfavored procedural shortcut," hut 
instead an "integral" component of the rules of civil procedure, "designed 'to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action."' Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (citing F.R.C.P. 1). This is equally true for 
summary judgment as found in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which is an identical procedural mechanism and 
is intended to serve the same role as its federal counterpart. 
summary judgment is improper "if conflicting inferences could be drawn from the record and 
reasonable people might reach different conclusions." Thomas, 138 Idaho at 205. If the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains on which the 
court may then enter summary judgment as a matter of law. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 
138 Idaho 443,445,65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003). 
V. ANALYSIS: 
Three issues have been raised by the Parties. First, the Court will address whether there 
was an occurrence under the Northland Policy and the date of the occurrence. Second, the Court 
will determine whether there is a duty to indemnify ICRMP for its' defense of the Paradis suit. 
Finally, the Court will address the issue of whether the Northland Policy can be classified as 
reinsurance. 
The court will note at the outset lhat the legal questions are complex and the law unclear. 
It is understandable that two excellent attorneys are in disagreement on the legal interpretations 
of these issues. 
A. "Occurrence" Under the Northland Policy: 
At issue is Northland's occurrence policy covering the period from October 2000, 
through October 2001. "An 'occurrence' policy protects the policy holder from liability for any 
act done while the policy is in effect." St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry, 438 
U.S. 531, 535 n.3, 98 S.Ct. 2923,2927 n.3 (1978). The Northland policy provides under Section 
I1 as follows: 
This Section applies only to bodily injury, personal injury or property damage 
which occur during the policy period and arise out of an occurrence which takes 
place within the territorial scope of the Policy. 
A. COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY: Underwriters hereby 
agree, subject to the limitations, terms and conditions hereunder 
mentioned, to indemnify the Assured for all sums, including expenses, all 
as more fully defined by the term ultimate net loss, which the Assured 
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages imposed by law because 
of bodily injury, property damage, personal injury, advertising injury, 
products liability and or completed operations hostlliquor liability or 
incidental malpractice which result from an occurrence and which occur 
during the policy period. 
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT LIABILITY: Underwriters hereby agree, 
subject to the limitations, terms and conditions hereunder mentioned, to 
indemnify the Assured for all sums which the Assured shall be obligated 
to pay by reason of errors, omissions or negligent acts arising out of the 
performance of the Assured's duties while acting as a law enforcement 
official or officer in the regular course of public employment as 
hereinafter defined, arising out of any occurrence from any cause on 
account of Personal Injury, Bodily Injury, Property Damage, Violation of 
Civil Rights or First Aid, happening during the period of this insurance 
except as covered under Section I1 A and B. 
(Northland Policy, p. 13). The policy goes on to further define an "occurrence" as: 
For Section 11, "occurrence" means an accident or a happening or event or a 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in personal injury or 
damage to property during the policy period. All personal injuries to one or more 
persons andlor property damage arising out of an accident or a happening or event 
or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions shall be deemed to be one 
occurrence. 
(Northland Policy, p. 6). 
Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law, which this Court freely 
reviews. AMCO Iizs. Co. v. Tri-Spur Inv. Co., 140 Idaho 733, 739, 101 P.3d 226, 232 (2004). A 
policy "is ambiguous if 'it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations."' Cascade Auto 
Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660,663, 115 P.3d 751,754 (2005). Any 
ambiguities in an insurance policy must be construed against the insurer; however, a court should 
not torture the language to create an ambiguity where none exists. Farmers Itzs. Co. of Idaho v. 
Talbot, 133 Idaho 428,435,987 P.2d 1043,1050 (1999). However, where the policy language is 
clear and unambiguous, "coverage must be determined in accordance with the plain meaning of 
the words used." Mutual of Enurnclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 235, 912 P.2d 119, 
122 (1996). Only where reasonable intelligent men, considering the word in the context of the 
entire policy, would honestly differ as to its meaning, will an ambiguity be found. Id. 
Here, the Northland policy is clearly an occurrence policy based on the unambiguous 
language and the applicable policy provisions, considered in their entirety. No ambiguity exists 
in the policy language and it is clear that only acts done while the policies were in effect were 
covered. Each policy specifically focuses on the act causing injury as the coverage "trigger" and 
specifically requires this injury to occur during the applicable policy period. 
Of central focus is when did the tortious conduct "occur" for purposes of insurance 
coverage? Much has been made about the difference between claim accrual for purposes of the 
statute of limitation and an occurrence for purposes of insurance coverage. The distinction is 
important and has been more fully discussed by other courts: 
Reliance on the commencement of the statute of limitation is not dispositive in 
determining when a tort occurs for insurance purposes. Statutes of limitation and 
triggering dates for insurance purposes service distinct functions and reflect 
different policy concerns. Statutes of limitation function to expedite litigation and 
discourage state claims. But when determining when a tort occurs for insurance 
purposes, courts have generally sought to protect the reasonable expectations of 
the parties to the insurance contract. Because of this fundamental difference in 
purpose, courts have consistently rejected the idea they are bound by the statutes 
of limitation when seelung to determine when a tort occurs for insurance 
purposes. 
City of Erie, Pennsylvania v. Guaranty Nut. Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 156, 161-62 (3rd Cir. 1997) 
(citations omitted). As indicated by other courts, it is irrelevant to the analysis whether aclaim is 
preserved for purposes of pursuing the claim. At issue here, is who will cover the tortious 
conduct based on the insurance contract. 
In order for the Court to establish whether there was an occurrence within the policy 
period, as such, the Court must first, identify the occurrence and then, determine when it took 
place. Generally, an occurrence is determined by the cause or causes of the tortious conduct. 
That is, the Court is to determine if there was "but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing 
cause which resulted in all of the injuries and damage." Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3rd Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). In applying this test, the Court finds 
that there was only one proximate cause for the wrongful imprisonment of Mr. Paradis and the 
damages that resulted from it; the failure to make the Brady disclosures and therefore, the failure 
to train properly regarding the Brady disclosures. It was this failure that caused the errors that 
led to the wrongful imprisonment in Idaho and the resulting infliction of emotional distress 
claims. Had the Brady training occurred, the exculpatory evidence should have been disclosed 
preventing the imprisonment of Mr. Paradis in Idaho and accordingly, his emotional distress 
claims. For that reason, the Court views the occurrence as being the failure to train regarding 
Brady requirements. 
However, the crucial issue is determining when the occurrence took place because only if 
it took place within the policy period is Northland required to cover the Paradis suit. While the 
law is less than clear on the issue, the Court has reviewed other cases that can be applied by 
analogy to determine that the occurrence here was about 1980 to 1981, that is when the failure to 
train regarding Brady disclosures occurred. The Court will set forth the reasoning below. 
In Appalachian Insurance Co., the court was faced with a similar determination of the 
time period in which an occurrence had resulted leading to the injury. There the injury of 
discriminatory employment policies were first adopted in 1965 but the results of the policies 
were not felt until some years later, with the injury being a continuous one. The timing of the 
occurrence was important as multiple insurance policies could be triggered. In addressing when 
the injury had occurred, the Court adopted the "effect" test ultimately holding that "the 
occurrence [took] place when the injur[y] first manifest [itself]." Id. at 63. The Court reasoned 
that the injuries to the employees occurred immediately upon the promulgation of the 
discriminatory policies not when the impact of those illegal policies was felt or the damage 
resulted. Id. 
In Kootenui County v. Western Cus. and Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908,750 P.2d 87 (1988), the 
Idaho Supreme Court faced the question of whether an improper execution sale which occurred 
about six months prior to the effective date of an occurrence policy was a covered occurrence 
because the effects or damages were realized during the insurance policy period. In Kootenai 
County, the sheriff negligently conducted an execution sale without complying with the statutory 
requirements concerning notice. The dispute arose because two policies could potentially be at 
risk to cover the injury because a second policy was secured about six months after the sheriff's 
failures but during the period of time when the damages became apparent. In determining when 
the event occurred for purposes of coverage, the Idaho Supreme Court held "[aln insurer is not 
liable 'for claims arising out of an event or accident which occurred prior to the effective date of 
the insurance coverage, even though damages and claims continue to accrue from this cause 
during the later period of coverage."' Id. at 915, 750 P.2d at 94 (citing Appalachian Ins. Co. v. 
Liberty Mutual Ins. Corp., 507 F.Supp. 59, 62 (W.D.Pa. 1981) (aff'd, 676 F.2d 56 (3rd Cir. 
1982). 
It is these two cases that the Court finds most persuasive in holding that the occurrence 
here happened when Kootenai County initially failed to train its' employees regarding the Brady 
disclosures. While the failures where alleged to have been on-going by Mr. Paradis, the fact 
remains, that much like the Appalachian employment manual, the initial failure to train resulted 
in the continuous injuries, this was the period when the injury was first manifest. The resultant 
situation was that an injury was manifest in 1980 with damages and claims continuing to accrue 
up until the release of Mr. Paradis from the penitentiary. Simply put, this is not a situation where 
the cause of the injury is difficult to ascertain and would be properly applied using the 
continuous torts doctrine. Rather, there was a single occurrence that had a continued and lasting 
effect causing many years of damage. As such, the Court finds that no coverage exists for 
ICRMP under the Northland policy because there was no occurrence during the policy period. 
ICRMP advanced a theory that the Northland policy covered the tortious conduct because 
the actions were continuous torts and the language within the policy states, ". . . an accident or 
happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in personal 
injury or damage to property during the policy period." (Northland Policy, p. 6). However, the 
Court's reading of this provision acknowledges a continuous or repeated exposure but the 
follows up with the modifier that the injury results "during the policy period." Id. The Court 
finds that the continued exposure must occur during the policy period. Again, the focus is on 
when the injury manifest itself not that the injury continued into the policy period. It is the 
Court's view that coverage will be provided for a multitude of events, so long as they occur 
while the policy is in effect. 
B. Indemnity for ICRMP's Defense: 
The next issue which must be addressed is whether Northland was required to reimburse 
ICRMP for defending against the Paradis suit. Similar to the above disc'ussion if there was no 
coverage under the Policy, there would likewise be no duty to reimburse for defending against a 
claim not covered by the policy. Again, Northland, when it issued the coverage, agreed to 
"indemnify . . . for all sums, including expenses . . . which the Assured shall become legally 
obligated to pay as damages imposed by law." (Northland Policy, p. 13). If there is no 
coverage, it follows that there can be no legal obligation to indemnify because there would be no 
legal obligation to pay. As such, because the triggering occurrence happened outside the policy 
period, there would be no legal obligation to indemnify or reimburse for defending against the 
Paradis suit. 
C. Reinsurance Issue: 
While the issue of whether the Northland Policy can be characterized as reinsurance or 
reimbursement insurance, the distinction is irrelevant at this point in time. Upon a closer review 
of Northland's papers, the Court would acknowledge that the issue, while discussed at length, 
appears to be a discussion of the Policy in response to issues raised in ICRMP's prior partial 
motion for summary judgment. Of note is the first line in Northland's opening brief wherein 
they state, "Plaintiff has previously asserted that the Northfield Policy is 'reinsurance."' 
(Northland Memo in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 47). The discussion appears to be 
directed at illustrating the distinction but not for purposes of summary judgment. This is true 
especially in light of the conclusion of the discussion where no request for summary judgment is 
made. This finding is further bolstered by the [act that the Conclusion makes no attempt to have 
a finding made regarding the classification of the insurance. While significant lip service was 
given to the issue, it does not appear to be an issue raised on summary judgment. Accordingly, 
the issue of whether the Northland Policy is reinsurance can be left for another day. 
VI. CONCLUSION: 
Based on the above discussion, the Court finds that there was no "occurrence" within the 
Northland Policy period and therefore, there is no duty to indemnify for either the settlement or 
the defense costs. Also', the Court will not address whether the Northland Policy is reinsurance. 
Accordingly, Defendant Northland's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in full. 
Dated this 61h day of June, 2007 
Darla Williamson, District Judge 
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2. Said Appellant has a right to  appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment and order described in Paragraph 1, above, is an appealable order under 
and pursuant to  IAR I I (a)( l ) .  
3. A preliminary statement of issues on appeal: 
(a) Whether the District Court erred by granting the Respondent's 
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(i) Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson in Opposition to ICRMP's Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed April 23, 2007; 
(j) Order Granting Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
June 6, 2007; 
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Summary Judgment dated June 11, 2007. 
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and hereby requests additional documents to be included in the Clerk's Record on Appeal, in 
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plaintifflappellant's Notice of Appeal. Specifically defendantlrespondent Northfield requests the 
following documents be added: 
1. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
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4. REPLY ~~E.MORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ICRMP'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, filed December 19,2006; 
5. DEFENDANT NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES' REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
RULE 5 6 ( ~ )  I.R.C.P. MOTION RE: IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
UNDERWRITERS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, filed January 17, 
2007; 
6. AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD J. FARLEY IN FURTHERANCE OF DEFENDANT NORTHLAND'S 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
UNDERWRITERS, 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE 
COMPANIES. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-oc 06171 12 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTION TO COSTS 
The Court heard argument on Plaintiff's Objection to Costs on September 12,2007.. 
Appearing on behalf of Plaintiff was Mark Sebastian, and Bryan A. Nickels appeared on behalf 
of the Defendants. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: 
This case was a breach of indemnity contract claim against Defendant ~orthland. '  
Plaintiff ICRMP sought to enforce a contract clause that obligated Northland to "indemnify 
[ICRMP] for all sums which [it] shall be obligated to pay by reasons . . . of negligent acts arising 
1. Northland Insurance Company is also identified as Northfield Insurance Company. The Court will use 
Northland to reference both in keeping with the symmetry of the pleading caption. 
out of [ICRMPI's duties . . . ." during the policy period.2 The issues discussed before dismissal 
were: 1) whether ICRMP was required to defend Kootenai County in the Paradis lawsuit;' and 
2) whether the Paradis settlement and related defense costs were covered by Northland's policy 
with ICRMP. On May 15, 2007, the Court granted ICRMP's partial motion for summary 
judgment and determined that ICRMP was required to defend Kootenai County in the Paradis 
lawsuit. On June 11, 2007, the Court granted Northland's motion for summary judgment and 
determined that the Paradis lawsuit was not covered by the Northland policy because no 
"occurrence" happened during the policy period, and thereby dismissed the complaint. 
Before the court is Northland's request for fees and costs in the amount of $1,524.23. 
Northland filed a memorandum of costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d) supported by an affidavit on 
June 25, 2007. Northland claims $58 in filing fees and $173.40 for the costs of exhibits- 
specifically six affidavits-as costs as of right.4 The affidavits were calculated at .10 per page, 
with one copy for the Court and one for opposing counsel. Northland further requests $1,292.83 
in discretionary costs, including: photocopies/scanning at $854.10,' FedEx at $37.63, PACER 
records regarding the Paradis lawsuit at $108, Westlaw at $292.04, and $1.06 in long distance 
phone calls. Northland has included the affidavit of Bryan A. Nickels in support of these costs, 
and also Exhibit A in camera, which includes an itemized billing summary. 
LEGAL STANDARD & ANALYSIS: 
The determination of costs is left to the sound discretion of the district court. Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare v. Southfork Lumber Co., 123 Idaho 146, 149,845 P.2d 564, 
2. (Martens Aff., Ex. A, at 17., Dec. 12,2006) Clause "A-Comprehensive General Liability" provided that 
Northland agreed to "indemnify the Assured for all sums, including expenses . . . which the Assureds shall become 
legally obligated to pay as damages imposed by law. . . ." Id. 
3. Northland specifically denied this: "Plaintiff undertook the defense of Kootenai County and its employees 
and settled with Paradis without contractual obligation to do so [therefore] Defendant has no obligation to indemnify 
or reimburse Plaintiff." (Answer 6.) 
4. Affidavits in support of Defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion: 1) Donald J. Farley on December 11,2006 (15 
pages) and; 2) on January 17,2007 (8 pages). Affidavits in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment: 1) Donald J. Farley on March 1,2007 (460 pages); 2) Bryan A. Nickels on March 1,2007 (74 pages) 
and; 3) Brian R. Martens on and March 1,2007 (155 pages). Affidavit in support of Defendant's Objection to 
PlaintifF's Motion for Summary Judgment: 1) Brian R. Martens on December 12,2006 (155 pages). 
5. 8,541 copies @ .10 per page. 
567 (1993). The burden is on the party opposing the award to demonstrate an abuse of the 
court's discretion and absent an abuse of discretion, the court's award of costs will be upheld. 
Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420,425,987 P.2d 1035, 1040 (1999); 
Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70,72,785 P.2d 634,636 (1990). 
A. Costs as a Matter of Right: 
When costs are awarded to a prevailing party, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) (1) 
(C) allows certain costs to be recovered as a matter of right. 
1. $58.00 filing fee. ICRMP concedes the $58.00 in  filing fees. 
2. Exhibit costs 
Included in this category of costs as a matter of right are "Reasonable costs of the 
preparation of . . . exhibits admitted in evidence as exhibits in a hearing. . ." 
Northland states that the Exhibit costs of $173.40 (copying costs) were necessary and not 
incurred for purposes of harassment or increasing the costs of litigation. Northland asserts that 
exhibits must be attached to an affidavit when no live testimony is allowed at a hearing and that 
affidavits in summary judgment proceedings are on par with trial exhibits. 
ICRMP argues that "exhibits" include demonstrative items or materials used by a witness 
to explain or enhance histher testimony, but does not include affidavits, which are the direct 
testimony of an individual witness. By ICRMP's reasoning, costs would be recoverable if a 
witness testified in person, but not if the witness provided testimony in writing. ICRMP further 
argues that photocopies are only allowable as discretionary costs. This argument fails, because 
I.R.C.P. 54(d) (1) (C) (10) allows charges for one copy of any deposition. To construe the rule 
to disallow exhibits attached to affidavits would remove the most obvious meaning of the rule, 
and would render the phrase "or other exhibits" a nullity. Therefore, the Court holds that 
exhibits attached to affidavits are "exhibits" for purposes of I.C.R.P. 54(d) (1) (C) (6). 
Although Northland claims costs for two copies of each exhibit, the Court will analogize 
to depositions and only allow costs for one copy. The rule allows costs for the preparation of an 
exhibit, and does not mention the costs of copies made for the other party. Northland will be 
allowed costs as a matter of right in the amount of $68.90 for one copy of each of the three 
affidavit exhibits filed with the Court in support of its motion for summary judgment.6 
B. Discretionary Costs: 
The Court may in its discretion award a prevailing party discretionary costs where there 
has been "a showing that the costs are necessary and exceptional, reasonably incurred, and 
should in the interests of justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(d) (1) (D). 
When ruling upon objections to discretionary costs, the Court is required to make express 
findings as to whether the costs are reasonable, necessary, and exceptional and should be 
awarded against the adverse party in the interests of justice. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D); Perry v. 
Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 60, 995 P.2d 816, 830 (2000) (where trial court 
failed to describe the circumstances giving rise to its allowing or disallowing certain costs the 
reviewing court could not determine if the trial court had applied the correct legal standard). 
Northland argues that the discretionary costs claimed are exceptional because it had to 
address ICRMP's partial summary judgment motion that ICRMP had a duty to defend Kootenai 
County under its own policy, which had no bearing on the decisive issue of the case, which was 
whether coverage existed under the Northfield policy. Northland argues that the costs were 
exceptional because the action was not a routine insurance matter, but instead a situation where 
ICRMF' sought coverage for an occurrence dating back two decades before the inception of the 
policy. Further, Northland argues that the underlying Paradis lawsuit required Northland to pay 
for access to federal records via PACER, and that an award of discretionary costs serves the 
interests of justice because it provides a small recovery for the expenses incurred by Northland in 
defending against matters arising 25 years ago, and required addressing matters unrelated to the 
ultimate issue of the litigation. 
ICRMP argues that discretionary costs should be denied because Northland failed to 
show that the costs were necessary and exceptional and should be imposed against ICRMP in the 
6. Affidavits in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment: 1) Donald J. Farley on March 1, 
2007 (460 pages); 2) Bryan A. Nickels on March 1,2007 (74 pages) and; 3) Brian R. Martens on and March 1,2007 
(155 pages). 689 pages @ .I0 per page. 
interest of justice. Computerized research costs should not be allowed because they are a form 
of attorney's fees rather than costs. 
The Court will now address each discretionary cost item requested. 
1. Photocopieslscans 
Northland's rationale for requesting photocopying costs is that the case was exceptional 
because it had to defend against ICRMP's motion for summary judgment. As discussed above, 
that fact does not render the case exceptional. Northland provides no other basis for deeming its 
photocopying costs exceptional. Although thousands of copies were made and more than 
$800.00 in costs are claimed, in an indemnity case such as this one involving complicated case 
law and an uncertain outcome, high copy costs are common. The photocopying costs are not 
exceptional because they exist in most lawsuits, and therefore the $854.10 in photocopying 
charges is denied. 
2. FedEx 
Although the FedEx charges may have been both necessary and reasonable, such costs 
are not exceptional. Litigation of all types commonly requires express mail service, and 
therefore the Northland's request for FedEx charges of $37.63 is denied. 
3. PACER records access 
Northland argues that because it had to access federal records while defending a state 
case, the costs to access PACER were exceptional. Referencing various documents from other 
jurisdictions, including the federal courts, is commonplace and not exceptional in litigation. 
Therefore Northland's request for PACER costs of $108 is denied. Further, fees paid for 
computer assisted research are akin lo Westlaw charges, and are not recoverable as costs. 
4. Westlaw 
I.R.C.P. 54(e) (3) (K) provides that the court will consider the reasonable cost of 
computer assisted legal research when determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. 
Because Westlaw charges fall under the category of attorney's fees and not costs, Northland's 
request for Westlaw costs of $292.04 is denied. 
5. Long Distance phone calls 
Although the long distance phone calls may have been both necessary and reasonable, 
they are not exceptional. Litigation of all types commonly requires long distance phone calls, 
and therefore Northland's request for long distance charges of $1.06 is denied. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Objection to Costs is GRANTED in part and 
DENJED in pan. Defendant is awarded costs of right of $120.90. Requested discretionary costs 
are disallowed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 13 day of September, 2007. 
A 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SE VICE 
&n&r 1 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this & day of Ck4dw 2008, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the 
manner indicated below: 
Mark Sebastian, Attorney - X U.S. Mail 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP H a n d  Delivery 
P.O. Box 7426 - Federal Express 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 Facsimile Transmission 
Brian A. Nickels, Attorney - X U.S. Mail 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 1271 - Federal Express 
Boise, Idaho 83701 - Facsimile Transmission 
Dated: 7/26/07 Signed: 
Deputy Court Clcrk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS. 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
a Minnesota corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. .. 
Supreme Court Case No. 34375 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 
November 17,2006. 
2. Affidavit of Lynnette McHenry in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, filed November 17,2006. 
3. Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Company's 
Rule 56(0 I.R.C.P. Motion Re: Plaintiff ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
filed December 1 1,2006. 
4. Affidavit of Brian R. Martens in Support of Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, filed December 12,2006. 
5. Reply Memorandum in Support of ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 
December 19,2006. 
6. Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Furtherance of Defendant Northland's Rule 56(f) Motion 
and in Opposition to Plaintiff ICRMP's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 
January 17,2007. 
7. Defendant Northland Insurance Companies' Reply Brief in Support of Rule 56(0 I.R.C.P. 
Motion Re: Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, filed January 17,2007. 
8. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Companies' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed March 1,2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
9. Affidavit of Brian R. Martens in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
March 1,2007. 
10. Affidavit of Bryan A. Nickels in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Company's 
Motion for Sumary Judgment, filed March 1,2007. 
11. Affidavit of Donald J. Farley in Support of Defendant Northland Insurance Company's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 1,2007. 
12. Affidavit of Richard B. Ferguson iq Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed April 23,2007. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this IS' day of October, 2007. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHLBITS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I Plaintiff-Appellant, I CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS, 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
a Minnesota corporation, 
Supreme Court Case No. 34375 
Defendant-Respondent. 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
PHILLIP J. COLLAER DONALD J. FARLEY 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO BOISE, IDAHO 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Date of Service: JAh 0 8 2008 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
PROGRAM UNDERWRITERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS. 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
a Minnesota corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
Supreme Court Case No. 34375 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed on the 3rd day of July, 2007. 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
JAM 2 2 ;ja 
,J. DAVID I\jAVV4RR0. Clark 
Sy A'iCONE 
DEPLJIV 
Donald J. Farley 
ISB #1561; djf@hallfarley.com 
Bryan A. Nickels 
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\2\2-241.l4\Tnanscript - Stip.doc 
Attorneys for Defendant Northland Insurance Companies, 
Properly identified as Northfield Insurance Company 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
UNDERWRITERS, 
STIPULATION RE: ADDITIONAL 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
vs. 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE 
COMPANIES, 
DefendanURespondent. 
COME NOW DefendanURespondent Northland Insurance Companies, properly 
identified as Northfield Insurance Company (hereinafter "Northfield"), and PlaintifUAppellant 
STIPULATION RE: ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - 1 00223 - "  
ANDERSON, JULIAN. HI'-- 
m o o 2  .- - 
12:35 FAX 2083445.*"* 01/22.108, , W V U  ,a. '3 & t , X  Car a j h l a u .  corn 
*,-;-'4!!,91/2008 15:24 PAX 2085 B5 J + AJH Law Fakes 
. ,  
B B L L F W Y  
Idaho Countic~ Risk Mmgemont P m m  Underwriters (hereinafter ''1CTrMP7'), pmsuant to 
1.A.R 29(a), and hereby stipulate to the addition to the transcript on apppl. SpeciBcatly, only 
the transcript for the May 17, 2007 hearing was prepared; however, defdanffrespondent 
NoMcld also requestad the preparation of the standard Repcuter's Transcript relating to the 
h d g  conducted on January 25, 2007, as per its Request for Additional Documents on 
Appeal, Bled July 26,2007. 
Accordingiy, Northfield and ICRMP stipdate that the kansoript on appeal further include 
Ihe tmwcript ofthe hearing conducted on January 25,2007. 
DATED this s h y  of~muary, 200~ .  
HALLI FARLEY, OBERRECHT 
& ELANTON, P.A. 
~ompaoios, Properly idmfilled as ~ o h d i e l d  
h u r a n o e  Company 
ANDERSON, mIAN & HULL, LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Idaho Camties Risk 
M-ernent Program UndcMxiters 
F I L E D  
Donald J. Farley 
ISB #1561; djf@hallfarley.com 
Bryan A. Nickels 
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley .corn 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West 1daho;Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:DD-241.14\MSJ - Overlength- 0rder.doc 
Attorneys for Defendant Northland Insurance Companies, 
Properly identified as Northfield Insurance Company 
NO. 
REDA.M. -&. 
JAN 2 3 2008 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IDAHO COUNTIES RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
UNDERWRITERS, 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 
NORTHLAND INSURANCE 
COMPANIES, 
Defendant. I 
Case No. CV OC 0617112 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION 
RE: ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT ON 
APPEAL 
BASED UPON written stipulation and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation Re: Additional Transcript on Appeal is 
granted. The Clerk shall cause a transcript of the January 25,2007 hearing in this matter to be 
prepared and submitted with the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript on appeal in this 
matter. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
." I DATED this&)day of January, 2008. 
,' ,< 
HON. DARLA WILLIAMSON 
District Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of January, 2008, 1 caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Donald J. Farley )(- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Bryan A. Nickels - Hand Delivered 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & - Overnight Mail 
BLANTON, P.A. - Telecopy 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Fax: (208) 395-8585 
Phillip J. Collaer 
Anderson, J u l i i  & Hull, LLP 
C.W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. Fifth St., Ste. 700 
P. 0 .  Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Fax: (208) 344-5510 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
- 
- 
Overnight Mail 
- 
Telecopy 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION RE: ADDlTIONAL TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
- 2 00226 
